STUDIES IN 

MINOR TACTICS 

1915 



(REVISED EDITION. 1916) 



PREPARFJD BY 

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART 

THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
FORT LEAVENWORTH 




SPECIAL REPRINT FOR TRAINING CAMPS 



WASHINGTON 
.OVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1917 




Class. 
Book^ 



STUDIES IN 

MINOR TACTICS 

1915 



(REVISED EDITION, 1916) 



PREPARED BY 

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART 

THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
FORT LEAVENWORTH 




SPECIAL REPRINT FOR TRAINING CAMPS 



WASHINGTON 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
1917 






D. of D, 
'UL 16 1917 



STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 
1915 



PREFACE. 



There having been an insistent demand for Studies in 
Minor Tactics, and the edition of 1908 being out of print, 
it was decided that the Department of Military Art should 
prepare a new book on the subject along somewhat different 
lines. 

With this purpose in view, Capt. E. D. Scott, Field 
Artillery; Capt. Le Roy Eltinge, Cavalry, and Capt. H. B. 
Fiske, Infantry, were designated to prepare these studies, 
each in his own arm. This they have ably done, and the 
results of their labors appear in the following pages. 

It has been the aim to teach the principles of minor 
tactics by applying them in a practical way to the handhng 
of small units, varying in size from a patrol to a regiment. 

This has been done by a series of troop-leading problems 
in which the various phases of field operations are set forth 
and commented upon, ordere being given for aU the units 
involved down to the smallest patrol. 

It is believed this book wiU prove of great value to those 
officers seeking information as to the practical handling of 
small units in field operations and of marked assistance to 
those preparing themselves for admission to the Army 
Service Schools. 

The authors desire to make grateful acknowledgment to 
Lieut. Aristides Moreno, Infantry, for his valuable assistance 
in correcting and proof reading the manuscript. Those por- 
tions of the studies referring to the sanitary dispositions are 
the work of Maj . Wilham N. Bispham, Medical Corps, to whom 
grateful acknowledgment is made. 

W. A. HOLBROOK, 

Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry, 

Senior Instructor, 
Department of Military Art. 
The Army Service Schools, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 

November 30 , 1915. 

5 



INTRODUCTION. 



In using this text nothing wiU be gained by casual or 
hurried reading. If any benefit is to be derived therefrom 
it can only be as the residt of careful and painstaking study 
of every detail. 

The reasons submitted for each action should be weighed 
in comparison with others that may appeal to the student. 
If the latter can not agree with the action taken he should 
come to a definite conclusion as to a better procedure. In 
no case shoidd the student uncritically accept the conclusions 
of the text. 

If he does not like an order as written, he should actually 
draft the one he prefers. By such criticism of the text he 
will work hirnself thoroughly into the spirit of the situation 
and, by the tactical thought required, gain the instruction 
which the authors hope to furnish simply by suggestion. 

When studying the text the student should break off 
whenever a decision or order is called for and himself write 
out that decision or that order before reading further in 
the text. He should then compare his work with the text 
and decide whether or not he is wrong, remembering that 
no two men will solve the same problem in exactly the same 
way and that he may be right and still differ materially from 
another who is also right. 

The map furnished with the text is a photographic reduc- 
tion of the 3-inch map of the same ground. Those who find 
the map trying on the eyes would do well to purchase the 
larger map, which may be obtained from the book depart- 
ment, the Army Service Schools for $1, mounted on muslin. 

In these pages the attempt has been made in each of the 
12 parts to carry a small unit of one of the three arms through 
a number of continuous situations covering a more or less 
extended period. By varying incidents presented to the 
commanders concerned the several primary forms of tactical 
procedure required of and proper for small detached units 
are illustrated and discussed and the manner indicated in 
which in service the commander's problems must shade 
into each other and liis solutions be connected into the com- 
plete leading of his troops. 
6 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

For example: Part I deals with an Infantry regiment 
which detrains, advances, reconnoiters, and attacks an enemy 
in position, pursues, halts for the night, estal)lishes outposts^ 
prepares and occupies a defensive position, withdi'aws there- 
from, and retreats. The whole covers a period of three 
consecutive days. The troop leading of thq regiment and all 
of its parts, from its reconnoitering, combat, and security 
patrols, through its company and battalion to regimental 
headquarters, is illustrated by quoting the orders issued, 
except where to do so would be a mere repetition of those 
given elsewhere. 

When an important decision is required, involving a radical 
change in tactical procedure, as from the offensive to the 
defensive, the commander's complete estimate of the situa- 
tion appears. When the new action is more in conformity 
with previously determmed policy, brief reasons only for 
the action are stated. When the reasons are obvious, the 
orders issued are permitted to speak for themselves. Finally, 
where the maim^er in which a decision is carried mto effect, 
for mstance, the conduct of the attack, does not sufficiently 
explain its technique, that phase concludes with detailed ex- 
planatory comment. To make the study complete in a par- 
ticular frequently neglected, the manner of handling the regi- 
ment's sanitary personnel, including its bandsmen, is de- 
scribed in detail and discussed. 

In Part II a detached battalion in charge of a convoy is con- 
sidered. Opportunity is there found for discussion of the 
details of outposting such an unwieldy body; of police 
arrangements necessary therewith; of those for secmity 
while on the march; and of a position of a battahon for the 
defense of the convoy. As an mcident to this study, the 
conduct of a distant reconnoitering patrol is described at 
some length. 

Part III jumps to the other side of the situation set forth 
in Part II, and deals with a battalion the mission of which 
is the attack of this convoy. In this part, also, a recon- 
noitering patrol is followed during some houi^. The part 
culminates with the reconnaissance of the battalion and the 
attack of an enemy in position. 

Following the general plan of Parts I to III, wliich deal 
with mfantry. Parts IV to VIII, which deal with cavalry, 
take up, in succession, a distant rccomioitering patrol; a 
squadron covering infantry to which it is attached, both on 
the march and in battle; a squadron acting alone; and a 
regiment acting as divisional cavalry. 



8 INTBODUCTION. 

It is important that officers not belonging to the artillery, 
but who may have organizations of that arm in their com- 
mands, shall have a clear understanding of what artillery 
can accomphsh, in order that they may not assign tasks to 
it which are beyond reasonable expectation of accomplish- 
ment, and on the other hand not neglect to take advantage 
of the valuable assistance which in nearly aU cases artillery 
can render. 

This requirement necessitates first, a knowledge of the 
effects of artillery fire, and approximately the time and 
amount of ammunition needed to obtain desired results; 
secondly the kind of positions needed by the artillery to 
best fulfill its functions. It is of course entu'ely unnecessary 
for officers not belonging to the artillery to have technical 
knowledge as to the manner in which the guns are actually 
handled, but they should thoroughly imderstand the tactics 
of the artillery, and what it can and can not do, and be 
prepared to issue orders for its joint action with other arms 
and assume full responsibility for such orders. 

Artillery has no independent role on the battlefield. 
Minor tactics, as the term is applied to the operation of 
troops that are able to maintain such a r61e, is scarcely 
the correct designation for the minor operations of the 
artillery. In general, the tactics of artillery means those 
operations necessary to get the artillery into such position 
that it can by fire action assist in the carrying out of a tactical 
idea in cooperation with other troops. 

With this feature of artillery tactics aU officers of other 
arms are concerned. Without mtelligent understanding 
of it, they are not able to appreciate the possibilities of the 
arm or its limitations, to evaluate the reports and recom- 
mendations of the artillery commander, and to make proper 
decisions thereon. 

The fire tactics of artillery calls for a technical training that 
officers of other arms have no opportunity to receive, and 
it will be well to leave it to the artillery, merely indicating 
what is desired. 

In the parts of this book devoted to artillery, the attempt 
has been made to illustrate some of the various activities 
of that arm with which officers of other arms should be 
familiar. Fire tactics has not been considered except in 
so far as it may affect the distribution and location of fire 
units. 

Parts VIII and IX are battery problems; Parts X, XI, 
and XII are battalion problems. All have been used in 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

The School of the L'mc, and three are followed by comments 
suggested by students' solutions. 

To facilitate an imderstanding of the text, simple sketches 
on which the troops are placed at important periods have 
been mterspersed through the pages; orders, messages and 
reports are set off from the context and placed in small 
type; and important hours are carried into the margin for 
ready reference. 

The orders, quoted throughout the text, are not pre- 
sented as those best fitting the circumstances; nor should 
they, by any means, be considered or used as models. They 
are simply submitted as ones which would probably initiate 
in a competent manner the action decided upon. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Part I. — An Infantry Regiment. 

Page. 

Situation -15 

An advance i5 

Battalion covering detraining 16 

Battalion orders for a march 16 

A company in advance guard 17 

A position in readiness 17 

incidents and actions to 1 p. m 19 

Regimental commander 's estimate of the situation 21 

His orders for a march forward 23 

Dispositions of the field train 23 

A battalion in advance guard 24 

A company as advance party 24 

A flank patrol ' 25 

A company as flank guard 26 

A platoon as advance guard of a company 27 

A march outpost 27 

An attack 28 

Preliminary reconnaissance by advance guard • 28 

Reconnoitering patrols 31 

Regimental commander 's estimate of the situation 34 

His attack orders and arrangements 36 

Actions and orders, First Battalion 37 

Actions and orders, Company A 38 

Actions and orders. Second Battalion 40 

Actions and orders, Company E 41 

Progress of the attack — 4.45 to 5.15 p. m 42 

Actions and orders, Third Battalion, and progress engagement 

to its conclusion 43 

The pursuit 44 

Comment , 47 

Sanitary arrangements 51 

Comment 53 

Halt for the night 55 

Arrangements and orders, regimental headquarters 55 

Outpost arrangements and orders 56 

Comment 59 

A defense 61 

Situation 61 

Regimental commander 's estimate of the situation 61 

Actions and orders, regimental headquarters 65 

11 



12 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

A defense — Continued. Page, 

Outpost arrangements and orders 66 

Dispositions and orders, Company C 07 

Dispositions and orders, picket No. 1 C8 

Dispositions and orders, Company D 69 

Comment 71 

Actions and orders. Second Battalion 74 

Orders and arrangements, Company E 75 

Actions and orders, Third Battalion 76 

Orders and arrangements, Company L 77 

Events of the morning to 9.30 o'clock 78 

Orders, regimental commander for defen.se of the position 79 

Orders, battalion commanders 81 

Withdrawal from action 83 

Orders, regimental commander 83 

Remarks 84 

Actions and orders, Third Battalion 86 

Actions and orders. Company 1 87 

Actions and orders. Company M 88 

Actions and orders. Second Battalion 89 

Actions and orders. First Battalion 91 

A retreat 95 

Orders, regimental commander 95 

Orders, commander rear guard 96 

Orders, commander support 96 

A halt 97 

Actions and orders, regimental commander 97 

A march outpost, orders, commander rear guard 98 

A halt for the night 99 

Actions and orders, regimental commander 99 

Outpost 100 

Actions and orders, outpost commander 100 

Actions and orders, support commander 101 

Sanitary arrangements 104 

Part II. — An Infantry Battalion. 

Escorting a convoy 107 

Battalion commander's estimate of the situation 107 

An Infantry patrol 115 

Orders, battalion commander 121 

A company as advance guard 1 22 

Arrangements and orders, commander of the convoy 123 

A battalidn in defense 125 

The battalion commander's estimate of the situation 125 

Actions and orders of the battalion commander 128 

The withdrawal 130 

Part III. — An Infantry Battalion. 

Attack of a convoy 131 

Battalion commander 's estimate of the situation 131 

Actions and orders, battahon commander 133 

Orders, commander advance guard 134 

An Infantry patrol - - - 135 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 13 

Attack of a convoy — Continued. - Page. 

A battalion attack 139 

Advance guard reconnaissance 139 

Battalion commander 's estimate of the situation 140 

His orders for attack 142 

Part IV. — Cavalry Patrol. 

An officer 's patrol 145 

Preliminary arrangements. 145 

Provision for transmitting information that may be gained 148 

A ruse 150 

Change of route 151 

Simultaneous reconnaissance in several directions 151 

Combat of a patrol 154 

Disposition made of a prisoner 155 

Observation of hostile main body 157 

Sending back important information 157 

Utilizing friendly inhabitants to gain information 159 

Going around hostile flank to send information by wire 159 

Part V. — Reconnaissance and Flank Protection by a Squadron. 

Reconnaissance 161 

Distant patrols 1G2 

An advance guard action 169 

Squadron supports its advance guard 170 

Pursuit prevented 172 

Flank protection 174 

Estimate of the situation 174 

Decision 177 

Covering the front during a change of position 177 

Preparations for an attack 177 

Part VI. — Squadron Combat. 

Mounted action by a squadron 179 

Approaching the enemy 183 

Guarding the flanks of the squadron 184 

Instant action required 186 

Orders for a mounted attack 186 

Part VII. — Cavalry Regiment. 

Combat by a regiment 189 

Supporting a contact troop ' 189 

Action when the advance guard is seen to form for attack 190 

Advantages of the different kinds of possible action 194 

Dispositions and orders for the attack 196 

Use of the reserve 196 

Part VIII. — Light Artillery. 

A battery in rencontre — Enemy on the offensive 199 

Orders of the commander of the force 199 

Estimate of the situation 200 

Discussion of possible battery positions 201 

Decision of the battery commander 204 

Conduct of an infantry support 204 

Battery commander's orders and actions 205 

Observation and communication 205 



14 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Part IX. — Light Artillery. 

A battery in recontre — Enemy on the defensive 207 

Orders of the commander of the force 207 

Preliminary orders of the battery commander 208 

Estimate of the situation 208 

Reconnaissance and selection of a position 208 

Use of reconnaissance officer and scouts 210 

Comment on students' solutions 210 

Part X. — Light Artillery. 

A battalion in observation 213 

March situation 213 

Orders of the commander of the force. 213 

Discussion of the situation 214 

Preliminary orders of the battalion commander 215 

Reconnaissance and selection of a position 216 

Orders to a battery commander 217 

Occupation of its position by a battery 217 

Further reconnaissance by the battalion commander 219 

Orders to other battery commanders 220 

Final assignment of duties 221 

Discussion of the position 221 

Observation and fire direction 221 

Part XI. — Light Artillery. 

A battalion in surprise attack 225 

The march situation 225 

Information en route 226 

Orders of the commander of the force 227 

Actions and orders of the battalion commander 227 

Conduct of a detached battery 229 

Conduct of the infantry support 230 

Comment 230 

Part XII. — LiciHT Artillery. 

A battalion in defense and attack 233 

The march situation 233 

Orders of the commander of the force 234 

Preliminary orders of the battalion commander 234 

Reconnaissance by the battalion commander 235 

Establishment of observation 236, 237, 238 

Communication with the defensive position 237 

Assignment of batteries to positions 237 

Orders to battery commanders 237 

. Information officers with the attacking infantry 238 

Observation and communication with the advance 238 



PART I.— AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



Situation. 



[General map, Gettysburg-Anfietam, 1 inch= 10 miles, and topographical map, 3 inches = 1 

mile.] 

The Pennsylvania-Maryland line separates hostile States. 
The northern State (Blue) is concentrating its first divi- 
sion by rail at Carlisle. To cover this concentration it 
has ordered the First Infantry to Gettysburg. 

Red points of concentration and intentions are uncer- 
tain, although the former seem most likely to be Baltimore 
and Frederick. 

The First Infantry, on June 17, was moving south on 
the Gettysburg & Harrisburg Raih^oad in fom* sections, 
one hour apart. The leading section detrained at Table 
Rock Station, 5 miles north of Gettysburg, upon receipt 
of a telegram from the Gettysburg station agent in which 
he reported that a thousand Reds had just entered that 
tov/n from the south. 

An Advance. 

Col. A read the telegram to the major of the First Bat- 
talion, and directed : 

Move south toward Golden\ille to cover the detraining of the remainder 
of the regiment. I will remain at this station until the next section comes in. 

With the fourth section there were five days' rations for 
the regiment. These were in addition to those required on 
the train, m the ration section of the field train, and on the 
person. The regiment had three ambulances. 

The regimental quartermaster was imloading the wagons 
and animals, the wagons by a ramp at the end of one car, 
and the animals by another ramp on to the station plat- 
form. Prepared ramps had been brought on the train. The 
quartermaster was assisted by the teamsters, the company 
quartermaster sergeant, cooks, artificer, clerk, and four 
men from each company. The work proceeded with the 
utmost rapidity since the train had to get back to Aspers, 
some 5 miles north, to find a siding long enough to permit 
the prompt passage of the second section. 

15 



16 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The colonel reported his action in detraining at once to 
the division chief of staff in Carlisle. In sending this tel- 
egram and the necessary railroad ones for the passage of the 
following trains by the empties, Gettysburg, needless to 
say, was cut out of the hne. 

A COVERING BATTALION. 

8.15a.m. Maj. B assembled his officers at 8.15 a. m., and directed: 

A thousand Reds are reported to have entered Gettysburg this morning. 

This l)attalion marches on Goldenville to cover the detraining of the 
remainder of the regiment. 

Lieut. K, battalion adjutant, will patrol with his orderly to the Hamil- 
ton farmhouse, about a mile south of Goldenville, taking station for obser- 
vation in that vicinity. 

Company A will constitute the advance guard, and will march at once 
by the railroad to Goldenville, and thence across coimtry to knoll 651. 

Companies B, C, and D, in the order named, will follow at 500 yards. 

Sergt. L, the battalion sergeant major, will take the ammunition wagons 
as soon as they are imloaded, via Table Rock schoolhouse and the unim- 
proved road, to join the battalion near Goldenville. 

I will march between the advance guard and the main body. 

The major, before starting to issue this order, spread 
his map on the station platform. He issued his order slow- 
ly, pointing out each place as he named it, but permitting 
no interruption until the complete order was given. He 
then answered the questions of those who had failed to 
grasp any part of it. 
8.40 a. m. Lieut. K informed his orderly of the enemy's presence 
in Gettysburg. He then moved, at 6 miles an hour, via 
Texas and the Carlisle road. At 8.40 a. m. the lieuten- 
ant, leading by 50 yards, approached the Hamilton farm- 
house. He stationed the orderly, momited, near road 
fork 646, watcliing down both roads to the south, tied his 
horse at the gate, and, using the farm telephone, tried to 
get Gettysburg. Failing there he tried the farmhouse on 
the same party line to the south, but without result. Then 
going to the orderly, he directed: 

Stay at this point, observing particularly down the right-hand road 
(toward C. Topper). I am going to the clump of timber on that knoll 
(pointing to 6G4) and will show myself to you as soon as I get there. If 
you see anything unusual, come to me, under cover, to report. 

The lieutenant then took station just under cover of the 
southern edge of the timber, whore he could keep both 
branches of the Carhsle Road and his orderly in view. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 17 

A COMPANY IN ADVANCE GUARD. 

The officers of Company A immediately upon receipt of ^-^^ ^- ™- 
the major's order rejoined the company; the noncommis- 
sioned officers and other scjuad leaders were assembled and, 
at 8.25 a. m., the captaia ordered: 

A thousand Reds are reported to have entered Gettysburg this morning. 

Our battalion marches to the south to cover the detraining of the re- 
mainder of the regiment. Lieut. K. has gone with his orderly to take 
station a couple of miles down the road toward Gettysburg. 

This company forms the advance guard. 

Lieut. N., -with the first platoon, as advance party, will precede the re- 
mainder of the company by 400 yards. March by the railroad to Golden- 
ville, and thence across country to the crest a half mile to the southeast. 
Move rapidly until your distance is gained. 

Sergt. J. (left guide), will be on the alert for signals from the rear. 

The musicians will march with me at the head of the company. 

Squad leaders will tell their men of the enemy's presence in Gettysburg. 

(The musicians are kept in observation of the terrain, 
one to the right, the other to the left of the road.) 

The captain put the company in march as soon as the 
advance party had its distance. 

At 8.45 a. m., near the farm road crossing of the rail- '^•^s a. m. 
road north of Goldenville, the captain directed Corpl. Y., 
of the fifth squad : 

Take your front rank and patrol to the top of that hill (707). Remain 
there in observation to the west and south. I will establish a semaphore 
station on one of those houses to the south (Goldenville). Get connection 
with that station. 

At 8.50 a. m., in Goldenville, to Corpl. R., of the sixth '^^o ^^- "- 
squad : 

Take your front rank and j^atrol east along this road (the Goldenville- 
Hunterstown) to the first crossroads about -| mile east of this place (Golden- 
ville). Remain in that vicinity in observation to the cast and south. The 
company marches on that low knoll (651) a half liiile to the southeast. 

A POSITION IN READINESS. 

At 8.47 a. m., Maj. B directed the captain of Company Ar^''^ *■ -^■ 

The battalion, less your company, will assemble east of Goldenville. 
Your company ^viIl take station on knoll 651, and provide security to include 
both branches of the Carlisle Road. Get semaphore connection vdth. Gold- 
enville, and connect vdih Lieut. K, who should be near Hamilton's. 

By 9.20 a. m., the battalion was disposed as f oUows : 'J-^o a. m. 
Companies B, C, and D were east of Goldenville and between 
it and the near-by stream line. Arms were stacked and 
packs removed, but the men remained close at hand. A 
signal station was on the western building of Goldenville. 
98755°— 17 2 



18' STUDIES liSr MINOR TACTICS. 

One musician thereat was watching knoll 654, another hill 
707 and Table Rock station, and a third, the farmhouse 700 
yards east of Goldenville. The combat wagons had joined 
and were in column, facing south, on the unimproved road. 

The main body of Company A was in the saddle between 
knolls 654 and 651, but north of the crest. One squad was 
marching to relieve Lieut. K, on knoll 664. (The lieutenant, 
when relieved, left his orderly as messenger with this sc|uad, 
and went back to report to the major.) A cossack post was 
at the northwestern corner of the patch of timber between 
knolls 654 and 664. A semaphore station was on knoll 654 
in communication with Goldenville. And two signallers 
were on the house one-half mile east of Goldenville for com- 
munication with the cossack post south of crossroads 608. A 
sentry squad was on knoll 651, and another near the south- 
east edge of the timber one-half mile southeast of knoll 651. 
A cossack post was on hill 707. (See sketch No. 1.) 

Maj. B. has taken up a position in readiness at Goldenville, 
from which pomt he can move on short lines to meet the 
enemy in whatever direction the latter may advance. The 
eastern branch of the Carlisle Road is the direct one to that 
town, and therefore the one most likely to be used by an 
enemy movmg agamst it. That road is covered from knoll 
651, by the greater part of one company which will be able 
to offer sufficient resistance to give time for the coming up of 
the remainder of the battalion. If the enemy advances by 
the western branch, the major will not go out to fight near 
Hamilton's, since he would bo getting entirely too far from 
the rest of the regiment, but will take a position east of hill 
707, across the Carlisle Road. And in the unlikely case of a 
hostile advance by roads east or west of these most direct 
routes, suitable positions withm short distances of Golden- 
ville arc to be found for opposing the enemy. 

With the excellent views obtained from hill 707 and 
the Hamilton — 651 ridge, but few and small detachments 
are needed to provide ample security. It is sufficient to 
keep the bulk of the command together in one place, provided 
prompt information is forwarded as soon as the detachments 
in observation catch sight of the enemy. Only four and 
one-half squads altogether are detached from Company A 
to fm^nish a Ime of observation, but the glycates t care is taken 
to organize a system of communication through Vv^'hich there 
will be prompt receipt of the information obtained by these 
groups. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



19 



INCIDENTS AND ACTIONS TO 1 P M. 

The second section containing the Second Battalion 
reached Table Kock Station about 9 a. m. By 9.30 it had 9 a. m. 
unloaded and was ready to march. The quartermaster was 
left at the station to forward the remaining troops as they 
came in, get his field train together, and store the extra five 
days' rations. The colonel marched with the Second Bat- 
talion to Goldenville, where he arrived at 9.50 a. m. The 9-5o a. m. 
Second Battalion assembled north of the First. Nothins: 



SKETCH No.f. 



Position in Readiness. June 17. 







further had been heard of the enemy, and no one had been 
able to get into communication with Gottysbui*g or any of 
its nearby farms by telephone or by telegraph. 

Col. A's most pressing need is for information. The report 
of the number of hostile troops in Gettysbui'g may be grossly 
exaggerated, as is so likely to be the case with civilian 
estimates. If so, a good deal of time is being lost and unnec- 
essary labor performed. But the inability to obtain tele- 
phone or telegraph comimunication with Gettysburg or its 



20 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

neighborhood, corroborates the operator's telegram at least 
to the extent that the enemy certainly has some force 
therein. It would not do, of course, to proceed farther by 
rail until Gettysburg is clear of the enemy nor, in the present 
uncertainty about the enemy's strength and intentions, 
would the colonel be justified in marching before he has his 
whole regiment together. Even if all of the sections come 
in on time the regiment can hardly be assembled at Golden- 
ville before 12 or 12.30. At best then it can not march 
before the hour last named. Meantime information must 
be obtained as to the situation in Gettysburg. 

The position of the First Infantry is very unusual in that 
the regiment has been detached to a considerable distance 
from support, without any attached cavaby to do its distant 
reconnoitermg. But, while Col. A. sadly misses the mounted 
troops, there is nothing to be gained by bemoaning the fact; 
he has simply to take his problem as it has developed and 
obtain the best solution with the means available. 

The distance to Gettysburg is too great for the use of 
dismounted patrols unless no other means can be found. 
That town is two hours' march away. If the patrol marched 
straight there and back, with no delay of any sort, what 
it learned would not be at hand before the middle of the 
afternoon. And patrols, naturally, can not obtain informa- 
tion by such simple and direct procedure. 

But there are the momited orderlies and the mounted 
officers. The colonel accordingly selected the adjutant of 
the second battalion to lead a patrol by giving him four of the 
regimental orderlies, and directed him: 

The Gettysburg agent of the P. & R. telegraphed me a little before 
8 o'clock that a thousand Reds were then entering the town. We have been 
unable since to get Gettysburg either by telephone or telegraph. I want 
you to take four of the headquarters orderlies and proceed thereto by routes 
entering town from the west to learn the hostile strength and dispositions. 
Let me have a report by 12.30 p. m. I will remain here till the last com- 
panies are up, which will be about that hour. 

About 12.30 p. m. the colonel received the following mes- 
sage: 

No. 1, Knoll ^ Mile "West of Penn College, 

17 June, 11. SO a. m. 
12. 3G p. m. ^,^^ ggg j^g^ troops intrenching north of Penn College. Retired Blue 
soldier tells me Red regiment came into town from south about 8 a. m.; 
two battalions went through to north; a third is collecting money and 
supplies and loading onto impressed transportation. Blue soldier had 
overheard men this battalion talking, his impression regiment half recruits. 

Remain here in observation. 

L., Lieutenant. 



AN INFANTRY EEGIMENT. 21 

By 1 o'clock, the rogimont was united at Golden ville. i.oo p. m. 
The men had lunched. 

THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER's ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Lieut. L. was exceedingly fortmiate in obtaining so 
promptly such detailed information, which from its source 
can be accepted as accurate. With that information at 
hand Col. A. has to decide upon his future action. His 
mission is to cover the detraining of the division at Carlisle. 
To perform that he was ordered to Gettysburg. But he 
must not take his orders too literally. His important duty 
is to remain between any hostile force and Carlisle. Shall 
he carry that out by remaining where he is, making prepa- 
rations only for fighting defensively if the enemy comes 
north, or shall he move aggressively on Gettysburg and 
attempt to throw the Reds out of that town ? 

While the enemy is intrenching north thereof, it is prob- 
able, nevertheless, that only a temporary occupation of 
Gettysburg is intended, and that the Reds will withdraw as 
soon as they have got their booty beyond reach, since Gettys- 
burg itself is of no particular value to them miless they are 
starting a general advance. That such may be the case, 
although no news of any further hostile troops have been 
received, is, of course, a possibility, and must be kept in 
mind. Initial successes upon the outbreak of war very 
greatly affect the morale of both sides, and are consequently 
of considerable importance. To obtain success in this case 
by attacking seems very possible for the Blues, if there 
should be in Col. A.'s front a single Red regiment, com- 
posed largely of recruits, and hampered also, as the Reds 
are, by their convoy and the hostile town behind them. If, 
on the other hand. Col. A. contents himself with holding 
his regiment supinely near by while a Red regiment works 
its will upon a large Blue town, the moral effect upon the 
Blue troops and the civil population will be anything but 
good. While keeping his main mission of covering the 
remainder of the division very carefully in view, the colonel, 
therefore, believes himself justified in an aggressive advance 
to attack the Red troops in Gettysburg. 

He must next decide upon a route. The direct road is 
now by way of Boyd schoolhouse. It has the advantage 
also over the eastern branch of the Carlisle road that the 
march of the regiment will probably be concealed a little 
longer from hostile view. The route farther west by the C. 
Topper farm and the Mummasburg road is a mile longer. 



22 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The more promptly he can close with the enemy the better, 
because the chances of preventing the escape of the hostile 
convoy are thereby increased, and because the day is 
already advanced, and daylight is necessary for securing 
the full fruits of victory. The enemy's work in intrench- 
ing seems chiefly designed to meet a Blue advance from 
the north. It is possible that a movement by the Mum- 
masburg Road would strike those trenches more or less 
in flank. The enemy's information in hostile comitry will 
be relatively poor. To come in by the Mummasburg road, 
the march of the regiment would be under cover of Oak 
Ridge until close at hand, and it is just possible that the 
enemy might not learn of th e Blue's approach until too late 
to construct or move into trenches in this direction. But 
the Reds can be expected to have a security detachment of 
some sort on Oak Ridge; and the probabilities are that the 
enemy would learn of the Blue approach in ample time to 
make the slight changes, on short lines, which would be 
required in his dispositions to oppose the Blues from the 
new direction. Nothing, then, would have been gained by 
the Blue detour. While the deployment to attack would 
be made from commanding ground, yet an envelopment of 
the enemy's left would have to proceed through timber 
shown by Col. A. 's map to have a heavy undergrowth. The 
consequent breaking up of the formations of the main 
attack and difficulties of communication would lessen the 
prospect of success very materially. 

An advance by the Mummasburg road would uncover 
Col. A.'s proper line of retreat, but, being in Bkie territory, 
this would make very little difference so far as the safety of 
the First Infantry alone is concerned. It could retreat 
toward Mummasburg in about as great safety as toward 
Carlisle. But, in doing so, it would uncover the main body 
of the division. The requirements of Col. A.'s larger mission, 
to cover the concentration of the division, must not be for- 
gotten. In the usual case such a mission can best be ful- 
filled by remaining squarely between the hostile forces and 
the point of concentration; and in this case to do so is more 
than usually expedient, because Col. A. is in some uncer- 
tainty as to what assistance the Red Regiment may receive 
from the south. If he strikes superior hostile forces, he 
wants to be able to retire directly toward Carlisle. On the 
whole, the advantages of the direct route toward Gettysburg 
outweigh those of any other. He decides to march by 
Boyd schoolhouse. 



AN INFANTE Y REGIMENT. 23 

And ho must march in one column. To send a portion of 
his command directly on Gettysburg while the remainder 
made in effect a turnmg movement by the Mummasburg 
road would be an inexcusable dispersion in the face of an 
enemy at least equal m numbers. 

ORDERS FOR A MARCH FORWARD. 

He accordingly issued verbal orders at 1 p. m. to his three i p. m. 
majors, commanding officer machine gun company and 
staff, in Golden ville, as follows: 

Lieut. L. ia with two orderlies west of Gettysburg. He reports that the 
Reds are intrenching north of Penn College, and that they seem to have a 
total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment; half of its men are recruits. 

This regiment will march on Gettysburg. 

The fii-st battalion and the machine gun company will constitute the 
advance guard and will proceed at once by the Hamilton farm and Boyd 
schoolhouse. 

The remainder of the regiment in the order: Second battalion, third bat- 
talion, band, and ambulances, will follow at one-half mile. 

The field train will await orders at Texas. 

Regimental headquarters will march between the advance guard and the 
main body. 

DISPOSITIONS OF THE FIELD TRAIN. 

In comphance with the above instructions for the field 
train, the quartermaster, after storing the five days' surplus 
rations in the house and on the platform at Table Rock Sta- 
tion, left a corporal and three men of his detail m charge 
thereof. The remainder of the unloading detail was directed 
to march via Golden ville to join the regiment. The train 
then moved by the unimproved road westward till its head 
halted at the Texas crossroads, in which position it was so 
placed as to be able to move at once either north or south. 
The quartermaster sent a quartermaster sergeant and three 
men to HiU 707 in observation; put a signal station on one 
of the houses of Texas in commmiication therewith and in 
observation to the west; stationed a sergeant and three men 
at the edge of the timber midway between Texas and Table 
Rock Station, and another sergeant and three men at the 
road fork 100 yards west of Texas. The wagons were all 
drawn well to the left side of the road and closed mitil the 
leaders' noses were at the tailgate of the wagon ahead. The 
remainder of the men (company quartermaster sergeants, 
cooks, artificers, and clerks) stacked arms in the field oppo- 
site, and north of the middle of the train, and remained 
within a few yards of their pieces, except one sentry who was 



l.ia p. m 



24 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

alert at the stacks. The quartermaster sent at once mounted 
men to reconnoiter the two bridges north and northwest of 
Texas, the roads as far north as Biglerville, and to find a 
place for watering. Receiving the report of the last, he had 
the teamsters unhook two of their animals at a time and sent 
them to water at the ford of the Conewago, 400 yards east of 
the CarUsle road. 

A BATTALION IN ADVANCE GUARD. 

Maj. B., rejoining his battalion, assembled the captains of 
Companies B, C, D, and the machine guns, and issued the 
following verbal orders at 1.10 p. m. 

Lieut. L. with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He reports that the 
Reds are intrenching north of Penn College, and that they seem to have a 
total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment; half of its men are recruits. 

Our regiment marches on Gettysburg. 

Tliis battaUon, reenforced by the machine-gun company, constitutes the 
advance guard. 

CompanyB, with Lieut. K. (battalion adjutant) and his orderly, will form 
the advance party, preceding the remainder of the battalion at 400 yards. 
The advance party will march at once by the railroad to the Carlisle road, 
and thence by the Stock Farm and Boyd S. H. 

Companies C, D, and the macliine gvms will follow in the order named 
as soon as Company B has its distance. Company C will regulate the pace. 

I will send Company A as left flank guard by the eastern branch of the 
Carlisle road . 

The combat wagons will proceed at once by the crossroads a quarter of a 
mile west of Goldenville and the Carlisle Road so as to join the tail of Com- 
pany D at the railroad crossing. 

I will march behind the advance party. 

Maj. B. then rode rapidly to Company A, and directed its 
captain : 

Lieut. L. with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He rejiorts that the 
Reds are intrenching north of Penn College and that they seem to have a 
total strength about Gettysbing of one regiment; half of its men are recruits. 

Our regiment marches on Gettysburg. 

The first battalion and the macliine guns constitute the advance guard. 

The rest of the battalion, Company B as advance party, is proceeding by 
the western branch of the Carlisle road. 

Your company will march as left flank guard by the eastern branch of the 
Carlisle Road. 

I will ride between the advance party and the support. 

A COMPANY AS ADVANCE PARTY. 

The captain of Company B assembled his officers and 
1.17 p.m. noncommissioned officers, and, at 1.17 p. m., issued verbal 



AN INFANTKY REGIMENT. 25 

orders to them and to Lieut. K. (battalion adjutant) as 
follows : 

Lieut. L. with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He reports that the 
Reds are intrenching a short distance north of that town, and that they seem 
to have a total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment; half of its men 
are recruits. 

Our regiment marches on Gettysburg, the first battalion and machine 
guns as advance guard. Company A will march as left flank guard by the 
first road east of tliis place (Golden ville). 

TMs company constitutes the advance party, and will march at once by 
the railroad and the west branch of the Carlisle Road. 

Lieut. K. with his orderly will trot ahead as mounted point to precede 
the company by about a mile. 

Lieut. M. (first lieutenant) will take the first squad as the point, preceding 
the company by 300 yards. He will move rapidly ahead to get his distance. 

The company will march as soon as the point has its 300 yards. 

Sergt. M. (left guide) will watch for signals from the rear. 

Approaching road fork 646, the captain directed Sergt. 
K., the company's right guide: 

Take the first two squads. Patrol down this road to the right till you 
strike the railroad about half a mile from this point, and thence along the 
railroad some two miles until you reach the Mummasburg road, a mile 
northwest of Gettysburg. Communicate by semaphore vrith the company 
at least once every mile. If you see nothing to report, simply signal 
"O. K.'' You are likely to find the enemy in some strength near the 
Mummasburg Road. 

Near the stock farm the captain sent a patrol of 2 men 
to the southeast to loioll 576 and to rejoin at the tail of the 
company. These two patrols were the only ones sent out 
during the first hour. The captain marched at the head of 
the company with its two musicians, one of whom kept 
track of the flank guard and watched the terrain to the east 
of the road, the other similarly kept track of the progress of 
Sergt. K.'s patrol and of the ground to the westward. 
Both were alert for and prepared to receive messages from 
the directions assigned them. 

FLANK PATROL. 

It may be of interest to see how Sergt. K. conducted his 
flank patrol. Turning off to the right with the designated 
squads at road fork 646, the sergeant halted his patrol as 
soon as it had cleared the mam road, and gave instructions 
as follows : 

This detachment moves as a flank patrol to the railroad half a mile down 
this road, and thence aloug the railroad a couple of miles farther. 

Corpl. L., take your front rank rapidly ahead as the poiiit. When you've 
gained 200 yards regulate your gait by miue. 



26 STUDIES IIST MINOR TACTICS. 

The remainder of the detachment, right by twos, marcli. Open np the 
files, one going on each side of the road. Take 5 paces distance between 
men. Corpl. B, watch the ground to the right of the road; Private L., to 
the left of the road. 

The patrol moved at about a 4 J -mile gait along tlie desig- 
nated route, so as to get even with or ahead of the dis- 
mounted point on the main road. Near the crossing south- 
east of C Topper, it halted while a signaler caught the 
company, and got an acknowledgment of his O. K. During 
this halt, the sergeant came forward to direct the point to 
leave the railroad, and move along the crest of Oak Kidge. 
Through the light timber thereon, the patrol moved in much 
the same formation as it had previously, except that the 
distance of the point was cut down to about 100 yards, and 
the sergeant sent forward a connecting file. Two men were 
sent around the west side of the heavy patch of timber north 
of J. Forney to rejoin on knoll 642. On arriving at that 
knoll the point halted, deployed, at the timber's V-shaped 
opening south of the crest; two men from the main body of 
the patrol were sent through the orchard to the J. Forney 
house, and O. K. was again signaled to the company. The 
column was seen to be halted at the end of the first hour 
and during that halt the main body of the patrol rested 
north of the crest of knoll 642. 

A COMPANY AS FLANK GUARD. 

As soon as the captain of Company A received the major's 
order, he assembled his ofhcers and noncommissioned officers, 
including all squad leaders except those away with detach- 
1.31p.m. ments, and at 1.30 p. m. directed: 

The enemy is believed to have one regiment in Gettysburg. 

Ovir regiment is marching on that town, the first battalion and machine 
guns as the advance guard. All but this company are moving by the road 
west of us. 

Company A marches as the flank guard. 

Lieut. J. (second lieutenant) and the fourth platoon will constitute the 
advance guard of this company and will march at once by the country 
road east of this knoll (651) and the east branch of the Carlisle Road. The 
advance guard will precede the rest of the company by 500 yards. 

The captain had the detachments on hill 707 and near 
road fork 608 signaled "Join company" and sent men to 
direct the detaclmients toward Hamilton's and a half a 
mile east of knoll 651, to join the company en route. He 
followed the advance guard at the proper distance with the 
main body of the company. 



AN" INFANTRY REGIMENT. 27 

A PLATOON AS ADVANCE GUARD OF A COMPANY. 

Lieut. J. had the fourth phitoon full in immediately and 
marched it to the fence corner east of knoll 651. There he 
issued orders to the entire platoon as follows : 

Tlie Reds are believed to have one regiment in Gettysburg. Our regi- 
ment is marching against them, the first battalion as advance guard. All 
but Company A are going by the road west of us; Company A goes by this 
road to the south (pointing out the east branch). 

This platoon is the comj^any's advance guard. 

Sergt. M, with Corpl. K, and the corporal's front rank, will constitute 
our point, preceding the remainder of the platoon by 300 yards. March 
by this country road to the highway. Move rapidly until you get your 
distance; then regulate your march by my gait. 

Corpl. K. (at the tail of the platoon) will watch for signals from the rear. 
We are to keep about 500 yards ahead of the company. 

The point moved out at about a 4|-mile-an-hour gait, 
in double column of files, one file on each side of the road, and 
with some 10 yards distance between men. The segeant 
and the corporal were on the left side of the road, the ser- 
geant leading. The sergeant watched chiefly to the front, 
the corporal to the left front and left. The three privates 
were on the right of the road, the leader observing down the 
road, the next to the right front and right, and the third 
watched for signals from the roar. 

The platoon sent foi-ward single men as comiecting 
files, spacing them about 100 yards apart. The platoon 
itself marched in double column of files opened well out on 
each side of the road to make a poorer target from the front, 
but the men of each file took only about one yard of dis- 
tance. The lieutenant observed chiefly to the front, but 
he recjuired the men of each file to watch toward their proper 
side and his attention to anything they happened to observe. 

The company marched in column of squads, sending 
forward connecting files toward its advance guard. 

The advance guard sent out one patrol of four men at 
road fork 513, to move to the southeast across Rock Creek, 
and across country east of it, to come in again near road 
fork 511. No other patrols were used during the first hour's 
march. 

A MARCH OUTPOST. 

At 2.20 p. m., when the dismounted point of the right 
colum^i reached a point 600 yards northwest of the junction 
of the two branches of the Carlisle Road, a ten-minute halt 
was ordered. As Lieut. K. (the battalion adjutant) with the 



28 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

mounted point rode over the crest cast of knoll 521, he was 
iirod upon from the direction of laioU 522 to the south. 
2.20 p. m. j\^jjj i^Q j^.^(j jj^t 2.20 fallen back on the dismounted point to 
report this fact. 

The dismounted point did not halt at once when the signal 
to do so was received, but continued to the crest at knoU 
521, deploj^ed, and lay down. Sorgt. K.'s two squads over 
on Oak Ridge, which wore about abreast of the pomt on the 
mam road, signaled ''O. K." from knoll 642, and remained 
thereat. Company B halted near the stream 400 yards 
northwest of its pomt. One musician remained m observa- 
tion to the east and southeast, the other to the west and 
southv\/^est. The point of Company A was about 300 yards 
south of crossroads 488, and its main body was east of 
the farmhouse 500 yards north of crossroads 488, with a 
patrol of two men 300 yards to the east. Companies C and 
D and the machine gmis were halted opposite the farmhouse 
400 yards south of Boyd S. H. The head of the mani 
body of the regiment was 500 yards north of that school- 
house. Throughout the regiment the left half of the road 
was absolutely clear of officers, men, and animals, at the 
halt as it was on the march, in order to permit the passage 
of mounted messengers at the highest gaits, without neces- 
sity for drawing rein at any point. One man in each com- 
pany of the command watched for signals along the coluimi, 
and the gromid, as well, to both flanks. 

It is evident how very simple need be the arrangements 
to provide ample secmity during a short halt even when, as 
in this case, all indications are that the enemy is very close 
at hand. If the halt were at all prolonged, it would be neces- 
sary to make m.ore elaborate arrangements, occupying, 
for example. Oak Ridge with detachments both west of C and 
D companies, and west also of the main body of the regi- 
ment. The longer the stay is to be, the more elaborate, 
naturally, must the arrangements become because of the 
greater time given the enemy to move about and select a 
point of attack. 

The Attack. 

advance guard reconnaissance of an enemy in position. 

When the captain of Company B received Lieut. K.'s 
report that he had dra\\ai fire from knoll 522, he sent the 
lieutenant back to make the same report to the major, and 
went forward himself to the point. There he was shortly 
joined by Maj. B. 



AN" INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



29 



SKETCH No.2. March Ou+pos+. Ju«el7. 




30 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

It then became necessary to determine wlietlier the 
enemy's main position was on the low ekvation containing 
knoll 522, or farther south, with simply an outpost near 
522. And to get this information as promptly as possible 
was, of course, the business of the advance guard. Maj. 
B. accordingly directed the captain: 

We must locate the enemy's main position. Take the bulk of your com- 
pany straight south along the Carlisle road to drive in any hostile covering 
detachments. Send strong patrols to locate the enemy's flanks. I vriW 
bring the machine guns to this knoll for your support, and assemble the 
other companies at the orchard north of us. Lieut. K. (the battalion adju- 
tant) is sending an ammunition wagon up to your company. 

The major then rode back to order the machine guns 
to knoll 521, to report his actions and intentions to the 
colonel, and to bring forward the remaining companies of 
the fii'st battalion. 
2.30 p.m. Capt. B, (commanding Company B) at 2.30 p. m. directed 
the lieutenant in charge of the point: 

I will send you another squad in a few minutes. "When it joins you, 
move your reenforced patrol east to Rock Creek, and thence south to locate 
the hostile right. I am going to take the company straight down this road 
to develop the enemy's main position. 

The captain next moved back, north of the crest, until 
he and a musician, who accompanied him, were perfectly 
concealed from the front, and told the musician to call Sergt. 
2.35 p. m. K.'s patrol (the one on Oak Ridge). He then, at 2.35 p. m., 
gave the musician, word by word, as it was semaphored, 
the following message: 
Move south. Locate Red left. 

Returning to the company, he had extra ammunition is- 
sued, directed one squad to report to the first lieutenant 
2.!5 p. m. (near knoU 521), and before marching at 2.45 p. m. informed 
the company: 

The Reds fired upon our advance from a point about three-quarters of a 
mile to tlie soutli. This company moves down the road we are on to locate 
the enemy's main position. Sergt. K., with two squads, is moving south 
along the ridge to the west, and Lieut. M., also with two squads, down the 
stream to the east. When we deploy, Corpl. B. will take C and aa a com- 
bat patrol to cover our right flank, K. will take L and M as a combat patrol 
to cover our left.. Both these patrols should keep several hundred yards 
to the front of the skirmish line and four or fi^'e hundred yards to the flank. 

The chief of each flank platoon caused one man to keep 
track of the progress and location of the adjacent combat 
patrol. 



AN INF ANTE Y EEGIMENT. 31 

Approaching the crest east of knoll 521, the captain com- 
manded: "As skirmishers, guide right, 3 paces, march," and 
the company advanced steadily toward knoll 522. 

The captain made his reconnoitering patrols strong be- 
cause they would probably have to drive in detachments of 
Reds to get the desired information. The combat patrols 
were small because only information of the presence of hos- 
tile forces was desired from them. The patrols were eche- 
loned forward in order that the location of flanking groups 
of the enemy might be learned before the company line came 
under the fire of such. 

RECONNOITERING PATROLS. 

When the second squad joined, Lieut. M. (commanding 
the point) said to his men: 

The company is going down this road to find out what is in our front. 
This patrol will move east, and then south to locate the enemy's right. 
Corpl. B., you will go ahead with your front rank to the orchard east of us, 
and then toward that low knoll (pointing to Barlow). K., with the rear 
rank of that squad, will follow the corporal to the orchard, then go on east 
to the stream (Rock Creek), and then south near it. I will follow the cor- 
jioral at 100 yards. ' Corpl. C. will deploy his squad at three paces and 
follow me at 100 yards. All three parties will each have one man constantly 
watching me for signals. 

Barlow l-moU was found unoccupied. The patrol at once 
moved east under cover of the knoll to the Harrisburg Road. 
Starting toward Gettysburg thereon, it quickly drew fire 
from the county almshouse. Small Red groups were shortly 
afterwards seen retreating from the almshouse toward Get- 
tysburg. Meantime the patrol moved rapidly east to Rock 
Creek, and under shelter of its fringe of trees, thence on to 
the south. Four men, under Corpl. B., led at 150 yards, 
while two other men crossed the stream and moved as a 
flanking group just east of the timber beyond. The re- 
mainder of the patrol was in column of files, the lieutenant 
at the head. At the mouth of Stevens Run, the patrol 
again turned toward Gettysburg following the bed of the 
stream. But after going some 300 yards in this direction 
it was fired upon from the road fork at the letter H in Ilarris- 
l>urg. The patrol promptly took cover in the hght timber 
just south of Stevens Run and rapidly worked back to the 
east a hundred yards or so until it was sheltered by the 
small nose from the direction of the enemy's fire. Deploy- 
ing his advance party then at five paces, Corpl. B. moved 
quickly toward the York Turnpike exit of Gettysburg. Two 



32 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

men were sent south to the railroad near 471-W. The re- 
mainder of the patrol deployed at 3 paces and lay down. 
Corpl. B.'s movement promptly drew fire from the buildings 
between the Hanover Road and the York Turnpike. His 
party was compelled to take cover in the small depressions 
afforded by the nearby ground. The lieutenant reinforced 
him wdth one squad and opened fire. The hostile reply was 
so heavy as to make certain the enemy had too many men 
to permit a further advance in that direction. He accord- 
ingly crawled over the nose on the right flank of his patrol 
and began searching with his glasses the ground north of 
Gettysburg. What he saw caused him to write the following 
message : 

No. 1, 100 Yards South Stevens Run, North op 

York Turnpike Exit Gettysburg, 

n June, 3.20 p. m. 
Red trenches visible extending Harrisburg road, 500 yards southwest 
almshonse, across Mummasburg road. Direction slightly north of west. 
Trenches full of men. Seems to be one company in support near Harris- 
burg road, 200 yards behind hostile right. I\Iy patrol held here by hostile 
fire from eastern exit Gettysburg. 

• M., Lieutenant. 

Tlie lieutenant moved back to his six men in reserve, and 
sent two with the message to find Company B. He then 
started a patrol of three men to the south to work into 
Gettysburg from that direction. The remainder of the men 
were gradually drawn back to better cover. 

Let us turn now to Sergt. K's patrol on the western flank. 
Upon receipt of the semaphored order, leaving four men as 
a reserve to follow at 300 yards, the sergeant deployed the 
10 remaining (two men are at J. Forney) at three paces and 
advanced toward knoll 577. This movement drew fire 
from 15 or 20 rifles on 577 and in the edge of the timber 
east of that knoll. The patrol reached the ditch of the 
Mummasburg road. Tlie sergeant then directed the next 
in rank to hold the patrol in that position during his absence. 
With 3 men, he worked down the railroad to the farm road 
crossing thereof south of the Mummasburg road. From 
that point he could see a hostile trench to the southeast. 
A small hostile group behind a nose less than 400 yards to 
the south convinced the sergeant he could get no fartlier in 
that direction. Returning to the Mummasburg road, lie 
WTote the following message: 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 33 



No. 1. 



MUMMASBURG RoAD SOUTII OP McLeAN FaRMHOUSE, 

n June, 3.10 p. m. 
From point 300 yards south of this, I have seen Red company trench on 
low knoll northwest of Penn College and about 500 yards to southeast of 
point where I was. No signs of trenches to south. Reds still at work in 
trench seen. Could locate no reserves. My patrol held southeast of J. 
Forney by hostile detachment 500 yards to south. 

K, Sergeant. 

Two men were sent with this north of knoll 522 to deliver 
it to Capt. B. The sergeant then started three men to work 
around to the west and into Gettysburg from the direction 
of the Lutheran Seminary. 

By 3.10 p. m. Company B was lying down on a front ofgj^ ^^ 
300 yards along the 522 ridge and on both sides of the Car- 
hsle road. Only a few scattered shots met its advance 
thereto, these coming principally from knoll 522 and the 
direction of the Almshouse. After some minutes spent in 
careful observation to the south, the captain wrote the 
message quoted below: 

Carlisle Road, Northwest of Almshouse, 

17 June, 3.25 p. m. 3.25 p. m. 
Maj. B: Hostile trenches visible along low crest about 700 yards south 
of crest I am on. Trenches seem to extend from Harrisburg road to 
include low knoll west of Miimmasburg road. Have drawn fire from 
central trenches due south this point. Only small hostile parties were 
on 522 ridge. 

B, Captain. 

The reports from the two flank patrols were sent back to 
the major as they came in. 

At 3 :30 p. m. Companies D, C, and A were in line of com- 3^0 p. m. 
panics in columns of foure at full intervals across the stream 
line midway between Barlow Knoll and knoll 521. The 
machine guns were in the drawhead northeast of knoll 521. 
Extra ammunition had been issued to the First Battalion. 
The conibat wagons, containing the packs of Companies A, 
C, and D, were east of the Carlisle road, north of the orchard 
north of knoll 521. 

The Second and Third Battahons were in column on the 
Carhsle road, with the tail of the Third Battahon near 
Boyd S. H. Extra ammunition was being issued, and the 
men's packs placed on the emptied combat wagons upon the 
order of the colonel. The colonel with his staff and majors 
was on Barlow Knoll. By 3.35 p. m. he had received the 
reports of Capt. B and of the two flanking patrols from Com- 
pany B. (See sketch No. 3.) 

98755°— 17 3 



34 ' STUDIES m MINOR TACTICS. 

REGIMEiSTTAL COMMANDER' S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Col. A estimates the situation somewhat as follows: The 
reports of Capt. B and those of his two flanking groups 
pretty definitely estabhsh the length and location of the 
hostile trenches. Their length, some 800 yards, indicates 
that at least two Red battalions are in position. In addi- 
tion, the whole or a part of the remaining battalion of the 
enemy's regiment may be in reserve. Some part of this last 
battalion, though, is almost certainly engaged in the work of 
requisitioning and guarding the supplies in Gettysburg, and 
it wiU hardly, therefore, be able to take part as a whole in 
the fight. But whatever the exact hostile dispositions 
may be, the odds, considering in addition to the above the 
reported character of many of the Red soldiers, rather favor 
the Blue regiment. With a reasonable prospect of success, 
the colonel would hardly be justified in permitting the Reds 
to escape with their booty through his failure to attack. In 
fact he has found conditions at Gettysburg exactly as 
expected when he marched from Goldenville. 

Deciding to attack, it is necessary next to consider how 
that attack should be made, whether frontally, or by en- 
veloping the right or the left flank. A purely frontal attack 
should only be made when the ground greatly favors such, 
or an envelopment is not practicable, or would require time 
that can not be spared. Usually that flank is enveloped 
which affords the best cover for the attacker. An envel- 
opment of the hostile left, with the main attack moving in 
the general direction of the railroad, would require an ad- 
vance over nearly flat and entirely open ground to long 
ranges. If the main attack moved west to cover behind 
Oak Ridge, either a portion of the enemy's trenches beyond 
the Blue left would not be engaged, or the regiment would 
be attacking on a dangerously broad front. In the first 
case, an opportunity would be offered the enemy to come out 
of his trenches and attack the exposed Blue left ; and in the 
second case, to attack and defeat the frontal or holding at- 
tack before the main attack was ready to strike. A further 
disadvantage of the attack by way of Oak Ridge lies in the 
close timber about knoU 582. Such timber, with heavy 
undergrowth to break up the attacker's formations and 
make all command and coordination extremely difficult, is 
a very positive disadvantage thereto. If the timber, on 
the other hand, were free from midergrowth and open in 
character, the cover afforded by it would be an equally posi- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



35 



SKETCH No. 3, S'ifua+ion a+ 330 p.m. June 17 




Red Force i » Blue Force 



36 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

tive advantage. In considering these disadvantages of an 
envelopment to the west, the colonel is simply rmming over 
the reasons that caused him at Goldenville to abandon 
the idea of a march along Oak Ridge. An envelopment of 
the hostile right is favored by considerable cover in front 
of that flank, and very much also by the low elevations paral- 
lel to the enemy's trenches, which furnish suitable inter- 
mediary objectives for advancing groups, on which to re- 
build the firing lines. The colonel decides to envelop the 
hostile right. 

He assigns the battalion in advance guard to the sec- 
ondary or frontal attack in order to get strong firing lines 
promptly into position, under the cover of which the deploy- 
ment of the main attack can be made without fear of hostile 
interference. And since this holding attack by the advance 
guard is to be largely by fire, and only to be pushed home 
when the enemy is about to break from the pressure on his 
flank, a very broad frontage will be assigned it. A conven- 
ient line to separate the objectives of the two attacks is fur- 
nished by the Carhsle Road. The First Battalion will be 
assigned the hostile trenches west thereof. The Second Bat- 
talion will be sent east of Barlow Knoll to attack the short 
front between the Carlisle and Harrisburg Roads and to 
make the envelopment east of that objective. The Third 
Battahon and machine guns will at first follow the Second 
Battalion, to be thrown in later as the progress of the action 
makes expedient. The Third Battalion will be used either 
to prolong the enveloping attack or to push the attack for- 
ward where hostile weakness has developed, and the machine 
guns at the decisive moment to bring an intense fire upon 
that portion of the hostile lines where seems to be the best 
chance of penetrating. 

HIS ORDERS AND ARRANGEMENTS. 

3.45 p.m. At 3.45 p. m., the colonel issued verbal orders to the 
three majors, C. O. Machine Gun Company, and staff, on 
Barlow Knoll, as follows : 

The enemy is in an intrenched position on the low ridge 500 yards south 
of the almshouse, extending from the Harrisburg Road to a point about half 
a mile west thereof. 

Company B is deployed across the Carlisle Road on the Almshouse Ridge. 
It has two squads south of Stevens Run, covering our left flank, and two 
squads near the Mummasburg Road on Oak Ridge, covering our right flank. 

The regiment will attack, enveloping the hostile right. March conditions 
ceaee. 



AN INFANTBY REGIMENT. 37 

The First Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Carlisle 
Road, inclusive, to the west. The strong patrols of Company B will be 
left on the duty of flank protection. 

The Second Battalion will proceed across country to the cover of Rock 
Creek and thence south by this knoll (Barlow) to the Harrisburg Road. 
It will then attack the hostile trenches from the Carlisle Road, exclusive, to 
the east and will envelop the enemy's right. 

The Third Battalion and machine guns, in reserve, will follow the Second 
Battalion to cover east of this (Barlow) knoll. 

No advance will be made from the 522, Almshouse ridge, until ordered 
by me. 
. Ambulances and combat wagons will assemble at Boyd S. H. 

The band is at the disposal of the surgeon. 

Messages to this point, with which all battalions will maintain sema- 
phore connection. 

At regimental headquarters the horses were held north 
of Barlow Knoll by orderlies not otherwise engaged. The 
colonel, lieutenant colonel, adjutant, and sergeant major 
were on the knoll. The sergeant major was in immediate 
charge of the details of communication. He had stationed 
one orderly to watch each battalion, keep track of its prog- 
ress, and transmit signal and semaphore messages. Two 
other orderlies, dismounted, were near at hand to carry 
written messages, and two were momited just north of the 
hill for the transmission of messages, where mounted delivery 
was practicable. 

The combat wagons were parked by a supply sergeant, 
off the road, with teamsters alert on the wagons and ready 
to move in either direction at a moment's notice. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, FIRST BATTALION. 

The colonel having completed his order, Maj. B moved 
rapidly to the center of his three companies, on the Carlisle 
Road, midway between Barlow and knoll 521, assembled 
the captains, and directed: 

The enemy occupies an intrenched position about three quarters of a 
mile south of this point. 

The regiment attacks. Company B has a strong patrol near the Mummas- 
burg Road, south of that wooded knoll (pointing to 642). 

This battalion will advance to attack. 

Company D will at once gain 500 yards to the west and will then follow 
the right of the firing line at 400 yards, in support. 

Companies C and A will gain ground to the west until Company C ia near 
the rail fence (pointing to the one 200 yards west of the road). They will 
then advance, Company C, the base company, moving up the little draw 
just east of the fence until I signal "Halt." 

The major sent the sergeant major to conduct the bat- 
talion ammunition wagons to Boyd S. H. 



38 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

When Company A, on the left of C, was about 100 yards 
north of knoll 522, the major signaled to both companies, 
"Halt, lie down, captains join me," this last addressed to 
the captains of Companies C, A, and B. These three officers, 
the major, and his adjutant moved cautiously up to 522 and 
lay down behmd its crest. There the major pointed out the 
indications of hostile trenches less than 700 yards away. 
(The enemy had cut the orchard between knolls 522 and 
527, and burned the farm buildings thereat.) The major 
ordered : 

The second battalion attacks the trenches east of the Carlisle road. 

Thia battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Carlisle road, 
inclusive, to the west. 

Companies C, A, and B, in the order named from right to left, will each 
deploy upon a front of 125 yards, with 25 yards interval between companies, 
the right of Company C at first near that fence corner (pointing to the one 200 
yards west of knoll 522). Objectives: Company B, the hostile trench from 
the Carlisle road, inclusive, to the fence corner about 150 yards west thereof 
(pointing to the one at G in Gettysburg); Company A, from that fence 
corner to include the Mummasburg road about seven fingers to the west; 
Company C, remainder of the hostile trenches. 

Deploy and signal me when you are ready to fire, but await my order to 
commence. 

Make no advance beyond this crest until ordered by me. 

Company B will leave its four squads out to cover our flanks. 

Company D is following the right of the firing line in support. 

I will be behind the center of the firing line. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY A. 

The major havirig fhiished, the captain of Company A 
signaled his lieutenants and his sergeants to come up to the 
crest. The company was lying down in line of platoon 
columns about 100 yards to the north. The captain moved 
to the center of the front assigned his company for deploy- 
ment, lay down so that he could just see over the crest, with 
his four platoon commanders, first sergeant, and remaining 
duty sergeants lying close to him on both sides. All so 
equipped were usmg field glasses. The captain ordered: 

The regiment attacks. 

Catch the red college building at 12 o'clock, and then the hostile trench 
tile right of which is at 7 o'clock therefrom. 

Our objective is that trench. Its total length is about seven fingers. 

The first and second platoons will each cover by their fire the entire 
western half of the company's objective, and the third and fourth platoons 
will each cover the entire eastern half of that objective. 

Give me the range. 

Each man estimated the range. The first sergeant 
dropped back of the crest, and with the help of the musicians. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 39 

quickly took range with the Weldon range finder to the fence 
corner near G in Gettysburg. The captain rejected the 
extreme estimates, took the mean of those remaining, and 
from this mean and the result obtained by the Weldon, de- 
cided upon 600 yards as the distance. Deducting 50 yards, 
so as to bring the sheaf of fire from the line of aiming points 
into the trenches, he announced: 
Aiming point, crest line just above trenches. Range, 550. 

The captain signaled to the company: "As skirmishers, 
march," and " Forward, march" ; then '' Halt, lie down," when 
the skirmish line was about 20 yards back of the crest. 

The platoon leaders caused their squad leaders to crawl 
up to the crest, pointed out the company objective to them, 
and assigned each squad its proportional part, using with 
them the sight leaf instead of "fingers" in designating the 
squad targets. Each squad leader then placed himself 
where the center of his squad was to be, and signaled his 
men to join him by crawling. The squad leader pointed out 
to his men the company and squad objectives, the aiming 
point, gave the range, and when certain that every man 
understood, signaled "Ready" to the platoon leader. These 
platoon leaders in turn signaled "Ready" to the captain 
when all corporals of the platoon had so reported. The 
captain, when aU four of his platoons had reported, signaled 
"Ready" to the major. As soon as ready aU men drew back 
from the crest and hugged the ground. The captain and his 
platoon leaders remained in observation of the foreground 
while awaiting the major's signal to commence firing. 

The deployment of Company C on the right was similar. 
This company sent four scouts as a combat patrol to work 
at first to the farmhouse on the Mummasburg Road southwest 
of 522. That patrol endeavored to keep thi-eo or four 
hundred yards south of the company, and a little farther 
than that to the flank, and to maintain touch with the two 
squads of Company B on the ridge to the west. One man 
on the right of the company watched this patrol, and the 
patrol kept at least one man always in sight of the company. 
Reports of the patrol were made by signals, or extremely 
abbreviated semaphore messages. 

Company B, on the left of the battalion, moved back from 
the crest and closed in to its right. Packs were dropped. 
The orders issued in this company were similar to those 
of Company A, except that, having a shorter objective as- 
signed, the captain ordered each platoon to distribute its 
fire over the company's whole objective, the idea being, of 



40 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

course, to maintain a greater density of fire over the section 
of the objective immediately in front of a rushing platoon. 

Before leaving the First Battalion, let us go further into 
the arrangements therein for communication. The agents 
and means of communication were as follows: Each com- 
pany had one musician lying near the captain watching bat- 
tahon headquarters, the other musician similarly watched 
the four platoon leaders. The battalion had one of its two 
mounted orderlies holding the four horses in the stream 
line 500 yards north of knoll 522. The adjutant was 4 or 
5 yards to the right of the major observing the enemy and 
the three companies of the firing line; the sergeant major, 
who had returned from conducting the empty combat 
wagons to Boyd S. H., was about the same distance to the 
left watching regimental headquarters on Barlow Knoll; 
and the second orderly from a position behind the major 
kept track of Company D (in support). AU of these agents 
were alert to transmit, both ways, forward and back, signals 
and semaphore messages, or in case of necessity to make 
personal delivery. 

Although every care had been taken in the deployment 
to keep under cover, the enemy's attention had nevertheless 
4.25 p. m. been attracted, and he opened fire. By 4.25 p. m, several 
men in the three companies had been hit, and the men gener- 
ally were becoming rather nervous. To keep his battalion 
in hand, the major accordingly signaled, "Commence 
firing," without waiting longer for the deployment of the 
Second Battalion to be completed. The enemy's fire 
increased rapidly in intensity, so that in a few minutes the 
battahon was engaged in a very hot fire fight. Company B 
quickly found it necessary to bring some fire on the Red 
trench east of the Carhsle road, which formed part of the 
objective of the Second Battalion. Its captain did so by 
signaling to the leader of his left platoon, "Shift 5 fingers, 
left." 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, SECOND BATTALION. 

Turning now to the Second Battalion, the head of which 
it will be remembered was near the farm road 650 yards 
3.55 p.m. south of Boyd S. H., we find its major rejoining at 3.55 p. 
m., after having listened to the colonel's attack order. He 
saw that ammunition had been issued during his absence. 
The four companies had been drawn up in double column, 
each column of two companies on the sides of the road. 
The ammunition wagons then had driven down between the 
two columns, and the boxes were quickly dumped into the 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 41 

road and their contents distributed. This issue required 
about 10 minutes. The major ordered the empty wagons 
to proceed to Boyd S. H. as soon as the Second and Third 
Battahons had passed to the south. He then conducted the 
battahon in column of squads across country slightly south 
of east to the steep banks bordering Rock Creek, and along 
these to the south. Nearing Rock Creek the major directed 
the leading company to double time a squad ahead to gain a 
couple of himdred yards on the battalion as its point, and to 
send a second squad across Rock Creek to march as a flank 
patrol east of the fringe of timber. The head of the battahon 
had arrived between Barlow KjioU and 474W when the 
heavy fire of the First Battahon opened. The major 
assembled his captains on the southeast nose of Barlow 
Knoll, and at 4.30 p. m. directed: '-'^ p- "• 

The right of the Red trenches is about a thousand yards down this road 
(Harrisburg). 

The regiment is attacking. The First Battalion is now engaged on our 
right. 

This battalion will envelop the enemy's right. 

Company E will deploy with its left on this road (Harrisburg), and will 
at once advance to attack the enemy's trenches between the Harrisburg 
(inclusive) and Carlisle roads (exclusive). 

Company F will deploy with its right on the road and will advance with 
Company E. 

Companies G and H in support, will continue south along Rock Creek at 
300 yards. 

I will follow Company F. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY E. 

The captain immediately doubled timed over to his com- 
pany and ordered: 

The enemy is intrenched about a thousand yards to the southwest. We 
attack straight down this road. Scouts out. 

He signaled, "As skirmishers, guide left." The second 
lieutenant and one scout from each squad double timed, 
deployed at about seven paces interval, for the Almhouse 
Ridge. The company followed in quick time at 200 yards. 
That ridge gained the scouts lay down. The heutenant 
dropped back to meet the captain, and reported that two 
orchards west and southwest of the Almhouse were down; 
that the enemy's trenches were in full view only five or six 
hundred yards away, and that the Almhouse Ridge would 
make a suitable position for opening fire. The preliminary 
orders and arrangements for firing were similar in Company 
E to those of Company A, previously described, although 
executed with much less dehberation than in the case of the 



42 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS. 

4.45 p. m. latter. At 4.45 p. m., Company E opened fii-e. Company F, 
east of the Harrisbm-g Road, with the exception of a few 
men on the extreme right, could not see the hostile trenches, 
and except the right squad, did not open fire with Com- 
pany E. 

At this time Companies G and H were in column of twos 
in the timber along Kock Creek, with the head of Company G 
at the fence corner somewhat north of east of the Almhousc. 
A patrol of four men from Company G was at the mouth of 
Stevens Run. The flanking patrol of one squad from Com- 
pany E was on the nose 400 yards east of Company G. 

PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK 4.45 TO 5.15 P. M. 

4.45 p.m. At 4.45 p. m., the Third BattaUon and the Machine Gun 
Company were east of Barlow KnoU. The colonel verbally 
directed the captain of that company : 

Put your guns on the Almhouse Ridge between the First and Second 
Battalions and open fire. Target: The red trenches east of the Carlisle 
Road. 

The colonel had the Second BattaUon signaled to advance. 
Its major signaled "Forward" to Company F on the left of 
the firing line. That company moved steadily forward 
without halting until it reached the nose south of the Aim- 
house. The Reds met this movement by deploying a 
company east of the Harrisburg Road in prolongation of 
their trenches west thereof. And Company F and this new 
Red company immediately engaged in a hot fire with less 
than 400 yards separating their men. As soon as the Reds 
prolonged their firing hne in this manner, the major sema-. 
phored the leading company of his support, which had 
moved forward with Company F, "R. L. F." (customary 
abbreviation in the battalion for "reinforce left of Company 
F"). Thereupon Company G deployed from the timber 
along Rock Creek, moved forward until its skirmishers pro- 
longed the line of Company F to the eastward; and joined 
that company in its fire fight with the Red company east of 
the Harrisburg Road. Company E on the right of F 
advanced by platoon rushes to the orchard west of the road. 
Tlie machine guns opened fire from the knoll northwest 
5.00 p. m. ^f the Almshouse at 5 p. m. Regimental headquarters, 
after ordering the Third Battahon to advance along Rock 
Creek to Stevens Run, moved forward to the crest north of 
the Almshouse. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 43 

At 5.10 p. m., Red skirmish lines appeared north of the^-^"?'^- 
eastern exit of Gettysburg. Companies F and G by this 
time had gained a decided fire superiority over their Red 
opponents, and wore beginning to gain ground by platoon 
laishes from the left. The fire, however, of the fresh hostile 
skirmishers north of Stevens Run and of several machine 
guns which opened from the same direction with them 
quickly stopped the Blue advance; and the two companies 
were soon suffering severely, notwithstanding the active 
support of the Blue machine guns. Immediately upon the 
appearance of these red reinforcements, the colonel sent 
verbal orders by his adjutant, accompanied by one orderly, 
to the Third Battalion : 

Attack eastern exit Gettysburg at once. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, THIKD BATTALION. 

In compliance with this order, the major of the Third 
Battalion put the battalion in march to the south, and, at 
5.17 p. m., standing 50 yards south of the mouth of Stevens ^"^^P" ™' 
Run, directed his leading captain: 

We attack the eastern exit of Gettysbui'g. 

Deploy, guide left, and advance at once witli your left marcliing on that 
white house (pointing to the nearest one of Gettysliurg on the York Turn- 
pike). 

Company K will deploy on your left. 

I win support you with the remaining companies. 

When the second company (K) came up, the major 
directed his captain: 

We are attacking the eastern exit of Gettysburg. 

Deploy, guide right, and prolong the left of Company I, which is the 
base company. 
The remaining companies will follow in support. 
I will follow the firing line at 50 yards. 

As the third and fourth companies came up he directed 
each captain: 

Companies I and K are attacking the eastern exit of Gettysburg. L and 
M, M on the left, will follow in support behind the left of K at 200 yards. 
M company will send a platoon at once to Benner's Hill to protect our left. 

Companies I and K advanced through the flanking 
patrol of Company B, and opened fire. To oppose them 
the enemy very soon deployed nearly an equal number of 
rifles. Each company (I and K) took roughly half of the 
front opposing them, and the platoons in like manner 
divided up the company's objective. The major almost 
immediately prolonged the firing line to the left by sending 
forward Company L. 



44 STTJDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

By this advance of the Third Battalion the pressure on 
the Second Battalion was relieved. The major of the Second 
Battalion deployed his last company over the front of the 
whole battahon and sent it into the firing line. The First 
Battalion extended its right also with its last company. The 
fire of all the companies and of the machine guns rose rapidly 
in intensity. The hostile fire, on the other hand, everywhere 
immediately lost in effectiveness. Between the Carlisle 
Road and Stevens Run it, in fact, grew wild. The Second 
Battalion began to gain ground by company rushes from the 
left. The enemy in front of this battalion left his trenches, 
and ran to the rear. The colonel signaled "Charge" to all 
of the battalions, and the musicians throughout the regiment 
sounded the charge. As the lines rushed forward, the 
enemy broke everywhere except east of Gettysburg, and 
in the last trenches northwest of Penn College. In these 
last some 200 men hung on until aU of them were captured 
by the movement westward of portions of the Second 
Battalion. 

The colonel rushed the machine guns forward to take up 
the fire pursuit. While these quickly cleared the main north 
and south streets of Gettysburg, they were not able to do 
much damage elsewhere because of the cover afforded the 
enemy by the buildings in the town. 

THE PURSUIT. 

When it became evident at regimental headquarters that 
the end of the action was approaching, the horses were 
brought forward. The colonel and staff mounted and gal- 
loped up to the Red trenches on the Carlisle Road. There 
the First Battalion was found less disorganized than the Sec- 
ond; the Third was still engaged east of the town. The 
colonel therefore hastened to the major of the First Battalion, 
whose companies were assembling near the hostile trenches on 
w p. m. ^}jQ Mummasburg Road, and at 5.55 p. m. directed: 

The Third Battalion is still engaged east of town. 

Take up the pursuit at once through Gettysburg with your battalion and 
the machine-gun company. 

The colonel then had the adjutant send a mounted orderly 
with orders for the field train, still back at Texas, to come up 
to Gettysburg, and for the combat wagons to pick up the 
packs of Company B and also come on to Gettysburg. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



45 



The major, First Battalion, assembled his captains at a 
double time, without interrupting the reorganization of the 
four companies, and, at 6 p. m., ordered: cp.m. 

The Third Battalion is still engaged with hostile forces east of Gettysburg. 
This battalion and the machine guns pursue at once. 
Company D will proceed by the Mummasburg road and the first street 
east of Penn College straight south through Gettysburg. 



SKETCH No.^. Posi+ion a+ 53-2 P.M.- Jixne 17. 




Blue Force 



Company B, to Carlisle road, and thence due south. 
Both companies will move rapidly. 

Companies A and C and the machine guns, in the order named, will follow 
Company D at 400 yards. 

Leave small details in charge of your prisoners, and to search for wounded. 
I will be at head of Company A. 



46 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The mkjor sent the battalion adjutant to the captain of 
the machine gun company to notify him that the colonel had 
attached his command to the First Battalion for the pursuit, 
and to direct him to follow Company C. 

Each leading company (D and B) moved out at once 
double timing a platoon 200 yards in advance. Each of 
these platoons hurried a squad 150 yards to its front. Both 
Companies D and B were throughout in double column of 
files, one colmnn on each side of the street. At the first cross 
street to the east. Company B, on the left, sent a platoon as 
left flank guard to the next north and south street. Com- 
pany D similarly sent a squad to right. 

In passmg through the town, the First Battalion picked 
up about 50 Reds, who were turned over to a couple of squads 
of the last company to be assembled at the central square. 

As soon as the advanced groups of Companies D and B 
emerged from the town, they received a hot fire from the 
national cemetery. These companies deployed immediately 
across the Taneytown and the Baltimore turnpikes. 

The major turned the main body west by the cross street 
just north of the race track, and southwest by the country 
road. Near the group of houses opposite the southern part 
of the race track, the major, halting the battalion, took his 
three captains to the nose a hundred yards still farther to the 
south, and directed: 

The machine guns will take station in this vicinity and fire on the ceme- 
tery. 

Companies A and B will deploy, Company B on the right, the left of 
Company A west of this point, and will then advance. Company B will 
direct its left upon that yellow house (pointing to the H, Bishop farmhouse). 
Company B will send a strong patrol to Seminary Ridge. 

I will follow the left of Company A. 

Under the fire of the machine guns, and upon the advance 
of Companies A and B, and of a portion of the Third Bat- 
talion across country east of Gettysburg, the hostile resistance 
quickly broke down. By 7 o'clock Cemetery Hill was in 
possession of the First Battalion, which was pursuing by fire 
down the Taneytown Road small rapidly retreating groups 
of the enemy. 

All the battalions sent parties to search, for wounded, the 
ground over which they had attacked. By early evening 
their reports mdicated that there had been some 121 casual- 
ties distributed about as follows: 

First Battalion— 1 officer, 6 men killed, 30 wounded. 

Second Battahon — 2 officers, 9 men killed, 45 wounded. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT, 47 

Third Battalioii^l officer, 5 men killed, 20 wounded. 
Machine-gun company — 2 wounded. 
About 70 Red wounded were found. 

COMMENT. 

With reference to the whole conduct of the attack, certain 
things are to be noted. 

While prompt action was of great importance in prevent- 
ing the escape of the enemy with his booty, nevertheless the 
colonel did not throw his regiment into the fight until the 
reconnaissance of the advance guard had made it pretty 
certam just where the hostile trenches were located and 
what was their extent. The long range of modern rifles 
renders exceedingly difficult any change in the direction of 
attack of troops once committed to action. Unless it is 
known beforehand where the enemy is, troops can only by 
chance advance in the direction for striking him. A com- 
mand that attacks with an incorrect direction line will at 
best simply strike a blow in the air, and at worst will be 
anniliilated by flanking or enfilade fire from the enemy's 
real position. Moreover, unless the enemy has been rather 
definitely located, the attack can hardly be made syste- 
matically and upon a well-cbnsidered plan, but the troops 
will have to be sent piecemeal simply to meet the exigencies 
of the engagement as they arise. Such a haphazard attack, 
even if its direction lines happen to be right, will have little 
chance of success unless made with an overwhelming supe- 
riority in numbers. The colonel, having these principles in 
mind, curbed, therefore, his impatient desire to get the 
action started, and waited quietly for more than an hour 
while liis advance guard was clearing up the situation. 

Such quiet waiting can of course easily be carried to an 
excess. Probably no commander ever feels certain that he 
has learned the exact situation on the other side. The 
determination, consequently, of the proper moment for con- 
cluding that no more information can be awaited, but that 
from what has already been obtained a certain hostile situa- 
tion must be assumed to exist, and an attack based upon 
that assumption must be ordered, calls ordinarily for the 
exercise of the nicest judgment. 

It might be asked why the colonel did not take advantage 
of this long period of waiting for information to bring up 
the Second and Third Battalions from their halting place 
south of Boyd S. H. into assembly positions rather close 
behind the advance guard. The answer, of course, is that 



48 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

the colonel had not yet made up his mind just how he 
would attack. By leaving the bulk of the regiment, mi til 
this decision was made, as far back as possible without 
dangerously isolating the advance guard, the movement 
then of these battalions to the right or left for deployment 
could be better covered irom hostile view, and the attack- 
ing battalions could be directed from a greater distance 
exactly toward their proper objectives, and so have all of 
their movements in deployment partake less of the nature 
and dangers of flank marches. 

The question of when to drop the packs, it is believed, 
will usually be a difficult one to answer. If as soon as an 
advance guard encounters a delaying lorce of the enemy, 
it immediately drops the packs, then, when the enemy is 
driven away, either much time is lost in going back for 
them, or they are left miles to the rear and are perhaps not 
seen again for many days, if at all. On the other hand, it 
is a great advantage in a prolonged engagement to relieve 
the men of this burden. In Col. A's engagement the fight 
promised to be serious enough to make it expedient to take 
them off, and there was hkely to be no difficulty in getting 
them up later, since he had no idea of a prolonged pursuit 
south of Gettysburg. But the colonel, and not one of his 
subordinates, was the proper one to make the decision. 

The method employed by the advance guard in its pre- 
liminary reconnaissance was the one that will ordinarily 
best serve. A detachment of considerable size must be 
deployed upon a broad front and sent straight toward 
where the enemy's main strength is thought to be, to drive 
in the groups by which he mil screen his dispositions, and 
so compel him to disclose his main position. In the case 
in question, a single company sufficed to lay bare the front 
of the enemy's position. It might have been necessary to 
deploy the greater part of the advance guard had the hos- 
tile covering detachments proved of greater strength, and 
Maj. B w^as prepared, and had grouped Ms other companies 
so as to be able to meet this necessity. While clearing up 
the front in this manner, strong patrols must be sent at the 
same time to the right and to the left to determine the 
hmits of the hostile position. Usually the general terrain 
and the previous idea of the strength of the opposing force 
will enable a guess to be made as to the location of the 
flanks. The patrols testing its accuracy are assigned routes 
which, if the guess is correct, will take them by the enemy. 
If the guess has not been correct, then other points still 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 49 

farther to the flank must be promptly tested. The patrols 
should be strong so as to drive in the corresponding security 
detachments of the other side and be able to detach men 
for close examination of particular points. The two flank- 
ing patrols of this problem met exactly similar bodies and 
were unable to gain much ground. But they, nevertheless, 
got far enough to locate very accurately the extrem.ities of 
the Red line. Such reconnoitering groups must work boldly 
and rapidly, giving but little thought to their own safety, 
or the information they obtain, if any at all is obtained, 
will come in to headquarters too late to be of much value. 

Next should be noted the care taken by the colonel to 
secure a imited attack by ordering that no advance be made 
from the 522 ridge until further orders. Had the First Bat- 
talion attempted to move forward from that ridge before the 
Second Battalion was ready, the First would probably at 
best have suffered severely, or might even have been defeated, 
by the concentration upon it over perfectly open ground of 
the entire hostile fire. This coordination of the two attacks 
might also have been obtained by ordering the First Battahon 
to "support" the attack of the Second, which would have 
made the Second Battalion the guide of the movement. 
Such an order would, however, have required the First Bat- 
tahon to divert agents of communication from other duties 
to keep track of the progress of the Second Battalion, while 
the regimental headquarters was already most conveniently 
located and had the proper personnel for the performance 
of this duty. 

The initial deployment of the regiment was upon a front 
of shghtly over a thousand yards. This is not excessive for a 
regiment (at war strength be it remembered) acting alone, 
because an affair between regiments will last a comparatively 
short time, and there will consequently not be the same 
need for relatively large supports and reserves to replace 
losses and push the firing line forward that will be found in 
an engagement between larger bodies. After the attack- 
ing lines had compelled the enemy to throw in his reserves, 
and make his dispositions and intentions reasonably clear, 
there was no hesitation on the colonel's part to put in all of 
his men, and to meet the hostile extension by a very consid- 
erable extension of his own lines. He did not permit him- 
self to be prevented from so using all of his men by the 
possibility that the enemy still had other reserves, or that 
perhaps other hostile forces would soon be coming in to 
98755°— 17 4 



50 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

help the one Red regiment reported. Such risk had to be 
taken. War can not successfully be made without taking 
chances. Judgment is displayed by taking only those in 
which the risk is reasonable or necessary. 

As is usually the case in an enveloping attack, the enemy 
finally presented a salient in his lines near the Harrisburg 
Road, which broke under the concentrated fire the Blues 
were thereby enabled to bring upon it. 

Everyone concerned, from a captain of an outside com- 
pany through the majors to the colonel, kept the matter of 
flank protection constantly in mind. The regimental com- 
mander perhaps need not have said anything in his attack 
order about it, since the steps already taken by Company B 
in sending out two strong patrols incidentally could amply 
provide for security. But those patrols went out primarily 
for information. Having obtained that, and the company 
being assigned another task with no mention of the duty 
of security therein, it was possible that these patrols might 
be drawn in or might fail to realize that their mission had 
changed from reconnaissance to security. The matter was 
of too great importance to . run any chance of misunder- 
standing, and accordingly was provided for in the regimental 
order. 

Means of communication and connection throughout 
the command, from the squads to the regimental headquar- 
ters, were systematically and carefully provided in advance 
of the necessity for their use. For such purposes, agents 
of communication must be trained for specific duties, unless 
detachments are to be lost sight of, and a failure of com- 
munication to result. A careful organization of the whole 
system of information and commmiication, both in the bat- 
talion and in the regiment, must be provided by those directly 
responsible if these organizations are to be combined into 
a smoothly working team. For distances up to 1,200 yards, 
and even with favorable conditions of light up to a mile, 
the semaphore flag (which can be used prone or kneehng 
as well as standing) will quite frequently be of the utmost 
value. But in using it, as well as in using any other system 
of signahng, the messages must be highly condensed and 
abbreviated. And the agents must not simply have a fair 
knowledge of their systems but must be expert. When 
using the semaphore it must also be remembered that no 
one system is ordinarily sufficient to meet all demands for 
commimication. It is frequently advisable, even with a 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 51 

most efficient system of signalling in existence, to make per- 
sonal delivery of certain messages. 

Whenever practicable, both in the battalion and in the 
companies, there was careful designation of objectives and 
of targets to secure proper distribution and accuracy of fire. 
These preliminary measures were hurried or omitted only 
when the exigencies of immediate action made it imperatively 
necessary to do so. Time spent in such measures for the 
adjustment of fire, unless carried to an excess, is ordinarily 
well expended. 

The machine guns were kept at first in reserve, to go 
into action only when the fight had progressed far enough 
to make rather certain where the attack had the best chance 
of getting home. Then the colonel put in these guns to obtain 
their powerful assistance in beating down the hostile fire over 
the limited front east of the Carlisle road. 

Finally, it is well to note tliat the colonel, after the attack 
order, remained quietly in one spot until the action was 
nearly over, issuing meantime comparatively few orders. 
After starting his battalions toward the enemy b)^ that 
initial order, he had practically nothing to do but to watch 
carefully the progress of the action and determine therefrom 
just when and wliere to put his reserves. Yet this decision 
was of such moment that it justified the absorption of liis 
entire thought. He permitted his subordinates to make 
their deployments and dispositions, with system and deUb- 
eration, and without hurrying by or interference from regi- 
mental headquarters. And in aU of his orders he assigned 
only tasks, carefully abstaining from any directions as to the 
manner of execution ; this must be left to the discretion of a 
competent subordinate. 

SANITARY ARRANGEMENTS. 

The sanitary personnel with a regiment consists of 4 
officers, 4 noncommissioned officers, and 20 privates first 
class or privates. Before the command entrained at Car- 
lisle, the regimental surgeon, by direction of the colonel, 
distributed the sanitary personnel as follows: With each 
battahon, one officer, one noncommissioned officer, five 
privates, the latter including the officer's orderly. He him- 
self remained with the commanding officer and the rest of the 
personnel or aid-station party followed in the mixed section. 

When the regiment detrained, this formation was adhered 
to, and on the march each battalion was followed by its 
detachment. 



52 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The aid-station party with the three ambulances followed 
the regiment. 

As soon as the order for the attack on the Red position 
was given, the colonel placed the band at the disposal of the 
regimental surgeon. Each battalion detachment followed its 
battalion into the engagement, keeping as close to the 
firing line as the terrain permitted. During the fighting, 
all the wounded who could be reached were given first-aid 
treatment, and if possible they were removed to some pro- 
tected spot until further evacuation could be safely carried 
out. 

The aid station party and the band remained in the ravine 
in front of Barlow KnoU, and under the direction of the 
regimental surgeon established an aid station at that point 
when necessary. 

By 5.30 p. m. this aid station had been abandoned as the 
line advanced and was now established in the ravine at the 
county almshouse. A few slightly wounded had been 
received at the first station, and when the advance took 
place a noncommissioned officer of the band and a sanitary 
private were left in charge of them. 

At the second station the terrain was favorable to a partial 
collection of the wounded, and litter squads composed of 
bandsmen were sent out to the several battalions to bring 
in as many men as possible. 

As soon as the enemy was driven from his position and 
protection from rifle fire was no longer a factor the regimental 
surgeon moved the aid station to the county almshouse and 
sent his orderly to Boyd S. H. to direct that the ambulances 
repair immediately to the battle field. The sanitary person- 
nel of the First Battalion accompanied it in the pursuit and 
cared for the wounded who fell during the second engage- 
ment. 

The sanitary personnel and the band, with the assistance 
of the details from the combatant troops and the ambulances, 
collected the wounded into the regimental aid station. At 
that time it was found that there were 10 nontransportable, 
very severe cases; 39 moderately severe, but able to stand 
transportation; 48 slightly wounded, 13 of whom required 
very little attention and could immediately rejoin their 
companies. In addition to these there were 67 severely 
wounded Reds. 

The regimental surgeon requested that rail transportation 
be sent from Carlisle to Gettysburg on the morning of June 
18 to remove 39 severely and 35 slightly wounded Blues, 



AN INFANTRY EEGIMENT. 53 

and 54 severely wounded Reds. This was approved by the 
colonel and foi'warded to division headquarters. Pursuant 
to this request a train consisting of four baggage cars and 
one ordinary passenger coach arrived at 7 a. m. and by 
9 a. m., with the use of the ambulances and vehicles, the 
wounded capable of being transported had been loaded on 
the train, which immediately started on its return journey 
to Carlisle. 

The 10 Blue and 13 Red nontransportable wounded were 
left in the almshouse, at which point a small temporary 
hospital was established. 

COMMENT. 

The distribution of the sanitary personnel with a regiment 
on the march and when preparing for an attack as outlined 
above is solely to provide for efficient assistance for all parts 
of the command without delay or confusion. By this 
arrangement a battalion ordered to some duty away from 
the regiment will always have its proper quota of sanitary 
assistance. 

Attention is called to the fact, as emphasized in this 
problem, that the regimental aid station is nothing more 
than a collecting point for the wounded. No elaborate 
treatment is contemplated and the administering of first aid 
is all that can be expected. This station is established 
whenever there is a sufficient number of wounded in a given 
area who can be collected in one protected spot, without 
undue exposure of the sanitary troops. This point is not 
fixed and there may be several such locations during an 
engagement as shown above. As the line advances the 
station advances, after collecting all the wounded in the first 
area. A point protected from direct rifle fire is selected as 
close to the line as possible and collection of the wounded 
into this station is begun at once. Wlien an advance of the 
station is ordered a detail sufficiently large to administer to 
the wants of the wounded is left at each location. 

A pursuit by a force of any size should be provided with 
some sanitary personnel. Casualties are very apt to occur 
and assistance would be needed at once ; therefore the person- 
nel attached to the First Battalion accompanied it in the 
pursuit, leaving the remainder of the detachment to collect 
and care for the wounded of the main engagement. 

After wounded are collected and dressed immediate efforts 
should be made to remove them to the rear. It might be 
said that the facilities presented in the town of Gettysburg 



54 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

for the care of the small number of wounded were ample, and 
no evacuation would be necessary. Though this is in part 
true, still several factors should be given more weight in 
considering this matter. In the first place the enemy might 
be reinforced and in turn compel the evacuation of the town, 
causing all of these wounded to fall into theh hands. Sec- 
ondly, the problem of supply for even a small command 
requires careful consideration, and if men are present who 
can not be used on the firing Mne for some time they should 
be removed as extra mouths to be fed without conunensurate 
services returned. 

The casualties in engagements are, unless more detailed 
information is provided, divided into their categories by the 
following percentages, which have been worked out accord- 
ing to the detailed reports of modern campaigns: 

Per cent. 

Killed 20 

Severely wounded: 

Nontransportable 8 

Transportable, sitting 20 

Transportable, recumbent 12 

Slightly wounded: 

Able to walk to dressing station or field hospital 28 

Able to walk to advance depot 12 

It should be noted that the Red wounded are aU classed 
as severe cases. This conclusion is arrived at by assuming 
that the slightly wounded have retreated with their own 
troops. 



A HALT FOR THE NIGHT. 



ARRANGEMENTS AND ORDERS, REGIMENTLAL HEADQUARTERS. 

At 6.15 p. m. the colonel directed the major, Second Bat- 6.15 p.m. 
talion : 

Leave one company to collect all the prisoners and confine them for the 
night in Penn College. Also leave detachments to search for your wounded. 
March the remainder of your battalion to the Taneytown Road at the 
southern exit of Gettysburg. 

The colonel then sent the adjutant to direct the Thii'd 
Battalion, the firing of which by this time had died away, 
to proceed to the Baltimore Turnpike at the southern exit of 
Gettysburg. The colonel, himself, went ahead in the direc- 
tion of the steady firing to be heard south of town, and 
from its outskirts watched the successful attack of the First 
Battalion. At its conclusion, he directed the battalion com- 
mander: 

Do not pursue farther. We will camp for the night east of the race 
track — the three battalions in the usual order from north to south. Wliich 
of your companies can best go on outpost? 

Company A, then, will take station in the vicinity of Cemetery Hill, 
and will secure the command from the Emmitsburg Road to the Baltimore 
Turnpike, both inclusive. Transmit this order to its captain. 

The adjutant will mark the company streets. 

Reserve rations to-night. The wagons will not be up for some hours. 
The combat wagons have been ordered to pick up the packs of Company B. 

The colonel then sent the adjutant to the Machine Gun 
Company, with orders for that organization to proceed to 
the race track. The colonel personally rode to the other 
two battalions and directed their majors: 

The enemy is retreating to the south in considerable disorder. 

We will camp east of the race track — battalions in the usual order from 
north to south. The adjutant is posting the company flags. 

Company A takes station on Cemetery Hill to secure the command from 
the Emmitsburg road to the Baltimore turnpike. 

Reserve rations to-night. The wagons will not be up for some hours. 
Your combat wagons have been ordered to bring up the packs. 

Go on to the camp ground. 

The colonel directed the major of the Third Battalion to 
have his adjutant report for duty with a reconnoitering 

55 



66 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

7.30 p.m. patrol. When the adjutant reported, the colonel, at 7.30 
p. m., directed: 

The enemy has retired by the Taney town road in. considerable confusion. 
We are going into camp south of Gettysburg. 

I want you to select four orderlies, follow the enemy, and remain in con- 
tact with him. Let me know where he camps to-night. 

While camp was being made the colonel directed the 
guard company to station a cossack post on knoll 574 of 
vSeminary Ridge, west of camp, a sentry south of camp and 
one at the picket line north of camp, and also to establish a 
signal station on the highest building immediately east of 
camp for observation of the surrounding country and for 
communication with the outpost. 

The ammunition supply was low, and very unequally 
distributed. There seemed to be an average of about 40 
rounds per man, and some 2,000 rounds in the machine-gun 
company. The ordnance officer was directed to redistribute 
so as to equalize throughout the regiment. 

Two hundred and fifty Red unwounded prisoners had 
been captured, in addition to the 67 severely wounded. 

Five days' rations were still stored at Table Rock Station 
under a small guard. During the night the quartermaster 
hired seven civilian teams, which he sent at daybreak with 
the empty ration wagons to bring these rations from Table 
Rock to Gettysburg. 

The railroad officials reported the track intact to the 
north. 

The colonel forwarded the following telegraphic report : 

First Infantry, 
Gettysburg, 17 June, 9.20 p. m. 
Chief Staff, Carlisle: 

Found First Red Infantry in position north of Gettysburg. Attacked and 
defeated it. Enemy retired in disorder to south . Am now camped southern 
outskirts Gettysburg. Had 120 casualties. Captured 250 unwounded Reds 
and 67 severely wounded. Have average only 40 rounds ammunition. 
Request 300,000 rounds ammunition be shipped Gettysburg by rail to-night. 
Also cars for evacuation Red prisoners and 93 severely and 35 slightly 

wounded. 

A, Colonel. 

OUTPOST ARRANGEMENTS AND ORDERS. 

The colonel's order to establish an outpost having been 
transmitted to the captain of Company A, the latter 
marched that organization to the orchard about 300 yards 
south of Cemetery Hill, where he halted the company, and, 



AN INFANTRY EEGIMENT. 57 

assembling Lis officers and noncommissioned officcre, 
directed: 

The enemy is retreating rapidly to the south. 

Our regiment camps east of the race track. 

This company will take station in this vicinity to furnish the outpost. 

Corpl. L, take your squad, as outguard No. 1, down the road to the right 
(Emmitsburg) about half a mile to the crossing of that road and the railroad. 

Sergt. M, take the second and third squads, as outguard No. 2, to the 
road fork about three-quarters of a mile south on the Taney town Road. 

Corpl. N, station your squad, as outguard No. 3, on the Baltimore Turn- 
pike, north of the stream which runs just north of those hills [pointing to 
Powers and McAllister Hills]. 

All outguards will get signal communication with the company station, 
which will be established on the house just south of us. 

Lieut. B will take charge of the company. Explain the situation to the 
men. Put an observatijon post at the house south of us. Establish com- 
munication with the outguards and with the camp of the Regiment. 

Get water from the farmhouse [pointing to one just to the south]. Put 
a sentry over the well. Collect rations and put men to work getting supper. 
Reserve rations to-night. Arrange to use the farmhouse range for cooking. 
Our wagons and packs will not be up for some hours. Check up our 
ammunition. 

Lieut. 0, prepare an outpost sketch. I will locate the troops thereon 
when I retiu'n from inspecting the outguards. 

Corpl. P, you and L, M, and N will come with me. 

I am going to visit the outguards from the right to the left. 

The captain first looked at the ground near by with a 
view to defense, and determined in case of hostile advance 
from the south or southwest to occupy the southern edge of 
the orchard on knoll 606, and if the enemy should advance 
along the Baltimore Turnpike, to move back to Cemetery 
Hill. 

He then started with Corpl. P and his men across country 
to the southwest. He found that Corpl. L, in charge of 
outguard No. 1, had posted his squad east of the road just 
south of the southernmost of the N. Codori houses, with one 
sentry 25 yards down the road. The corporal intended to 
cut wire to barricade the road just beyond the sentry. Two 
of his men had collected the rations and were arranging to 
cook supper in one of the farmhouses. One man was at the 
northernmost house to get semaphore connection with the 
Company. The captain notified Corpl. L that he need do 
no patrolling at night, except to investigate something 
suspicious. 

From outguard No. 1 the captain and his patrol pro- 
ceeded to No. 2, by the railroad track, southeast to the 
unimproved road, and thence along it between knolls 566 
and 592 to the 545 road fork. The main body of Sergt. 



58 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

M's picket was bivouacking in the southern edge of the 
orchard north of the road fork. A cossack post was on knoll 
592 with its sentry up a tree in observation of the Taney- 
town Road. At dark the cossack post was to be drawn in 
to the picket. One sentry was posted at the picket. The 
two roads were barricaded about 25 yards out. After dark 
a sentry was to be posted near each barricade. As in the 
first outguard, the rations had been combined and supper 
was being prepared in the farmhouse north of the orchard. 
One signaler at that house had made semaphore connection 
with the company. The captain directed the sergeant to 
send a patrol of three men, every hour, 1 mile to the 
south, and upon a hostile advance in any strength greater 
than a recoimoitering patrol to fall back promptly mitil 
abreast of the company on the Taney town Road. 

The captain went to outguard No. 3 by the road to the 
east, and then north between Powers and McAllister Hills. 
The outguard was at the southern house with a sentry 
posted, one signaler on the northern house in communica- 
tion with the company, and two men in the last-named 
house getting the combined supper. The captain directed 
that the stream crossing be barricaded, and, in case of a 
hostile advance, that the outguard retire along the Balti- 
more Turnpike, delaying the enemy as much as possible. 
He informed the corporal that hourly patrols would be sent 
from the company by the route the captain had come, and 
directed the corporal to require each patrol leader to name 
himself before being allowed to cross the stream. 

All three of the outguards had either an electric torch 
or lanterns with which to signal a hostile advance in strength, 
and these means were to be used for no other purpose. 
The farmhouses near each outguard were required to be 
kept absolutely dark. 

The captain got back to the company about 8.30 p. m. 
He found that the packs had come up, and a bivouac of the 
company in one Ime just north of the two houses had been 
prepared. Semaphore connection fron one of the houses 
had been made with each outguard, and by flag with a house 
in Gettysbm'g, on which was the regimental station. The 
field wagons had not appeared. He ordered a barricade 
of the road 25 yards to the south and one sentry squad 
into the position, just south of the houses, in which, if re- 
quired, the company would fight at night. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 59 

The captain thcii prepared the following report, the 
back of which carried Lieut. C's. sketch (No. 5) : 

Co. A, AT Farmhouse, 400 Yards South of Cemetery Hill, 8-15 p. m. 

n June, 8.45 p. VI. 
Colonel A : 

Comjiauy A posted as ou sketch. In case hostile advance on Taneytown 
Road will defend this locality; if on Baltimore Pike will defend Ceme- 
tery Hill. I have only 50 rounds ammunition per man. 

A, (Captain. 

This he sent to regimental headquarters by a messenger, 
directing the man after delivering the report to wait for 
the baggage wagon and come back on it. 

The baggage and ration wagons joined the company at 
9.45, were unloaded, and returned to the regimental camp. 

The captain caused patrols of three men each to traverse 
hourly the route followed by him in visiting the outguards. 
The first three patrols sent out were each guided by one of 
the men that had gone about with the captain. 

COMMENT. 

With a badly beaten enemy, the regiment can safely 
trust to the simplest measures for securing its camp. In 
this case, though, as in all other cases, the prime requisite 
is that touch shall be maintained with the retreating enemy. 
Only mounted men can satisfactorily accomplish this mis- 
sion. That contact the colonel provides for by sending a 
single small patrol. After that, one company a short dis- 
tance to the south furnishes ample protection. 

In that company again the most simple measures, con- 
sisting only in placing three small detachments on the main 
roads to the south, are sufficient. Practically the only func- 
tion of these is to give the company a few minutes to get into 
position for action. In the absence of mounted men with the 
outguards, some system of signalling both by day and by 
night is required m order to give sufficient warning to the 
company of a hostile advance. Even if moimted men were 
available, the use of signals would stiU be the more rapid 
means. 

Under the circumstances, furthermore, no elaborate 
system of patrolling is called for. But little more is there- 
fore provided than a visiting patrol, which incidentally 
covers the ground between outguards frequently enough to 
have a reasonable prospect of discovering in time a hostile 
movement in strength across country. 



60 



STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 



Notwithstanding the fact that the regiment has had a 
considerable initial success, it is still in a dangerous situa- 
tion through its isolation so near the hostile territory, and 
before an enemy that has shoAvn himself by no means lack- 
ing in energy and aggressiveness. Col. A. may have to 



SKETCH No.5 Oufpost. Nighf June 17-18 




light again to-morrow. If he does, with only 40 rounds of 
ammunition per man, he will stand little chance of success. 
To get at least enough ammunition to-night to refill the 
men's belts and the combat wagons, is therefore the most 
important matter now requiring the colonel's attention. 



THE DEFENSE. 



SITUATION. 



During the night of June 17-18 a train brought suffi- 
cient ammunition to refill the belts and ammunition wagons, 
and also empty cars which took the wounded and prisoners 
back to Carhsle. 

On the 18th the chief of staff telegraphed that the re- 
mainder of the First Brigade would be sent by rail to Gettys- 
burg, where its first train should arrive by 10 a. m. on the 
19th. Three reports were received from the mounted patrol 
sent to the south — the first to the effect that the defeated 
Red regiment camped at Centennial S. H. for the night after 
the fight; the second that at 4 a. m. of the 18th it marched 
toward Emmitsburg; and the third, received at 10 p. m. 
of the 18th, that two fresh regiments marched from Em- 
mitsburg during the afternoon and camped at Fairplay on 
the Gettysburg road for the night of June 18-19. 

REGIMENTAL COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

In solving the new problem so presented to him, Col. A 
considered the questions involved about as follows: 

He must keep clearly in view his original mission, which 
was to secure the division concentration at Carlisle, some- 
thing over 25 miles north of Gettysburg. Any protection 
of Gettysburg must be made subservient to the primary 
mission, in which there has yet been nothing in circum- 
stances or orders to produce any radical change. The com- 
ing of the remainder of the brigade perhaps indicates some 
fear on the part of the division commander that Col, A wiU 
be unable to gain the required time with his regiment alone; 
and it may indicate also that he hopes to retain Gettysburg 
through this added strength. 

If the objective of the two new hostile regiments is 
Gettysburg, and they start from their night's camp at 5 
o'clock, having about 6 miles to go, their advance, if unin- 
terrupted, would be in the neighborhood of the Blue outposts, 
as now located, between 7 and 7:30 a, m. Even on a long 

61 



62 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

June day they are not likely to start before 5 o'clock, and, 
of course, they may start much later. 

If the hostile reconnaissance upon gaining contact is 
promptly carried out, the enemy may have sufficient in- 
formation to determine in an hour thereafter his method of 
attack. His deployment for attack and advance to decisive 
ranges wiU take another hour, and to carry the attack 
through to a decision would probably take a third hour. 
So, Col. A can reasonably expect from one position to hold 
the two hostile regiments until somewhere near 10.30 a. m. 
By 10 o'clock the first section of the Blue reinforcements 
should reach Gettysburg, and its troops should arrive on the 
battle field within 15 or 20 minutes thereafter. The rein- 
forcement then received will probably consist only of one 
battalion. This will by no means place Col. A upon equal 
terms with his adversary, who not only seems to have two 
regiments now advancing toward Gettysburg, but may be 
able to reinforce them with some part of the beaten Red 
regiment. It is doubtful, therefore, whether, if the enemy 
advances aggressively in the morning, aU of the time required 
for uniting the First Brigade can be gained in one position 
south of Gettysburg. 

Col. A might advance at daybreak with his whole regiment 
in the direction of the enemy, to fight a series of delaying ac- 
tions, and so gain the necessary time for uniting the brigade 
and for saving Gettysburg from another hostile visitation. 
At first sight, the idea appears decidedly good. But the 
enemy may not march at an early hour in the morning, and 
his objective may not be Gettysburg at all; he may simply 
have moved out to cover Emmitsburg, The possibility of 
this last being the case seems greater when it is remembered 
that the beaten Red regiment was operating in hostile terri- 
tory, and without cavahy; and being so hampered in obtain- 
ing information, may have no very clear idea of the Blue 
strength opposed to it. Consequently, if Col. A remains near 
Gettysburg he may not have to fight at aU, or not until he 
has been strongly reinforced. An unnecessary fight, particu- 
larly against superior numbers, is always to be avoided. 
Wliile to conduct a series of delaying actions may on its face 
seem a simple proposition, yet in fact to carry such through 
against an enemy of twice his strength is an exceedingly dif- 
ficult and dangerous operation, in which Col, A, by the 
slightest false step or bad luck, might easily have his regiment 
destroyed. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 6'3 

By advancing to meet the enemy the engagement would 
probably become a rencontre in which the hostile superiority 
in numbers would have every advantage. The ground west 
of the Round Tops has too much timber to favor delaying 
actions in which extended fields of fire are of the utmost 
value; yet, if the enemy marches promptly in the morning, 
that is the place where he is most likely to be met. Further- 
more, by such an advance Col. A would give up all time for 
intrenching, and the great advantage for the defense thereof. 

It would hardly do to evacuate Gettysburg, moving to the 
north, only perhaps to learn later that the enemy also was 
on the defensive and had no intention of advancing; or, that 
he advanced so slowly that the town might well have been 
saved from his retm^n. 

Some consideration is given to the occupation of a flank- 
ing position on Round Top, but this is promptly decided 
against because the position there is not strong to the west 
and south after the enemy begins to get anjrwhere near at 
hand, and because it is doubtful if it could be properly oc- 
cupied in time by the regiment. The long-range fire from a 
small detachment thereon would cause almost as much delay 
as would the regiment in a hurriedly occupied position which 
it did not intend to hold to the end. 

In view of all these considerations, it seems much better 
to make one fight, and that rather close in to Gettysburg, 
provided a suitable position is there to be found. And in 
making the fight alone, it must not be to a decision. If it 
becomes apparent that reinforcements are not going to reach 
him in time, Col. A, remembering that his primary mission 
is to cover the division, will withdraw to the north of Gettys- 
burg while still able to do so. 

In looking for a position, the colonel notes that every- 
where south of the J. Smith faiTu, within distances that 
might be considered, there is too much timber to obtain 
suitable fields of fire. North, however, of J. Smith's there 
is considerable open gromid. A fair position is there offered 
with its left on knoll 606, near the Taneytown Road, and 
extending nearly due west untO. the right is on Seminaiy 
Ridge. Over parts of this front the field of fire is excellent; 
over other portions it is rather restricted by the small folds 
of the earth. But machine guns judiciously posted can flank 
most of these folds that would otherwise afford shelter for 
attacking hues until very close in. Seminary Ridge must 
be included to prevent it from covering the enemy's main 



64 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

attack while he is making his envelopment on the shortest 
and most natural lines. 

By occupying Seminary Ridge the position will become 
nearly 1,700 yards in length, entirely too long for the regi- 
ment to hold in a decisive engagement. But in a purely de- 
laying action, a position of considerable length is, on the 
other hand, an advantage since it makes the hostile recon- 
naissance more difficult, requires movements upon longer 
lines to prepare envelopments, and renders it much harder 
to determine what strength is" occupying the position. AU 
of these conditions add to the time taken before a decisive 
attack can be laimched. 

The position in question covers both the Emmitsburg 
and the Taneytown roads. To get into Gettysburg the 
enemy must either attack it or make a very considerable 
detour with consequent loss of much time. 

Behind its front there is considerable cover, both in the 
shape of folds in the ground and of timber, which will facili- 
tate withdrawal when such becomes necessary. Its flanks 
will be secured by fairly good fields of fire. 

On the whole, it is simply a fair position. Particularly 
in a delaying action, the field of fire should be very exten- 
sive. Yet in this one, in several places, it is considerably 
restricted. But the perfect position probably does not 
exit. Col. A simply has to make the best of what he can 
find; and this position is good enough to warrant its use 
under the circumstances. 

Now as to its occupation, it seems best not to use more 
than two battalions in the first line, since a strong reserve 
should be held well back to facilitate withdrawal in case such 
becomes necessary. The machine-gun company wiU be spht 
between the two first line battahons, one platoon going with 
each to compel the early deployment of the enemy, to flank 
those areas in which the enemy's lines could otherwise work 
forward imder cover to close range, and to bring a concen- 
trated fire to the flanks to hinder envelopment. Unhke the 
attack, the delaying action makes it expedient to bring the 
machine guns into action from the very first. Until the 
enemy shows his hand, the reserve will be held at the race 
track, whence it can quickly be moved under cover to which- 
ever flank is threatened. 

While preparing the main position with two of his bat- 
talions, shall he detach the reserve battahon, with the ma- 
chine guns perhaps, to the south to meet and compel the 
enemy to make a partial deployment, and so gain time ? Do- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 65 

ing SO would have all of the disadvantages inherent in the 
occupation of an advanced position. Unless the battalion 
sent forward were to break off its delaying action at exactly 
the right moment, it would find itself unable to do so, and 
in the presence of six times its numbers would, if it rejoined 
at all, come back a badly beaten command. Then not 
only would the battalion itself be unfit for much more that 
day, but the morale of the whole regiment as well would be 
greatly lowered by this partial defeat. The machine guns 
also can do better work by getting themselves well into posi- 
tion and intrenched for the main engagement. This does 
not, of course, mean that Col. A will fail to cover his working 
parties by outposts. But it does mean that these outposts 
will be so weak that they can do little more than send in 
timely warning of the enemy's approach in strength, and 
give his patrols some trouble in locating the main position. 

By the time Col. A had come to his decision it was nearly 
11 o'clock. Shall he turn out the troops as soon as the order 
can be issued and have them work the remainder of the 
night in preparing the position ? He decides against the 
idea. Although at night there is much lost motion, he would 
perhaps have better trenches when the fight begins, but his 
men instead of being fresh would go into action to-morrow 
tired and disgusted. And it is men that will win the fight, 
not trenches. He decides to start the regiment at 4 o'clock, 
and ordered reveilled for 3. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS. 

The colonel immediately directed the quartermaster to 
pick up such tools for intrenching as could be found in 
Gettysburg, and have them at camp by 4 a. m. ; also to hire 
wagons for carrying the three days' additional rations still 
on hand. 

The outpost was notified at once of the new enemy. 

Then the colonel telegraphed as follows: 

First Infantry, Gettysburg, 

18 June, 11 p. m. 
Chief Staff, Carlisle: 

Defeated Red regiment continued retreat to Emmitsburg to-day. Two 
fresli hostile regiments marched from Emmitsburg this afternoon, camped 
at Fairplay. I will intrench a position 1 mile south of Gettysburg at 
daybreak. If remainder brigade unable to get up in time, shall decline 
decisive engagement and withdraw north of Gettysburg. 

A, Colonel. 
98755°— 17 5 



66 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

3.30 a. i;i. At 3.30 a, m., June 19, the colonel issued verbal orders to 
the assembled commanders of battalions, machine-gun com- 
pany, and staff, as follows : 

The Red regiment we defeated on the 17th has withdrawn in disorder 
to Emmitsburg; but two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emmitsburg 
yesterday afternoon and camped at Fairplay last night. 

The remainder of the First Brigade is coming to reinforce us. Its leading 
section should arrive by rail about 10 o'clock tliis morning. 

This regiment will prepare a defensive position extending from Seminary 
Ridge to the southern portion of knoll 606. 

The Second Battalion will prepare from Seminary Ridge, inclusive, to 
the southern portion of the large orchard 600 yards southwest of the E. 
Trostle farmhouse, exclusive. 

The Third Battalion, from that orchard, inclusive, to knoll 606, inclusive. 

The machine gun company will send a platoon to report to each of these 
battalions. 

Standing trench will be dug. 

The First Battalion will send Company B to the Second Battalion to 
assist in clearing the foreground along Seminary Ridge. I will order Com- 
pany A. to report to the Third Battalion for similar work as soon as it is 
relieved from outpost. 

The First Battalion (less Companies A and B) will march at 4 a. m. to 
take over the outpost duties, and will seciue the line J. Musser crossroads 
580. Upon a hostile advance in strength the outpost will check the enemy, 
and, without becoming seriously engaged, will retire behind the flanks of 
the main line. 

The quartermaster has obtained tools in Gettysburg which he will divide 
among organizations in accordance with the duties allotted them. 

The field trains will assemble in this field ready to march at 5 a. m. 
Combat wagons when emptied will be returned to this field. 

Messages to E. Trostle. 

The colonel directed the quartermaster to load the surplus 
rations on hired wagons and add them to his field train. 

He caused regimental headquarters to be established at 
E. Trostle shortly after 4 o'clock; but followed the Second 
Battalion to Seminary Ridge, and, after learning from its 
commander of the manner in which he intended to prepare 
and hold his section, went then to- the Third Battalion for a 
similar conference there. He agreed with their dispositions, 
pointing out, though, to both the necessity for flanking the 
front by machine-gun fire, not only of their own companies, 
but in each case of the companies of the other battalion, as 
far as the ground permitted. 

OUTPOST ARRANGEMENTS AND ORDERS. 

Maj-. B, First Battalion, issued verbal orders to the cap- 
3.45 a. in. tains of Companies A, C, and D, and his staff, at 3.45 a. m.: 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 67 

The Red regiment that we defeated has retreated in disorder to Emmits- 
burg. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emmitsburg yesterday 
afternoon, and camped at Fairplay last night. 

We are to be reinforced to-day by the remainder of our brigade. 

The regiment will prepare a defensive position about a mile south of this 
camp. 

Company A will report to the Second Battalion to clear the foreground of 
the position of that battalion. 

Companies C and D, under my command, will secure the general line 
George Spangler — J. Musser — Pitzer, S. H. 

Company C will march at once to crossroads 580; whence it will provide 
security from Willoughby Run to the Peach Orchard, inclusive. 

Company D will proceed to J. Musser to secure the line Peach Orchard, 
exclusive. Round Top — J. Eckenrodes. 

The outpost will prevent hostile patrols from reconnoitering the position 
of the regiment, but will withdraw, at my order, upon the advance of the 
enemy in strength. 

Do not issue extra ammunition. Combat wagons will remain here. 

Field wagons will report, ready to march, to the quartermaster at 5 a. m. 

I will take station on Round Top, with which signal connection will be 
made. The signal F B addressed to a company will be the order for its 
withdrawal. 

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY C. 

The captain formed the company at 4 a. ra. in march 
kit, and proceeded by the Emmitsburg road. At N. Codori 
the company was halted while he questioned the outguard 
there for further information of the enemy. Nothing new 
having been learned, he issued orders, at 4.20 a. m., to his 4.20 a.m. 
lieutenants and noncommissioned officers, as follows: 

The Red Regiment, defeated by us on the 17th, has retreated in disorder 
to Emmitsburg. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emmitsburg 
yesterday, and camped at Fairplay, about 5 miles southwest of us. We 
are to be reenforced to-day by the remainder of our brigade. 

The regiment is preparing a defensive position on the rise behind us. 

Companies C and D outpost the command; Company D has the sector 
east of us. 

This company is assigned the sector from Willoughby Run to include 
some 500 or 600 yards east of this road (Emmitsburg). We will march now 
on crossroads 580, nearly a mile down the Emmitsburg road. 

Lieut. R (first lieutenant), take the first squad ahead as the point. 
Move rapidly until you have gained a distance of 400 yards, when the 
company will follow you. 

Approaching crossroads 580, the captain called up his 
second lieutenant, and at 4.40 a. m,, directed: 4.40 a. m. 

The company will take station near the crossroads a few hundred yards 
ahead . 

Take the last six squads and Sergt. L by the road to the right to a station, 
as picket No. 1, aboutmidway between Willoughby Run and this road). 
Secure from Willoughby Run to the first ridge west of the Emmitsburg 



68 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS. 

Road, inclusive. Stop hostile patrols. If the enemy advances in strength, 
the company will fall back to Seminary Ridge through the timber to our 
right rear. You will join us near the southern corner of that timber (point- 
ing to the patch 600 yards northwest of J. Smith). 

The captain then had word passed up by the connecting 
files to the point for Lieut. R to join him, and at cross- 
roads 580 directed that officer: 

The company takes station here. Post Corpl. Y's squad (the point) 
on the next ridge, as outguard No. 2, and then rejoin. Lieut. S (second 
lieutenant) has taken the road to the right to secure from the first ridge 
west to Willoughby Run. Company D will probably have troops on Round 
Top and at Devils Den. The corporal will fire on any Red detachment. 
If the enemy advances in strength he will fa,ll back on the company. 

The captain directed the leading corporal of the main 
body: 

Station your squad, as outguard No. 3, at the southern comer of this 
orchard, east of the Emmitsburg Road and south of the road leading from 
this crossroad to the east. Prevent any hostile patrols from working through 
the timber from the south. Corpl. Y has a squad on the next ridge of the 
Emmitsburg Road (pointing toward J. Rose), the company will be on this 
knoll (587), and Company D will probably have men within 300 or 400 yards 
east of you, at Devils Den and on Round Top. 

He next conducted the company to the road just north of 
knoll 587, on which knoll he intended to deploy if resista,nce 
toward the south became necessary; posted a sentry thereon, 
and signallers to get connection by flag with Round Top, 
and by semaphore with Lieut. S (picket No. 1). He 
started a patrol of two men by the road to the east, to get 
connection with Company D and learn of its nearby disposi- 
tions. A sergeant with a couple of men was sent to recon- 
noiter the line of retreat across country to the north, and 
then by the unimproved road toward Seminary Ridge, and 
to cut all fences that might interfere with the withdrawal 
of the company. The remainder of the company stacked 
arms and rested nearby. 

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS, PICKET NO. 1. 

Lieut. S (second lieutenant) turned his squads to the right 
at crossroads 580, and clearing the Emmitsburg Road, 
halted them. He directed the leading corporal : 

Get 200 yards distance to the west with your squad, at double time, 
as point of this detachment. Take the left-hand road at the fork ahead. 

When clear of the woods southwest of knoU 589, the 
lieutenant halted the detachment, and directed: 

Corpl. R (who had the point), take your squad to a station near the 
western edge of this timber (the patch 300 yards south of east of Pitzer S. H.) 



AN INFANTEY REGIMENT. 69 

and south of this road, from which you can watch the road along the stream 
(Willoughby Run) 600 or 700 yards west of us. Fire on any hostile patrols 
that attempt to work north. I am going with the bulk of the platoon 
beyond the timber to the south. 

Corpl. L, take your squad to the southern edge of that clump of timber 
(pointing to the one on the 589 ridge to the southeast). Establish sema- 
phore connection with the company at the crossroads where we left them, 
and with me in the timber south of this point Prevent the advance of any 
hostile patrols from the south. 

Corpl. M., double time ahead with your front rank through the timber 
directly south of us. Halt when you reach open ground on the other side. 

Leaving one man in the road to direct messengers to him, 
he then conducted the remainder of the detachment to the 
southern edge of the timber on the small nose 600 yards 
northeast of J. Diesecker. There he posted one man up a 
tree, with glasses, in observation to the south, a double 
sentry at the bend in the road through the timber 200 yards 
east of the platoon, one man north of the road to connect 
with the squad on the ridge to the east, and one at the timber 
corner 200 yards to the west, to connect with the squad 
watching Willoughby Run. The remainder of the men were 
in the farm road where it crosses the nose located above. 

DISPOSITIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY D. 

Company D marched, at 4 a. m., straight south on the 
Taneytown road, and halted to question the outpost if any- 
thing further had been heard of the enemy. 

At the outguard near road fork 545, the captain assembled 
his officers and noncommissioned officers, and ordered : 

The Red regiment, defeated by us on the 17th, has retreated in dis- 
order to Emmitsbiu-g. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emmits- 
burg yesterday afternoon and camped at Fairplay, about 5 mUes to the 
southwest. We are to be reenforced by the remainder of the brigade to-day. 

Our regiment is preparing a defensive position north of us. 

Companies C and D outpost the command; Company G has the sector west 
of us. 

This company will secure the line Peach Orchard, exclusive, Round 
Top, wooded knoll three-fourths mile to the left front (532 near J. Ecken- 
rodes). 

The first six squads and Sergt. M., under Lieut. J. (first lieutenant), will 
proceed rapidly down the Taneytown road and will take station, as picket 
No. 2, on Round Top. Secure the sector from Devils Den, exclusive, to 
the Taneytown road, inclusive. 

Lieut. K. (second lieutenant) will take the next four squads by the farm 
road to the right to the knoll above Devils Den, as picket No. 1, and vnli 
secure from the nose just east of the Peach Orchard, inclusive, to the 
eastern fork of Plum Run. 

I will take station with the rest of the company at the J. Musser farm, 
about three-fourths mile south of this point. 



70 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Hostile patrols will be prevented from penetrating the screen. Watch 
the Emmitsbiirg road for opportunities to check the enemy by long-range 
fire. Upon a hostile advance in strength, the outpost will retire at the 
major's order. Company D will rendezvous at this road fork. 

Battalion headquarters is going to Round Top. 

Semaphore connection will be established with J. Musser. I will put a 
relay station for picket No. 1 on Little Round Top. 

The two pickets moved out at once on the routes assigned 
to them, each throwing out a point of one squad by orders 
similar to those used in Company C. The right picket (No. 1) 
sent one squad to knoll 548, just west of the Wheatfield, 
and one on to the nose and near the western branch of Plum 
Run, due west of knoll 561 (Devils Den), the lieutenant 
and three men took station on knoll 561, one watching 
Round Top and one the country to the southwest. The 
remainder of the picket was posted in the timber inside the 
fence corner just west of the crest of knoll 561. A patrol of 
two men was sent to connect with Company C. 

The picket on Round Top had an extended view in all 
directions. There the lieutenant posted one man in obser- 
vation of the ground from the Hoffman farm to Rock Creek, 
and another watching from the Hoffman house to Willough- 
by Run, paying particular attention to the Emmitsburg 
Road. He sent one squad due west to the nose 400 yards 
from the summit of Round Top, directing its leader: 

Take station on the nose about 400 yards west of this summit to prevent 
any hostile patrols from passing between Plum Run, below us, and this 
point. Fire on any Red patrols that you see. The enemy is likely to 
appeal" soon on the Emmitsburg road over there. When he does I shall 
open fire from this hill. 

The lieutenant and his range finders estimated the dis- 
tance to the J. A. Wolfe and the Vaughan farmhouses, and 
to crossroads 540 and 450. He noted the mean of the esti- 
mates obtained to each, for use if the enemy appeared in 
the vicinity. 

Battalion headquarters was established just north of 
the crest. Two signal stations were posted, for concealment, 
a short distance down the northern slope. One quickly es- 
tablished semaphore connection with the station of Company 
D on the J. Musser house, and the other by wigwag with 
Company C at crossroads 580. The sergeant major was in 
charge of these stations, the remainder of their personnel 
being furnished by the detachment of Company D. The 
horses of the battalion were held a little farther down the 
slope, and the two orderlies were kept in readiness to 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 71 

deliver messages mounted, if for any reason, there was a 
hitch in the signals. 

The captain of Company D marched the six squads left 
with him about 500 yards behind the detachment going to 
Round Top. Approaching the J. Musser farm, he detached 
two men to the top of Little Round Top to relay messages 
from the Devils Den knoll. He sent a sergeant, two mu- 
sicians, and a private to the top of the J. Musser house. One 
musician there maintained connection with Round Top, and 
one with Little Round Top. The sergeant watched the 
Taneytown Road and the country to the south. A messenger 
was to be left on the ground, but he went first with the 
company to locate its station. 

The company halted in the road between the orchards 
west of knoll 532, stacked arms, and rested, except for one 
sentry thereat, and a cossack post on knoll 532 which ob- 
served the sector Taneytown Road — J. Eckenrode farm. 

The entire outpost was in position by 5.20 a. m. (See 5.20 a. m 
sketch No. 6.) 

COMMENT. 

In this outpost we find dispositions differing radically 
from those for the night of the 17th. Then, there was a 
beaten enemy whose only thought apparently was to escape. 
Three sentry squads in observation on the three roads by 
which the enemy might return, with an occasional patrol 
between these detachments, and a single mounted patrol to 
hang on to the defeated regiment, furnished ample strength 
for the first line. Now, with a superior enemy who can be 
expected to advance aggressively, no such simple measures 
will suffice. The present outpost has not only the duty of 
furnishing sufficient warning to the main body of a hostile 
approach but, since the whole desire of the regiment at 
present is to gain time, must interpose an effective screen 
against the reconnaissance of his detachments. These 
greatly different conditions require both much greater total 
strength in the outpost and a very different distribution of 
troops therein. With no intention of resisting the deter- 
mined advance of any large body of the enemy, no particular 
strength is required on the line of supports, and no reserves 
at all are necessary. But since every effort must be made to 
prevent the small patrols of the enemy from breaking 
through the first line to offer resistance — that is, the lino of 
observation — must be relatively strong and its parts weU 
connected up. 



72 



STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 



>SKETCH No.6. Oufpost. A.M.June 19 




Z-*- 



AN INFANTEY REGIMENT. 73 

The ground very much favors this work of screening. 
By the occupation of the Round Tops, and of the ground east 
and west of the northern one, the enemy can tell nothing of 
what is happening beyond them until he has penetrated or 
broken this line. Round Top itself, if rather strongly held, 
should alone cause the enemy considerable delay. For no 
large body can march by without first taking it, because 
long-range fire therefrom will reach the Emmitsbm'g Road, 
and the most convenient roads and crossroads directly south 
of it. The ground likewise facihtates withdrawal without 
loss. By dropping back a few yards, all of the detachments 
can place themselves under cover, and the companies can 
find convenient routes by which to pass by the flanks and 
uncover the front of the main position. 

The outpost commander has also taken an unusual posi- 
tion in front rather than behind his line of supports. His 
important duty is the determination when to withdraw. 
Unless that withdrawal is accurately timed, and the detach- 
ments move off practically together, some will be caught by 
the enemy and lost. The major has taken the position 
which most favors a proper decision and concerted move- 
ment. 

Exact coordination of this movement requires a sys- 
tem of prompt and unfailing communication. Great care 
is therefore taken in the establishment of such a system 
throughout the outpost. The flag will well serve to both 
companies. The semaphore, at 900 or at 1,000 yards, will 
have no diffi.culty in transmitting from battahon headquar- 
ters to Company D, and the larger flag, using the Morse 
Code, at about 1,900 yards to Company C. No attempt 
will be made, after once getting communication, to send any 
lengthy messages. The first appearance of the enemy will 
be reported from Round Top, and then the system kept clear 
for the withdrawal signal. If for any reason there is the 
slightest hitch with the flags, the major has in reserve the 
mounted messengers. 

The supports at crossroads 580 and at J. Musser are 
there not to reenforce the line of observation or to fight 
where they are; but by their fire simply to assist the with- 
drawal of their outguards if any of the latter require such 
assistance. 

But little patrolmg is required until the enemy beguis 
to appear. Then patrols will be used to ambush or drive off 
hostile patrols that are threatening to penetrate the screen. 



4.20 a. m. 



74 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, SECOND BATTALION. 

The Second Battalion was formed, in march kit, at 4 a.m. 
Company A reported. The major had previously directed 
the senoir captain to divide among the companies the tools 
obtained from the quartermaster and then to march the 
battalion by the farm road west of camp to southernmost 
end of the road. The major, with his adjutant and order- 
lies, galloped ahead for a hmTied reconnaissance of the 
ground. That completed, he sent his adjutant to meet the 
battalion, halt it south of the farm road it was marching on, 
and to direct its captains and the officer commanding the 
machine guns to join him on Seminary Ridge and to order 
the issue of ammunition. 

The major on that ridge (he is about at "n" m the word 
Seminary, 3-inch map), at 4.20 a. m., issued the following 
orders : 

The hostile regiment we defeated on the 17th has retreated in bad shape 
to Emmitsburg. But two fresh Red regiments marched from Emmitsburg 
yesterday afternoon and camped last night near Fairplay, about five miles 
south of this point. 

The remainder of the brigade begins to arrive in Gettysburg by rail at 
10 o'clock this morning. 

Our regiment prepares a defensive position extending a Little south of 
east from this point. The Third Battalion is on our left with its right in 
that large orchard (pointing to the one 350 yards to the east). The First 
Battalion (less two companies) is outposting an east and west line a mile 
or more to the south. 

This battalion will prepare a position from the southern point of the large 
orchard, exclusive, to this ridge, inclusive. 

Company E will intrench the low rise, with its right about 250 yards 
southeast of this point. It will be prepared to fire to the south toward that 
low knoll (572) and up the draws to the southeast. It will also be able to 
bring the lire of not less than one platoon to the west into the draw south of 
this point. 

Company F will intrench across Seminary Ridge, at this point, to fire 
to the soiith. 

The macliine guns will be posted in the Company F line at the crest 
of the ridge and be prepared to bring fire over the whole sector from the 
wooded knoll (586) due west to the raikoad line to the east. 

Company G, with its left about 100 yards west of this point ("n" in 
Seminary), will intrench to fire to the south and southwest. 

Standing trench will be dug. 

All axes of these three companies will be tiu'ned over to Company H, 
which will clear Seminary Ridge in front of Company F to the cross fence 
north of the ravine. Company 11 will send one squad to intrench the 
battalion headquarters. It will also send a combat patrol of two squads 
to the bare knoll (552) a thousand yards to the west. 

Company A will start at the cross fence north of the ravine and clear to 
the south. Fill the ravine with timber. Construct a strong obstacle 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 75 

along the stream line to the junction 400 yards west of the ridge. Station 
a small security patrol well to the south of your working parties. 

Battalion headc^uarters will be established at the fence corner 100 yards 
north of this point. Get semaphore connection therewith. 

The major then directed the adjutant to send the empty 
combat wagons back to the camp gromid, to intrench the 
headquarters station", to arrange the system of communica- 
tion with each first-line company and with Company H, 
which will probably be stationed north of the hedge to the 
right roar of Company G; and by semaphore or wigwag 
with regimental headquarters at the E. Trostle farmhouse. 
The major then rode the line from left to right to make cer- 
tain the company commanders had understood and were 
locating their trenches in accordance with his orders. Ho 
also carefully reconnoitered the timber and orchards on 
Seminary Ridge, north of the position of the battalion, with 
a view to withdrawal, if to do so became necessary. 

ORDERS AND ARRANGEMENTS, COMPANY E. 

Tlie commanding officer of Company E stacked arms 
and removed packs a few yards back of the position as- 
signed that organization, and with his platoon commanders 
roughly marked out the line to be intrenched. He then 
issued the following orders to his officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers: 

The Red regiment we defeated on the north side of Gettysburg has retired 
in disorder to Emmitsburg. Two fresh hostile regiments came out of 
Emmitsburg yesterday afternoon and camped last night about 5 miles 
southwest of us. 

The remainder of our brigade will reinforce us to-day. Our regiment 
prepares a defensive position along this line. Two companies of the First 
Battalion have an outpost a mile or more to the south. Company F is on 
Seminary Ridge to our right and the Third Battalion on our left. 

This company will dig a standing trench along the indicated line, by 
platoon, in order from the right: First, second, third, and ourth. 

Dig squad trenches first, and then connect around traverses. 

The first platoon will be prepared to fire into the ravine to the right and 
the fourth toward the farmhouses to the southeast (N. Codori). The third 
platoon will send a squad to construct shelter for the company commander. 

Corpl. K, with three men of his squad, will take station on the low knoll 
to the front (572) in observation of the country to the south thereof. Com- 
pany A will probably have a security detachment to your right. 

Sergt. M, with the remainder of Corpl. K's squad, will measure and mark 
distances to the crest to the south and southeast and into the ravine to the 
west. 

The musicians will get semaphore connection with battalion headquar- 
ters, which is to be established near that fence corner (pointing to one near 
"y") on Seminary Ridge. 



76 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The captain then indicated to the squad from the third 
platoon Avhere shelter, about 20 yards back of the center of 
the line, was to be constructed for the captain, and for 
the musicians, about 3 yards to his right and to his left. 
The right musician was entirely protected from the front, 
his whole business being to communicate with battalion 
headquarters. The left musician watched the platoons and 
constituted the agent of communication therewith. The 
platoon leaders were similarly intrenched 4 or 5 yards behind 
the centers of their respective platoons. Having watched 
the beginning of work, the captain, after the major's visit, 
went to the company of the Third Battalion which could be 
seen at work in the orchard, to find out if any other arrange- 
ments for support were desirable beyond the flanking fire of 
the left platoon, already provided for. 

Tlie orders and arrangements in the other companies of 
the battalion resembled those in Company E, and therefore 
need not be noted here. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, THIRD BATTALION. 

As soon as the major of the Third Battalion received the 
regimental order, he directed the senior captain to form the 
battalion at 4 o'clock, receive the tools from the quarter- 
master, and then march the battalion to E. Trostle. Like 
the commander of the Second Battahon, he then rode forward 
with his adjutant and orderlies to reconnoiter the gromid. 
4.25 a. m. rpj^g battalion reached E. Trostle at 4.25 a. m. The captains, 
including the captain of Company B, and the commander of 
the machine guns, were assembled at the farmhouse on the 
western side of knoll 606, ammunition being issued during 
their absence from the battahon. Orders were issued as 
follows : 

The regiment we defeated on the 17th has retreated in disorder to Em- 
mitsburg. Two fresh regiments came out of Emmitsburg yesterday after- 
noon and camped some 5 miles south of us last night. 

The remainder of our brigade will reinforce us to-day. The regiment 
intrenches an east-and -west line through this point. The Second Battalion 
is on our right. Two companies of the First are covering us in the vicinity 
of Round Top. 

This battalion will intrench from the large orchard to the right, inclusive 
(pointing to the one 600 yards to the west), to this knoll (606), inclusive. 

Company I will intrench near the southern end of the orchard to lire to 
the south and southwest. 

Company K wUl intrench the nose to our right rear, with the left of the 
company about 100 yards west of the Emmitsburg road, to fire to the south. 

("ompany L, with the machine guns, will intrench the southern end of 
this knoll (606) to fire over the sector included between the Emmitsburg 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 77 

and Taneytown roads, both inclusive. The machine guns will also be 
prepared to bring flanking fire across the front of all trenches clear to Semi- 
nary Ridge. 

Company M will intrench the south slope of Cemetery Hill so as to be 
able to fire on both sides of the Taneytown Road and across the left of the 
trenches of Company L. This company will send one squad to battalion 
headquarters. 

Standing trench will be dug. 

Company A will clear the foreground of Company L to the south and 
southeast. 

Empty ammunition wagons will return to the camp ground. 

Battalion headquarters at this house. Semaphore communication there- 
with. 

The major then directed the adjutant to arrange bat- 
talion headquarters and open communication with the com- 
panies and regimental headquarters. Starting with Com- 
pany L, he inspected the locations selected by the companies. 

ORDERS AND ARRANGEMENTS, COMPANY L. 

Upon receipt of the major's order the captain of Com- 
pany L sent the musician that had accompanied him back 
to guide the company and the machine-gun platoon to the 
southern part of the orchard on knoll 606. The captain 
went himself to look over the ground. When the company 
approached, he had arms stacked, and packs removed. He 
called up several men with picks and rapidly drew out on 
the ground the line to be occupied, and marked the limits of 
the two sections into which he proposed to divide the line. 
He then assembled his officers, noncommissioned officers, 
and the commander of the machine-gun platoon, and di- 
rected : 

The Red regiment defeated by us north of Gettsyburg has retreated 
to Emmitsburg in bad shape. Two other Red regiments marched from 
Emmitsburg yesterday and camped last night about 5 miles southwest 
of us. 

We are to be reinforced by the remainder of the brigade to-day. Our 
regiment is preparing a defensive position extending to the west from this 
knoll. 

Part of the First Battalion has an outpost near Round Top. The Second 
Battalion is on our right. Company I is in the large orchard west of us, 
and Company K on the nose 500 yards to our right rear. 

This company will construct standing trench on the line I have marked 
out, the machine guns in the center, the first and second platoons, under 
Lieut. K, on the right, the third and fourth platoons, under Lieut. L, on 
the left. The right half will be prepared to fire over the ground from the low 
knoll to our right front (584), inclusive, to the one to the south (566), exclu- 
sive. The left half, from the draw to the south (toward A. Trestle's) to 
include the farmhouse southeast of us (Mrs. Buck). 



8 a. m. 



Y8 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

The machine guns will be intrenched to bring fire from the ravine through 
Seminary Ridge due west of us to the farmhouse southeast of us (Mrs. 
Buck). 

Sergt. B, with four men from the second platoon, will mark the ranges to 
the wooded knoll (592) to the south, and the low one with the farmhouse 
and orchard thereon to the southwest (pointing to J. Smith). 

The third platoon will send six men to this point to intrench the company 
commander's station. 

The musicians will establish semaphore connection with battalion head- 
quarters at the yellow farmhouse (pointing to the one south of E. Trostle). 

EVENTS OF THE MORNING TO 9.30 o' CLOCK. 

Hostile troops were seen from Round Top shortly be 
fore 6 o'clock marching north on the Emmitsburg Road 

6.30 a. m. through Greenmount. By 6.30 the enemy's leading ele- 
ments were west of Round Top. The detachment thereon, 
shortly afterwards, opened fere with combined sights on 
what appeared to be the support of a battahon in advance 
guard. It seemed to obtain a few hits, and halted the ad- 

6.40 a. m. yQ^iQ(jg, guard in some confusion. At 6.40, two or three Red 
companies started toward Round Top from the direction of 
J. A. Wolfe. By 8 o'clock, hostile detachments of some 
size were working up the southern and western slopes; while 
firing over on the Emmitsburg Road, indicated that the ene- 
my was also pushing his reconnaissance against Company C. 
The major then signaled "F.B." to each of his companies. 
The companies in turn signaled their detachments to with- 
draw, and the entire outpost began a nearly simultaneous 
movement straight to the rear along the previously selected 
and reconnoitered routes. The right company, C, moved 
rapidly in column due north to the orchard, 200 yards from 
crossroads 580 ; and then under its cover, down the draw into 
the timber 700 yards northwest of J. Smith. The squad that 
had been stationed as an outguard at J. Rose, followed as a 
rear point, deployed as skirmishers at 5 yards. The rear 
point halted on reaching the timber. The company moved 
up the road a couple of hundred yards, and waited for the 
six squads that had been on the 589 ridge to come in; then 
continued the march by the wood road and the draw west of 
Seminary Ridge. 

The left company (D) moved immediately upon receiv- 
ing the signal to withdraw by the Taneytown Road to cross- 
roads 545, and there waited for the detachments at Devils 
Den and Round Top, which came in promptly and without 
loss. The march was then continued north, leaving a single 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 79 

squad on knoll 592 to remain in observation until a hostile 
advance should compel further withdrawal. 

The Red patrols closely followed the Blue outpost, and 
by 9.30 a. m. were feeling out, and had drawn fire from, the^-^'' ^- ™- 
Blue position from Seminary Ridge to the Taneytown Road. 
All of the Blue covering detachments to the front had come 
in. The working parties in front withdrew upon the ap- 
proach of the outpost companies. 

REGIMENTAL COMMANDEr's ORDERS FOR DEFENSE OF THE 

POSITION. 

As soon as Maj. B (outpost commander) was certain that 
his companies were starting the withdrawal, he and his staff 
rode rapidly north on the Taneytown Road and to regimental 
headquarters at E. Trostle. There at 8.25 a. m. he received s.so a. m. 
the following verbal orders from the colonel: 

We will defend the position we have prepared. Aesemble your battalion 
in reserve at the race track. Put a squad in observation on Culps Hill. 
Have them connect by flag with this building (E. Trostle). Send a platoon 
to the vicinity of Willoughby Run on the Hagerstown road. Get sema- 
phore connection from your battalion with this bviilding. 

At 8.30 a. m., the colonel had manifold copies of the^-^*^^-™- 

following delivered by mounted orderlies, to the Second and 

Third Battahons: 

First Inpantey, E. Trostle, 

19 June., 8.S0 a. m. 8.30 a. m. 
F. 0. No. 10. 

1. Our outpost has withdrawn before strong hostile forces advancing on 
Emmitsburg road. 

2. We will defend the position as prepared. 

The First Battalion will assemble in reserve at the race track. It is 
sending patrols to Culps Hill and to Willoughby Run on the Hagerstown 
toad. 

A, Colonel. 
First Infantry, E. Trostle, 

19 June, 8.45 a. rn. 8.45 a. m. 
Captain Q, Regimental Quartermaster: 

Enemy advancing in force on Emmitsbirrg road. We defend position. 
Send band and combat wagons, Second and Third Battalions, to Central 
Square, Gettysburg, at disposal surgeon. Conduct field train by western- 
most streets, Gettsburg to Boyd S. H. 
By order, Colonel A. 

X, Adjutant. 

Note. — Band had been left at the camp of the preceding night. 



80 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

SKETCH No.7 Defence Posi+ion. June 19. 




Z-^ 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 81 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, BATTALION COMMANDERS. 

Upon receipt of the colonel's verbal instructions at 8.25 
a. m., Maj. B (First Battalion) said to his adjutant: 

Bide over to Seminary Ridge. Dii-ect Companies B and C to proceed 
to the race track, where the battalion assembles in reserve. Have Com- 
pany send a platoon to Willoughby Run, on the Hagerstown road, to 
cover our right flank. Send your orderly with that platoon for messenger 
duty. I will direct Companies B and D to go to the race track. 

Company B was found on the Taneytown road, east of 
knoU 606, and directed to proceed to the race track. It was 
told to send immediately one squad with a flag to Gulps Hill 
to remain in observation to the south and west. This squad 
was to communicate directly by flag with regimental head- 
quarters at the E. Trostle house. 

The major of the Third Battalion received F. O. No. 10 at 
8.32 a. m. At 8.35 a. m. he had signalers semaphore simul- 
taneously to the three first lines companies, and immedi- 
ately afterwards to Company M: 

Enemy advancing. Occupy trenches. 

The Second Battalion received the order at 8.35 a. m. ^-^^ ^- ™- 
Companies A and H had quit work and were then under 
cover 300 yards northwest of the station of battalion head- 
quarters, and their captains were with the major, where they 
had gone for instructions. The major had his three first- 
line companies (the machine guns are with the center com- 
pany) semaphored, ''Enemy advancing. Occupy trenches." 
He then read F. O. 10 to the officers with him, and said: 

Capt. A, go on to the race track. Capt. H, yoiu- company will take 
station in support north of the hedge to the right rear of Company G. Bring 
in your patrol from the right flank, as soon as the First Battalion gets a 
platoon out there. 

(See sketch No. 7 for details of position.) 
98755°— 17 6 



WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION. 



At 10.15 a. m. the colonel received the following mes- 10.15 a. m. 
sage: 

Mount Holly Springs, 

19 June, 9.30 a. m. 
Colonel A, 
Gettysburg. 
Mountain Creek bridge down. Am detraining at Mount Holly Springs. 
Can not move south before to-morrow. 

B, Brigadier General. 

By 10.20 a. m. the Reds had deployed a practically con-^^.^oa m. 
tinuous firing line extending from knoU 566, west of the 
Taneytown road, south of the N. Codori houses, over knolls 
572 and 577, and into the large orchard southwest of Semi- 
nary Ridge. (Sketch 8.) Over nearly the whole front the 
opposing firing lines were rather hotly engaged. 

The message above leaves Col. A no choice but to with- 
draw. EQs chances for victory against at least twice his 
strength, if he should fight to a decision, would be anything 
but good. In trying to save Gettysburg he must not run 
the risk of a failure in his true mission, which requires him 
to keep an unbeaten regiment between the enemy and the 
rest of the division. Since he is going to withdraw, he must 
start to do so at once. The more closely he allows his 
command to become engaged, the more difficult and costly 
wiU be the withdrawal when finally made. 

His orders foUow at 10.20 a. m., by messenger: 

First Infantry, E. Trostle, 

19 June, 10.20 a. m. ^°-^ " '"• 
Major B (Ist Bn.): 

Regiment withdraws. Place First Battalion vicinity Hagerstown road, 
west of Seminary Ridge, to cover withdrawal remainder regiment. 

A, Colonel. 

First Infantry, E. Trostle, 

19 June, 10.25 a. m. 10-25 a. m. 
Captain Q (Regtl. Q.M.): 

Regiment withdraws. Conduct field trains at once via west branch 
Carlisle road to north side Oonewago. 
By order Col. A: 

X, Adjutant. 

83 



84 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

F. O. No. 11. First Infantry, E. Trostle, 

10.30 a. m. 19 June, 10.30 a. m. 

1. Remainder our brigade delayed north of Gettysburg. 

2. Regiment will withdraw to Boyd S. H. 

3. (a) Third Battalion at once via Gettysburg. 

(6) The Second Battalion will withdraw when Third Battalion clears 
Cemetery Hill. 

(c) First Battalion takes station on Hagerstown road, west of Seminary 
Ridge, to assist withdrawal Second Battalion. 

4. Regimental headquarters will accompany the Third Battalion. 

A, Colonel. 

Manifold copies of Field Orders No. 11 were delivered 
by mounted messengers to the Second and Third Battalions, 
receipt being acknowledged at once by semaphore. 

The colonel then verbally directed the surgeon, who had 
heard these orders read before signature: "Start what 
wounded you have collected at once to the north." 

REMARKS. 

It seemed best to the colonel to break off the action 
rather in the customary manner, that is, by starting first the 
troops of the fighting hne that were farthest from the enemy, 
in this case the Third Battahon. If, on the contrary, he 
had caused the Second Battahon to lead, the enemy, who at 
10.20 a. m 10.20 a. m. was only a few hundred yards from it, by follow- 
ing its retiring lines closely, would almost immediately have 
found himself on the flank of the Third Battahon. The 
right companies of the Third Battahon then would have had 
considerable difficulty in getting away. But with the 
Third Battalion retiring first, the enemy's hues behind that 
battahon had much farther to go, and consequently much 
more time must elapse before they could pass the flank of 
the Second Battahon. He might have started the two bat- 
tahons at the same time, but the Second Battahon, from the 
nature of the ground, would probably have gotten away a 
httle earher than the Third, with a somewhat greater chance, 
consequently, of trouble, for the Third Battahon. By 
moving off a battahon at a time the regiment wiU more 
naturally and promptly take up the march in retreat from 
Boyd S. H. under cover of a regularly constituted rear 
guard. By leaving the battahon most closely engaged to 
the last, he is continuing the troops now having the hardest 
duty, in the most responsible and difficult position. But, of 
course, Col, A's thought must be for the security of the 
greatest number. If to save two battahons it is necessary 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



85 



to sacrifice tlie third, he must not hesitate to do so. In the 
case at hand, however, he is not making any such choice. 
By reason of the favoring ground behind most of the com- 
panies, and the assistance of the First Battahon, there should 
be no particular cUfficulty in the Second Battahon hanging 
on for some little time, and finally in getting away without 
much loss. The colonel, of course, might have made the 
escape of the First and Third Battahons absolutley safe, by 
starting them at once straight to the north, leaving the 



SKETCH No. 8. Si+ua+ion a+ I02p A.M. June 19. 




Red Force 



Blue Force 



Second to extricate itseK as best it could. That, however, 
would have jeopardized the Second Battahon to an entirely 
unnecessary extent. The First Battahon can quickly be 
gotten into position well out on the tlireatened flank, from 
which it can bring fire against the enemy as he comes into 
the present position of the Second Battahon, and thereby be of 
the utmost assistance to the latter. The First Battalion in 
turn w^U find the ground behind it well fitted for an orderly 
retirement. 



86 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

It will be noted that the colonel ordered his regiment to 
retreat to Boyd S. H., or, in other words, he named that as 
the rendezvous or assembly point. Boyd S. H. is about 3| 
miles away. By the time the bulk of the regiment reaches 
that point it should have shaken off the enemy to the extent, 
at least, that an orderly retreat with a regular rear guard 
will be practicable thereafter. Such a point must be at a 
considerable distance, or the enemy may make it impossible 
for the fractions of the command to stop there. On the 
other hand, it should be no farther away than is necessary 
to make sure it will serve its purpose, since the command, 
as quickly as possible, should be reassembled and brought 
under control. 

That distance will naturally vary with the size of the 
command, aggressiveness of the enemy, ground, etc. 

No route to Boyd S. H. is assigned to the Second Battal- 
ion. What will be best for that battalion depends very 
largely upon what the enemy does, and therefore should be 
left to its immediate commander. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, THIRD BATTALION. 

10.32 a. m. The order for withdrawal was received at 10.32 a. m. 
The major had Companies I and K semaphored: "Withdraw 
at once to racetrack," and Company L, "I and K withdraw. 
L and guns cover movement," and, finally, Company M, 
^'Battalion withdraws. M covers movement." 

The major watched the withdrawal of Companies I and 
K. When the last men of Company I cleared the orchard, 
which that company had defended, he semaphored Com- 
pany L, "L and guns withdraw." 

He then sent his adjutant to the race track to bring Com- 
panies I and K into the Taneytown Road east of the race 
track, while he personally directed the captain of Company L: 

You will move rapidly on with your company to the Taneytown Road 
east of the race track, pick up Companies I and K, and continue the march 
with them to Boyd S. H. I am going to direct Company M to secure the 
march of the battalion and then I will join you. Send the machine guns 
to Company M on Cemetery Hill. 

Crossing over to company M, he directed its captain: 

The regiment is withdrawing to Boyd S. H., this battalion leading. 
Companies I and K are now near the race track. Company L is passing 
your right. The machine guns have been ordered to join you. Follow 
Company L as rear guard at one-half mile. 

From Cemetery Hill the major watched for a few minutes 
the enemy's advance and then galloped north in time to 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 87 

join the battalion shortly after the three companies had 
united. 

The movement of the Third Battalion to the rear might 
have been expedited by starting Company M at the same 
time as I and K. But that would have left Company L to 
shift for itself; and if the enemy happened to realize at once 
what was being done and advanced rapidly from the N. 
Codori houses, unless he was checked by fire from the di- 
rection of E. Trostle or Cemetery Hill, Company L would 
have been placed in serious straits. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY I. 

The trench of Company I was almost entirely within 
the large orchard, and about 10 yards back from its southern 
edge. 

The captain, at 10.40 a. m., signaled his platoon com- lo.wa. m. 
manders "Assemble personally." They ran in quickly to 
within earshot. The captain directed: 

The company withdraws. Detail one experienced man in each squad to 
remain behind under Lieut. X (first lieutenant). Lieut. X will cover our 
retirement by taking up rapid fire with these men until the comjiany has 
been gone five minutes and will then follow. When you have made up 
your details signal "Ready." The company will move to the rear at my 
signal "Cease firing; to the rear." 

At 10.45 a. m. the company started back, moved a hundred 10.45 a. m. 
yards in line of skirmishers, then in squad columns at a walk 
to the north edge of the orchard, and thence to the northeast. 
The main body of the company assembled in column of 
squads 400 yards northwest of H. Bishop and marched to 
the race track, Lieut. X's party followed at some 600 yards, 
deployed as skirmishers at six paces. 

Company K's movement to the rear was similar, cover 
being obtained at once behind the crest immediately north 
of the trenches. The machine guns with Company L were 
turned on the hostile lines in front of I and K to check any 
hostile tendency to follow them. When Company L received 
the signal to start, the machine guns were carried by hand 
to the animals, which were in the timber east of battalion 
headquarters. Company L followed almost immediately 
under cover of accelerated fire from a thin line left for a 
few minutes in the trenches. 



88 STUmES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, COMPANY M. 

The trenches of Company M were high up the south- 
ern slopes of Cemetery Hill, just below the 620-foot contour, 
with the timber in front well thinned out. Upon receipt 
of the semaphore message from the major to cover the 
withdrawal of the remainder of the battalion, the captain 
directed his first lieutenant : 

The battalion is withdrawing; this company covers the movement. 
Take your platoon to the Emmitsburg Road near that farmhouse (pointing 
to E . Trosite) . Open fire whenever the enemy offers a target. I will remain 
here for the present. 

The captain assembled the remaining platoon com- 
manders, told them of the withdrawal and Company M's 
task, and then with them watched its progress. Immediately 
after the major had detailed the company as rear guard, the 
machine guns were brought up at a trot. The captain then 
u.cTa. m. ^t 11.07 directed: 

The machine guns will take station on the crest of this hill (Cemetery) and 
open fire at once upon any hostile target that is offered to the southwest or 
south . 

Lieut. K (second lieutenant), move north under cover east of the crest (of 
Cemetery Hill), with the third and fourth platoons to the nearest house 
of Gettysburg on the Baltimore Turnpike. Be prepared to support our 
withdrawal by fire when we move from this hill. 

The second platoon will remain in the trenches. Open fire at once on 
any hostile detachments that appear to the south. 

I will remain here. 

11.18 a.m. j^j^ 11.18 a. m. Company L disappeared in the streets of 
Gettysburg. The captain of Company M immediately 
directed the machine-gun commander to trot north on the 
Baltimore Pike and go ahead of Lieut. K (the second lieu- 
tenant) through Gettysburg, and to tell Lieut. K to keep mov- 
ing directly on Boyd School House. He semaphored the first 
lieutenant, ''Withdraw; follow Company L," and when the 
movement had begun directed the second platoon to follow 
the bulk of the company by the Baltimore Turnpike as rear 
party. The captain then met the first lieutenant near H. 
Bishop and directed him to continue as right flank guard by 
the Taneytown Road and on tlirough Gettysburg. The cap- 
tain hurried ahead to join his third and fourth platoons. 

It wiU be remembered that the First Battalion had a patrol 
of eight men on Gulps Hill. These saw the first movements 
of the regiment in retreat. The noncommissioned oflftcer in 
charge realized, however, that his position f acihtated observa- 
tion of the hostile movements and that he had an excellent 
covered line of retreat up Rock Creek, which would probably 



AN INFANTRY EEGIMENT. 89 

not be cut by the enemy for some time, or, when that was 
cut, he could cross Rock Creek and rejoin by a somewhat 
greater detour. He therefore remained in observation until 
the enemy's leading detachments were actually entering 
Gettysburg and a hostile patrol ascending Stevens HiU. No 
difficulty was then experienced in withdrawing along Rock 
Creek and joining finally his proper battalion some miles 
to the north. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, SECOND BATTALION, 

The commander of the Second Battalion received the regi- 
mental order to retire at 10.35 a. m. He immediately sema- lo. 
phored " E withdraw to north" ; then directed his adjutant — 

Meet Company E near the orchard to the northeast (pointing to the one 
at Q. McMillor house). Direct Capt. E to continue north to the railroad 
crossing of the Mummasburg road. Then go on yourself to the nose west 
of the national cemetery. I am ordered to withdraw when the Third 
Battalion clears the national cemetery. I want you to keep track of its 
progress and semaphore me when its last company passes the cemetery. 
Report your arrival on the nose. 

He next semaphored to Company F: "Guns help with- 
drawal Company E and Third Battalion." 

The following message was carried by the major's orderly 
to Companies F and G, in turn: 

Second Battalion, 10.45 a. m. 
Captains F and G: 

The regiment is withdrawing, Third Battalion leading. First Battalion 
takes station to our right rear to cover our withdrawal. 

Machine guns will assist retiring companies Third Battalion by heavy 
fire on the enemy in front those companies. 

Companies F and G will withdraw at my signal "To the rear." I will 
semaphore the machine guns to go just before the companies. 

Acknowledge receipt by semaphore. 

C, Major. 

The major watched the withdrawal of Companies I and 
K and saw enough of the movement of Company L to 
know when that company started. The Red firmg Hues 
were unable to make much progress between the N. Codori 
houses and knoll 572 to the west thereof because of the very 
effective flanking fire of the machine guns with Company F. 

At 11 a. m. he sent the following message to Company H, 
which by this time was firing against a considerable exten- 
sion of the Red lines to the west : 

Second Battalion, 11 a. m. 
Captain H: 

Regiment withdraws. First Battalion is west of Seminary Ridge on 
Hagerstown road to cover movement. Start your company at once by 
route near Seminary Ridge to Hagerstown road. 

C, Major. 



IC-lS a. m. 



90 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

11.30a. 111. At 11.30 a. m. he semaphored Company F, "Guns with- 
draw"; and three mmutes later he signaled, "To the rear," 
to Companies F and G. 

Company E moved promptly to the rear upon receipt of 
the major's semaphored order to withdraw, in line of 
skirmishers at a walk, under cover of the very rapid fire 
of two men from each squad and of the machine guns on 
Seminary Ridge. Wlien the company reached shelter along 
the railroad to the north the covering party followed, open- 
ing out to four or five paces between men. Nevertheless the 
company suffered severely, losing 10 men during the five or 
six minutes required to reach cover. The major wished he 
could get this company into position on the nose southwest 
of the racetrack to check the enemy with its fire if the Reds 
should follow Companies F and G too closely, but he recog- 
nized that Company E must drop many men in its move- 
ment to the rear and that an attempt to stop prematurely 
a shaken command might lead to an entire loss of control. 
He therefore placed its rendezvous point a good 2 miles to 
the rear. 

When the time came for the machine guns to go they 
were carried by hand under shelter of the timber along, 
the ridge crest to their animals, which were south of the 
Q. McMillor house. The platoon then trotted ahead to the 
Lutheran Seminary. 

At the major's signal, "To the rear" Companies F and G 
went rapidly back into the timber behind their trenches, 
taking advantage of the small folds in the ground for partial 
protection and covered, like most of the other companies, by 
the rapid fire of a thin line, left in this case to foUow at a 
couple of hundred yards only. In the timber the companies 
formed squad columns, and continued rapidly along the 
ridge. 

After starting these companies, the major hurried north 
to the horses near Q. McMiUor, found Company H, and 
ordered it to continue near the railroad toward Boyds 
S. H. At the Lutheran Semmary he directed Companies F 
and G to follow the first two (E and H), Company F leaving 
the equivalent of a platoon 600 yards behind as a rear guard. 
North of the Mummasburg road he halted the leading com- 
panies until the four had closed, and then continued, still 
with the small rear guard, to Boyds S. H., where the bat- 
i2.joa. m taUon arrived at 12.40 a. m. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 91 

Near road fork 560 the major met the adjutant of the 
First BattaHon, from whom he learned of the dispositions of 
that battahon. The major then placed the machine-gun 
platoon at the disposal of the First Battalion. At the sug- 
gestion of the adjutant the machine gmis continued north 
to join Companies A and B. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, FIRST BATTALION. 

Maj. B received the order at 10.30 a. m. The company 10.30 p.m. 
stacks were east of the race track, in close line, facing south. 
The major had the battalion fall in and assembled his 
captains; then ordered: 

The regiment is withdrawing. This battaKon covers the movement from 
the Hagerstown road west of the Seminary Ridge. Lieut. Y (battalion 
adjutant), take my orderly and trot ahead to Seminary Ridge. We will 
issue ammunition at once. 

The issue made, he directed the empty wagons to pro- 
ceed at once to Central Square in Gettysburg, and report to 
the surgeon or his representative thereat. The major then 
conducted the battalion in column of squads straight for 
road fork 560. 

At road fork 560 the major directed his adjutant, who 
was waiting there, to examine the ground to the west to 
include knoll 559; and the captain of Company A, at 10.50 
a. m.: 

Companies C and D will deploy on the rise a half mile west of this point 
to check the enemy. Take Companies A and B north by the Lutheran 
Seminary to the Chambersburg road, to a position for firing down the draw 
west of us, to support Companies C and D when they withdraw. 

At 11 a. m., when the center of Companies C and D was 11 a.m. 
directly north of hill 559, the major halted the battalion, 
assembled the captains on the crest, pointed out the indica- 
tions to the south of the engagement of the Second Battalion, 
and directed : 

Capt. C: Take command of these two companies. Deploy them along 
this crest (559), and open a heavy fire in support of the Second Battalion as 
Boon as the enemy gives you a target. Send parties from each company to 
reconnoiter and prepare routes for your withdrawal through the timber to 
the north (pointing it out). Notify your platoon on our right to fall back 
along Willoughby Run when you retire. I am going to place Companies 
A and B at the head of this draw (the one immediately east of 559) to sup- 
port you. I will return to you in a few minutes. 

The major then galloped north to knoll 574, which Com- 
panies A and B were then approaching from the southeast. 



92 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

After a hurried reconnaissance of the vicinity the major 
assembled the captains and directed: 

The right of our Second Battalion is about 2,000 yards down this draw 
near the short strip of timber. Companies C and D, from the knoll where 
they now are (pointing to 559) will check the enemy and then withdraw 
through the timber to our right front. I want you, Capt. A, to assist the 
retirement of Companies C and D by the fire from A and B. Place an 
observation station on the wooded knoll east of us to watch Gettysburg and 
to the south. I want information of the progress of the Third Battalion 
through Gettysburg, and of the Second Battalion, which will probably 
come north by the Lutheran Seminary. Have that post also keep careful 
track of the enemy's progress in pursuit. I will leave you an orderly 
(mounted) to bring me word of what is seen. I am going to reconnoiter the 
ground behind us, and then go to Companies C and D. 

The orderly left was the one that had been with the 
platoon of Company C near Willoughby Run, The major 
rode rapidly back to J. Forney. He promptly decided to 
bring Companies C and D, upon retirement from knoll 559, 
into positions east of and about the J. Forney house, to 
assist Companies A and B, which would retire from 574 by 
covered routes a httle west of north. He then galloped 
back to the small knoll north of 559, where the sergeant 
major established battahon headquarters, and opened sema- 
phore communication with both wings of the battalion. 
The adjutant was sent with the remaining orderly to road 
fork 560 to report the passing of the Second Battalion. 

11.10 a.m. The deployed companies on knoll 559, about 11.10 a. m. 
saw Company H start north along the western edge of the 
timber on Seminary Ridge, and hostile Unes about the same 
time moving north across the farm road west of the southern 
point of the ridge. Fire was opened in a few moments on 
the hostile lines, using combined sights at twelve and 
thirteen hundred yards. 

11.10 a.m. At 11.40 a. m., the adjutant semaphored from the road 
bend west of the Lutheran Seminary, "Tail past." Red 
lines were about 800 yards away down the draw, but the 
enemy was evidently gaining ground more rapidly in the 
timber on Seminary Ridge. The flanking platoon, the fire of 
which had been heard for the last 20 minutes, was crossing 

11.47 a.m. the Hagerstown road in retreat. At 11.47 a. m., when the 
enemy had gained another hundred yards in the draw, and 
was nearing the Hagerstown road to the southwest, the 
major signaled "To the rear." The companies immediately 
moved back in one Hne due north to the timber, and through 
it, by the routes previously recoimoitered. Each company 
was covered by half a dozen scouts who remained on 559 till 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 93 

the company reached the timber, and then followed in a 
wide deployment. 

The major conducted these companies at a rapid pace 
up the draw west of knolls 574, 576, and 577. When the 
battalion (two companies) approached the Mummasburg 
road, the machine-gun platoon that had been with the Third 
Battalion, reported, its commander saying that the colonel 
had ordered it out from Gettysburg by the Mummasburg 
road. The major, at 12.12 p. m. directed: 12.12p.m. 

Companies A and B have an observation station at the wooded knoll 
(582) to the south. Company D will take station at the orchard east of 
this draw prepared to fire to the south, and to the southeast. Company C 
will take station near the house (J. Forney) west of us, to fire toward the 
knoll on which Companies A and B now are. The machine guns will go 
to the knoll to the north (642) and into position for firing on the sector from 
Barlow Knoll east of us to Willoughby Run to the west. I am going to 
Companies A and B, which will withdraw under cover of the nose west of us. 

By this time, the observation station on Imoll 582 had 
reported that both the Second and Third Battalions were 
past the J. Forney position, and that only small parties of 
the enemy had come north of Gettysburg. Companies A 
and B and the machine guns therewith were engaged with 
hostile Hues south of them. The major galloped back to 
the vicinity of knoll 574, directed the commander of the 
machine guns to move rapidly north under cover (west) of 
the J. Forney nose and join the remainder of the company 
on knoll 642. He caused the companies a few minutes later, 
to retire to the heavy timber to the north (the timber north- 
west of J. Forney). This withdrawal was made in much 
the same manner as that of the other two companies from 
knoll 559. 

By 12.35 p. m. Companies A and B were on the Mummas- 12.35 p.m. 
burg road, 300 yards northwest of J. Forney, with a sentry 
squad in observation at the southwest angle of the woods 
thereat, and a cossack post on the Mummasburg road at 
their western extremity. The machine guns and Companies 
C and D were, as the major had ordered, on and south of 
knoll 642. The enemy had not yet appeared in any strength 
in front of the J. Forney position. Battahon headquarters 
was on knoll 642. The major sent the following: 

First Battalion, J. Forney F'arm, N. W. Gettysburg, 

19 June, 12.40 p. m. 
Colonel A.: First Battalion and machine guns in position on J. Forney 
farm. Have had few casualties. Enemy has to present time only patrols 
north of Gettysburo-, and has not yet advanced in any strength against my 
position here. If compelled to withdraw, shall do so along Oak Ridge. 

B., Major. 



THE RETREAT. 



Regimental headquarters had retired with the Third 
Battahon. When the northern Hmits of Gettysburg were 
reached the colonel directed the major of that battalion to 
send the machine guns out on the Mummasburg Road to Oak 
Ridge, to find and join the First Battahon. Even before the 
Second Battahon reached Boyd, S. H., it was evident that the 
regiment, as had been anticipated, could be assembled there 
and marched thence in route column under the protection 
of a regular rear guard. The field wagons, combat wagons, 
and ambulances with the wounded had long before disap- 
peared in the direction of the Conewago. At 12.50 p. m., 12.50 p.m. 
the Second and Third Battalions were resting at Boyd S. H., 
under the immediate protection of three small detachments, 
when Maj. B's (First Battalion) report of 12.40 came in. 
The following order was then issued verbally to the battahon 
commanders present: 

ORDERS, REGIMENTAL COMMANDER. 

The destruction of a railway bridge near Mount Holy Springs has com- 
pelled Gen. B to detrain there. The First Battalion and machine guns have 
withdrawn without much difficulty , and 10 minutes ago were at the southern 
end of Oak Ridge. 

The regiment will retire in the direction of Biglerville. 

The Second and Third Battalions, in that order, will march at once. 

The First Battalion and machine guns will follow as rear guard. 

I will march at the head of the Second Battalion. 

Form your battalions. 

The message below was returned by the orderly that had 
brought Maj. B's report: 

1st Inf., Boyd, S.H., 

19 June, 12.55 p, m. 12.55 p. m. 
Major B : The destruction of a railway bridge near Mount Holly Springs 
has compelled Gen. B to detrain there. 
The regiment is retiring toward Biglerville. 

First Battalion and machine guns, as rear guard, will follow upon receipt 
of this message. 
Leave patrol to maintain contact with the enemy. 

A, Colonel. 

95 



96 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

ORDERS, COMMANDER REAR GUARD. 

When the major received the colonel's message the 
enemy had two or three companies deployed along the 
fence through knoll 577 and in the timber east of 577 ; Com- 
panies C and D were partially deployed and firing on these 
troops, while the machine guns were holding several Red 
companies by fire on the 522— Almshouse Ridge. The cap- 
1.10 p.m. tains assembled on knoll 642. At 1.10 p. m. the major 
ordered : 

The destruction of a railroad bridge near Mount Holly Springs has com- 
pelled Gen. B. to detrain there. The regiment marched about 15 minutes 
ago from Boyd S. H. toward Biglerville. 

We form the rear guard. 

Company A, the Machine Gun Company, and Companies B and C will 
constitute the reserve and will march at once, in the order named, along 
the crest of Oak Ridge and the railroad, to come into the Carlisle Road a 
mile and a half north of Boyd S. H. 

Company A will send a strong officers, patrol along the Mummasburg 
Road to the ridge half a mile west of this, and then north by the road on that 
ridge. 

Company D, as support, will follow at 500 yards. It will leave a patrol 
of four men to remain in contact with the enemy. 

I will be at the head of the support. 

Company D had one platoon deployed at the southern 
edge of the orchard west of the M. McLean farmhouse. The 
remainder of the company was in support on the north side 
of the orchard. The captain assembled his officers and the 
noncommissioned officers of the three platoons in support, 
1.17p.m. and at 1.17 p. m. directed: 

Gen. B has been compelled to detrain at Mount Holly Springs by a broken 
railroad bridge. Our regiment is retiring toward Biglerville. The First 
Battalion constitutes the rear guard. Company A is sending a strong 
patrol along the ridge half a mile west of this one. 

The rest of the battalion is marching north along this (Oak) ridge. 

This company forms the support. 

The first platoon will constitute the rear party and will follow the com- 
pany at 200 yards. 

Sergt. B, take the fifth squad, under cover, to the farmhouse (J. Forney) 
west of us. Check any hostile troops that may attempt to advance from the 
south or southwest. Retire at the same time as the rear party and join it 
on top of the ridge north of us. 

The captain had the company fall in, started connect- 
ing files to keep in touch with the reserve, and then marched 
through the orchard west of knoll 642. When near the 
crest he directed Sergt. M: 

I want you to remain in touch with the enemy with three men of the sixth 
squad. Retire north along the ridge only as his advance compels you to, 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 97 

and no farther than is necessary. Continuo on, however, to join the com- 
pany at dark. The regiment is marching by the west branch of the Carlisle 
Road. Information is wanted not only of the hostile movements on this 
ridge but of the enemy's movements to the east as well. 

The rear party sent connecting files, about 30 yards apart, 
to follow the company, and moved to the rear at the pre- 
scribed distance. 

A HALT — ORDERS AND ACTIONS, REGIMENTAL COMMANDER. 

At 2 o'clock the Second and Third Battalions were passing ap.m. 
over the eastern nose of hill 707. The field and combat 
trains had been reported as halted in column just north of 
the Conewago. The rear guard seemed to be a couple of 
miles behind. One message had been received from its com- 
mander, sent after passing west of Boyd S. H., which re- 
ported that although the rear guard had had no difficulty 
so far in its retirement, yet hostile troops were following 
both directly along Oak Ridge and on the Carlisle Road. 

The colonel decided to halt, not only to let his rear guard, 
which was becoming dangerously isolated, close up, but 
also to get a better idea of the enemy's intentions. He had 
no idea of continuing to run if there was not to be an aggres- 
sive pursuit by superior forces. Moreover, the ground that 
had been reached was well suited for administering a check 
to the enemy if necessary to help out the rear guard, or to 
make trouble for an inexpert pursuer. 

He accordingly massed the regiment in the field to the 
east of the road north of the 707 ridge, and directed the 
majors: 

We will halt here for at least one hour. The Third Battalion will place a 
squad in observation on the hill to the west (707) and another beyond the 
timber east of us. 

The colonel then sent the following message : 

First Infantry, 1 mile south of Texas, 

19 June, 2.05 p. m. 
Major B: The regiment is halting for at least one hour. 

Close up the bulk of your rear guard to the crossroads, one-half mile west 
of Goldenville. 

A, Colonel. 

The adjutant then notified the quartermaster that the 
regiment would halt for at least one hour. 

98755°— 17 7 



98 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

A MARCH OUTPOST ORDERS, COMMANDER OF THE REAR 

GUARD. 

Maj. B received the order when near the Hamilton farm. 
For some time the battalion had seen no hostile detachments. 
The major dropped back at once to the captain of Company 
D, and directed: 

The regiment is making a long halt northwest of the large hill [pointing 
to 707]. 

This battalion will halt at the crossroads a mile north of us. Leave a. 
platoon on this ridge, and with the rest of your company join the battalion. 

I will direct one of the mounted orderlies to remain with that platoon for 
messenger duty. 

At crossroads 621 he turned the battalion west into the 
scattered trees nearby, formed close column, stacked arms, 
called out that time would be given here for lunch, and 
assembling the captains, when Company D came up, directed: 

The regiment halted beyond the crest north of us. Company D has left 
a platoon on the ridge a mile to the south. 

Company D will also send a squad to the crossroads 500 yards west of this 
point, and one to the nose a half mile east of Golden ville. It will place an 
observation station at the crossroads (621), and one on the hill (707) north of 
us. 

With the excellent view obtainable from hill 707 for a 
long distance to the south, 'very little is required for proper 
security. Nothing would be gained under the circumstances 
by leaving a company to the south, anywhere short of the 
Hamilton Ridge, since it could sec nothing from a station 
north of that ridge that can not be seen from hill 707. The 
major had no intention of offering resistance to a hostile 
advance in strength south of the Golden viUe-Mummasburg 
Road. The platoon at Hamilton was simply a patrol to 
keep in touch with the enemy, made strong enough to 
maintain its position in the face of the enemy's reconnoiter- 
ing patrols, but not so strong that it would be tempted to 
remain in the face of larger hostile forces. The two squads, 
east and west, were sent out, directly from the support, to 
stop any Red patrols that might work around the platoon 
at Hamilton's and escape detection from hill 707. In 
addition, the colonel covered the flanks of the main body 
of the regiment by two small detachments, the western one 
of which will now be relieved by the party Maj. B has 
ordered to hill 707. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 99 



A HALT FOR THE NIGHT. 



At 3.10 p. m. report was received from the lieutenant 3.10 p.m. 
at Hamilton's that the enemy, except by small patrols, had 
made no advance north of the stock farm, or the knoll 
(636) one-half mile west of it. 

Whatever may be the intentions of the enemy, whether 
Gettysburg simply is his objective, or he intends ultimately 
to continue farther to the north, it is hardly likely that he 
will do the latter to-day. The colonel decides, therefore, to 
put his tired regiment into camp. To obtain somewhat 
greater safety for the main body, and also to give the men 
the benefit of the Conev/ago for bathing, he will take the 
main body to the north side. While that stream is not 
much of an obstacle, the division's advance later will still 
be facilitated if he can hold its crossings open. The colonel 
consequently will leave a strong outpost south of the stream. 

He issued, at 3.20 p. m., the following verbal orders to 3.20p.m. 
the three majors: 

Lieut. X, who is down near the Hamilton farm, reports that the enemy 
has not come north of the stock farm with anything stronger than small 
patrols. 

We will go into camp. 

The First Battalion and the Machine-Gun Company will camp near 
Texas and secure the heights (hill 707) south of us. If attacked, these 
heights will be held. 

The remainder of the regiment will camp in the field north of the Cone- 
wago and west of the Carlisle Road. 

Capt. A (adjutant) will ride ahead to place the company flags. 

The wagons will join the troops. 

Form your battalions. 

The colonel then marched the regiment to camp. At 
4.30 p. m., he directs the majors of the second and third ^-sopm. 
battalions to send their adjutants to report for an all-night 
patrol. To them, he said: 

The enemy seems to have made no advance north of the stock farm 
except in small patrols. 

I want to know his strength and dispositions near Gettysburg, and whether 
other troo]:« are following- the detachment we met this morning. 

Lieut. K, get three orderlies from the detachment commander and pro- 
ceed at 6 p. m., by routes well to the east of Rock Creek until east of Gettys- 
burg, to obtain this information. 

Lieut. L, you will also take three orderlies and proceed at the same time, 
by routes generally west of Oak Ridge until west of Gettysburg, for the same 
purpose. 

Let me have reports by 5 a. m. tomorrow. 

The colonel started his rcconnoitering patrols at this 
hour, 6 o'clock, so as to allow time for the care and rest 



100 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

of the animals and for the men to get their supper. The 
necessity for such improvisation of mounted patrols for 
an Infantry regiment is, of course, by no means frequent. 
This regiment is in a very abnormal situation in civilized 
warfare; first, in being detached; and, second, when de- 
tached, in not having some Cavalry with it. 

Tlic colonel forwarded the following telegraphic report 
from Biglerville : 

No. 2. 

IsT Inf., Camp just north of Conewago, 

South of Biglerville, 

19 June, 5 p. m. 
General B., Mount Holly Springs: 

Two hostile regiments attacked my position south of Gettysburg thia 
morning. Upon receipt your No. 1, I started withdrawal. Effected with 
little loss. Enemy followed only some 2 miles north of Gettysburg. 

Have my outpost south of Conewago. Unless hard pressed will keep 
open nearby crossings that stream. 

My combat wagons are empty. Request at least two hundred thousand 
rounds ammunition be sent to Biglerville. 



A, Colonel. 



OUTPOST. 



Maj. B, after receiving the colonel's halt order, returned 
to his battahon near crossroads 621, assembled his captains, 
3.38p.m. and at 3.30 p. m., directed: 

Lieut. X reports that no hostile detachments larger than patrols have 
come north of the stock farm. Our regiment is moving into camp just 
north of the Conewago. 

This battalion and the Machine-Gun Company outpost the command. 

Company C, and one platoon of the machine guns, will take station on 
the ridge north of this point (the 707 ridge) to secure the sector Golden- 
ville — 5 forks, 1,500 yards west of the Carlisle Road. In case of attack the 
company will hold the 707 ridge. Signal communication from the 707 hill 
to Texas will be established. A platoon will be sent to relieve company 
D's post at the Hamilton farm. The mounted orderly now there will re- 
main all night. 

The remainder of the outpost will camp at Texas. 

The rations and baggage of Company C will be sent to the company. 

Return the wagon immediately to Texas for the night. 

The major marched the battalion to Texas, and camped 
in the field northwest thereof. He had Company A place a 
cossack post on the unimproved road toward Table Rock 
Station at the bend 250 yards east of Texas, and one at the 
703 road fork southwest of camp. He also placed a signal 
station on one of the houses of Texas for communication 
with liill 707. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 101 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS, SUPPORT COMMANDER. 

The captain of Company C at 3.40 p. m. assembled his 3.40 p.m. 
officers and noncommissioned officers, and the lieutenant in 
command of the machine guns, and directed : 

Lieut. X reports that no hostile detachments larger than patrols have 
come north of the Stock Farm. The regiment camps north of the Conewago 
tlie remainder of the battalion at Texas, three-quarters of a mile north of 
tliis point. 

This company and the platoon of machine guns, as the support of the 
outpost, take station on the ridge to the north. 

The following outguards will be posted at once : 

Corpl. B, with his squad, as No. 1, at the five forks (679) three-quarters 
of a, mile west of us. 

Corpl. C, with J, K, and L, as No. 2, at the crossroads (648) 500 yards west 
of this point. 

M, with the remainder of Corpl. C's squad, as No. 3, at the road fork (621) 
on the Carlisle Road. 

Corpl. D, with N, O, and P, as No. 4, at the railroad crossing in Golden- 
yille. 

Lieut. B, with the fourth platoon, will relieve Lieut. X at the Hamilton 
Farm, a mile and a quarter south on the Carlisle road. The mounted 
orderly will remain all night with this post for messenger duty. Get flag 
communication also with hill 707. Send small patrols as far south as 
Boyd S. H. 

Lieut. R (machine-gun platoon) will reconnoiter positions on hill 707 
for sweeping the approaches from the south. 

Corpl. R will take four signalers to the hill top (707), and establish com- 
munication with Texas, each of the outguards, and Lieut. B's detached post. 

The captain then conducted the company and the ma- 
chine-gun platoon to the north side of the small grove north- 
east of hill 707. Arms were stacked. One observer with 
glasses was put on the house, with a messenger below. The 
animals were taken, one-half at a time, to water west of 
Texas. Water for the men was obtained from the farm- 
house well, over which a sentry was posted. Fires for cook- 
ing were screened in the northern edge of the timber. The 
captain directed the fii'st lieutenant to make camp, and then 
explain the situation to the men. The captain himself 
looked over the ground to decide upon positions for defense, 
and then visited the outguards beginning with No. 1. At 
each station he made sure that the men understood the situ- 
ation, that the outguard was posted to best advantage; he 
indicated routes for messengers, patrols, and lines of re- 
treat if driven in; and pointing out the station on hiU 707, 
saw that the outguard had semaphore connection therewith. 



102 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Returning to the company, lie prepared the following 
report, and the sketch accompanying it (No. 9) : 

Company C, First Infantry, 

June 19, 4-SO p. m. 
Major B: Outpost as shown on sketch herewith. Detached post at 
Hamilton's instructed to send small patrols to Boyd S. H. 

C, Captain. 

This message was delivered by messenger to Maj. B, who 
forwarded it to Col. A, adding: 

First Battalion camped in field northwest of Texas. Will reinforce 
Company C in case of attack. Cossack posts for local security east and 
west of battalion camp. 

The reserve does no patrolling at all. Until dark none is 
done by the support. At night one patrol of three men goes 
each hour by Goldenville, crossroads 608, to the east, then 
toward Gettysburg by the east branch of the Carlisle Road 
to the farm road, and by knolls 651 and 654 to Hamilton, 
road fork 630 and crossroads 648. A second patrol, also of 
three men, goes hourly by crossroads 648, road fork 644, 
five forks 679, and road fork 703. 

The machine guns are on the Carlisle Road during the 
night. 

On the night of the 17th, with a beaten enemy in front, 
one company, or less than one-twelfth of the regiment, con- 
stituted its outpost. To-night, in a retreat, and wdth a nu- 
merically superior enemy in front, considerably more than 
one-third of the regiment is on the duty of security. But 
even in this case only one company, the one in support, is 
actually losing much rest, and of it, only about one-third of 
its members are on duty at a time. The three companies 
and a half at Texas will have about as good a night as those 
in the regiment north of the Conewago. But their presence 
there, with a comparatively short distance to go to reinforce 
the company in support, adds very greatly to the security of 
the remainder of the regiment, and to the prospect of hold- 
ing the position south of the Conewago. From these ex- 
amples, it is evident how little any set forms or rules can 
be applied to the dispositions of outposts, but on the con- 
trary, how absolutely these must depend upon the circum- 
stances of the particular case. 



AIT INFANTRY REGIMENT. 



103 



SKETCH No. 9 Disposi+ions Nighi June I9-20 




104 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

SANITARY ARRANGEMENTS. 

Wlien the regimental surgeon received the information 
of the advance of the hostile force from Emmitsburg, he 
immediately requested that all civilian transportation that 
could be collected, be ordered to report at the county alms- 
house at 6 a. m. June 19. 

On the morning of June 19 one medical officer and six 
men were left with the wounded thereat, and with the 
approval of the colonel the regimental surgeon distributed 
the remaining personnel as follows: 

One medical officer with the First and Second Battalions. 

Tvv^o enlisted men with each company on the line. 

He, with the remaining two enlisted men, and the pack 
mule loaded with supplies necessary for an aid station, 
halted at E. Trostle. No aid station would be established 
at that time. 

The three ambulances and the combat wagons were or- 
dered to proceed to the Central Square, Gettysburg. When 
the band reported, he sent the principal musician and nine men 
to report to the officer left in charge at the temporary hos- 
pital to assist m moving the patients when evacuation be- 
came necessary. Of those remainmg, 10 men were ordered 
to report to the surgeon of the vSecond Battalion and 8 men 
he retained at regimental headcjuarters. 

When word was received that no more trams would 
come through to Gettysburg, the regimental surgeon im- 
mediately sent orders to the officer in charge at the county 
almshouse to evacuate to Holly Springs, in the impressed 
transportation, all patients able to travel, leaving with the 
non-transportable cases only sufficient personnel to care for 
their immediate wants. (Nearly all of the woimded on the 
17th, of course, went out by rail on the 18th.) 

The surgeon, himself, remained with the regimental 
commander, but ordered two ambulances to advance to the 
Second Battalion as safety would permit. The remaming 
ambulance he ordered to E. Trostle. 

As soon as the Third Battalion, m its retirement, reached 
the latter place, the wounded who had been brought back 
with the command, were loaded in this ambulance and it 
proceeded north in advance of the retreatmg force. 

On the retirement of the Second Battalion, all womided 
who could be transported were placed in the two ambu- 
lances with that section of the command. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT. 105 

The six men of the band and six sanitary soldiers then 
on duty with the Third Battalion were ordered to report 
to the surgeon of the First Battalion. 

"Wlien the outpost li^e was formed that night the sani- 
tary personnel on duty with the First Battalion remained 
with the battalion headquarters at Texas. 

COMMENT. 

The advance of the new Red force immediately aroused 
fears for the safety of the remaining wounded of tlie first 
engagement; and the regimental surgeon had to make pro- 
visions for their evacuation by road. Of course, he could 
transport a large number on the combat wagons, etc., be- 
longing to the regiment, but he desired to keep them as free 
as possible for the probable additional womided expected. 

The assignment of the sanitary personnel to the different 
elements of the intrenched command was made m such a 
way that each company would be provided with sanitary 
assistance. With such distribution, it was, of course, im- 
possible to remove some of the wounded from the field, but 
at least they received first-aid treatment. 

The regimental surgeon, himself, remained at headquar- 
ters, but this location was such that he also acted as surgeon 
of the Thii'd Battalion. 

The band was distributed in such a way that theii" services 
as litter bearers could be employed to the best advantage. 
The ambulances and wagons being placed in Gettysburg, 
were out of danger during the actual fighting and were so 
placed that they could be sent to either flank without 
delay. 

No aid station was established, as the line was so located 
that no one point could be selected for this work. The 
battalion detachments had to collect the womided to such 
points as were convenient to the actual firing line. 

The regimental surgeon, by ordering the immediate 
removal of the wounded by road, as soon as he was informed 
that the railroad was interrupted, provided for their safety; 
and at least all of the transportable cases could be removed 
to the rear. Every effort must be made to prevent wounded 
from falling into the hands of the enemy. The necessary 
attendants for wounded unable to be moved must always 
be provided for before a retirement takes place. 

By reinforcing the sanitary personnel with the First Batr- 
talion provision was made for the care of the wounded in 



j_QQ STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

the section of tlie command which was most liable to be en- 
gaged on the retreat. A larger nimiber of men than is nor- 
mally provided for was detailed, so that all the wounded 
possible could receive first aid and be removed from the 
field in advance of the rear guard. 



PART n.— A BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 



Escorting a Convoy. 

On May 5 a Blue army moving northeast in hostile terri- 
tory has reached the line Hunters Run to Newville (sketch 
No. 10), where it is confronted by the main Red forces. 

A depot for the service of the right of the Blue army is 
being established at Center Mills, The First Battalion, First 
Blue Infantry, has been collecting supplies therefor south- 
east of Littlestown. It camped for the night of May 5-6, 
about 9 p. m,, near 558 W, north of Littlestown, with a 
hundred impressed and heavily loaded wagons, the poor 
teams of v/hich are practically exhausted. Recent heavy 
rains have put all roads in bad condition. That of the Bal- 
timore Turnpike is exceptionally poor. Its bridge over Rock 
Creek is out. The nearest Blue troops are at Center Mills. 
The battalion came to Littlestown from Center Mills by way 
of Hunterstown and BoneauviUe. 

The feeling of the inhabitants is bitter against the Blues. 
Numerous small partisan corps exist. Othei^wise, except 
for a garrison at York, no Red troops are known to be nearer 
than those of the main Red army. 

About 10 p. m. Maj. A, commanding the battalion, learns 
that a Red battalion marched in from Hanover and camped 
at Brushtown late in the evening. 

BATTALION COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Maj. A was sent out to bring to Center Mills such sup- 
plies as he could gather. He intends to accomplish that mis- 
sion if it is practicable to do so. 

In country exceedingly^ hostile to the Blues, the Reds 
are, without doubt, weU informed of the movements of the 
Blue battalion. Consequently, the Red detachment at Brush- 
to^\^l very probably has for its mission the capture of the 
Blue convoy. That battalion may be alone, or it may be 
the advance of some larger command. But at best, if the 
battalion is operating alone, the Reds have still a very 
considerable advantage over the Blues, hampered as the 
latter are by their slow moving and unwieldy convoy. 

107 



108 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

From Brushtown by Felty S. H. to knoll 647, northeast 
of Pleasant Hill S. H., is 3 miles; by crossroads 601 to the 
Small farmhouse, east of Whitehall, is about SJ miles; by 
Square Corner to the road fork north of the Shebley farm 
is about 4 miles; and to the houses midway between Square 
Corner and Boneauville is also about 4 miles. With Ked 
troops at any of these points, the convoy could not pass 
on the Pleasant Hill S. H. — Boneauville road. On this 
road, from 558 W to road fork 598 is 1 mile; to Whitehall 
is 2^ miles; to road fork 637 is slightly under 3| miles; 



SKETCH NO. 10. 






ONewville 




N 

Hunters o a 
Run 


1 




O Center 
Mills 




OYork 


O Hunters town 




O 




Gettysburg O Hanover 




o 

Littlestowo 




5 10 15 ?0 


23 M 

• 





and to Boneauville is 4]- miles. The convoy is roughly 
a mile long. 

If the enemy starts at the same time as the convoy and 
goes at the same rate, marching by Felty S. H., he will 
reach knoU 647 twenty minutes after the tail of the convoy 
passes road fork- 598; marching via road fork 606, he will 
reach knoll 607, southeast of the Small farmhouse, 5 minutes 
before the tail of the convoy enters Whitehall; via Square 
Corner, he wiU reach the road fork northeast of the Shebley 
farm a few minutes before the tail of the convoy passes 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 109 

road fork 637; aj^aiii via Square Corner he will reach the 
houses midway between Square Corner and Boneauville 
while the head of the convoy is still east of Sweet Home 
S. 11. The enemy's best route for cutting off the convoy is, 
therefore, via Square Corner on Boneauville. ' Since this 
hostile action promises most trouble for the Blue battalion, 
it is well for Maj. A to make his own dispositions with it 
primarily in view. 

Now, all of these calculations are based upon the as- 
sumption that the convoy and the Red battalion start at the 
same time and proceed at the same rate. But Maj. A is 
well aware that the enemy, with a single unencumbered 
battalion in friendly territory, may start at a very early 
hour, or may, in fact, make a night march; and when started 
the Red battalion should march very much faster than the 
scratched up and unwiUing train in his charge. Notwith- 
standing the bad condition of the roads the Reds arc likely 
to do a full 3 miles an hour, while the convoy is having 
great difficulty in doing 2. From all of these considera- 
tions, it is evident that if the enemy's objective is the con- 
voy, the latter can hardly continue by Boneauville without 
finding some means for delaying the enemy east thereof. 

The first idea of Maj. A is to hook up and puU out at 
once; but that plan has to be rejected immediatel}^. His 
animals are nearly exhausted. Some hours' rest must be 
permitted before they start once more with their heavy 
loads through the mud. Moreover, the difficulties of a night 
march, even if the teams could stand it would be almost in- 
surmountable, through the favorable conditions extended by 
darkness for intentional delays and impediments upon the 
part of the impressed teamsters. To go at once is out of 
the question. But on the other hand the march must begin 
in tlic morning at the earliest practicable hour. Sunrise 
will bo at 5.22; dawn about an hour earlier or at 4.22. To 
get teams ready requires the men to be up from an hour 
to an hour and a liaK before the starting time. To move 
much before dawn would be very difficult with such a con- 
voy. Maj. A accordingly concludes that 4 o'clock is the 
very earliest practicable hour. 

If the convoy goes by Boneauville the Blue battalion 
wiU probably have to fight to obtain the time required for 
the escape of the convoy. Can any other route be used that 
will avoid the necessity for fighting? The Baltimore turn- 
pike is impracticable. If it were not since the convoys is 
only half a mile nearer the center of Gettysburg than is 



110 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

Brushtown, the Reds could easily cut it off at that point. 
Any route south of the turnpike adds to the length of the 
detour. Any such route would probably also be found in 
worse condition than the turnpike and the farther down 
Rock Creek a crossing is attempted the greater the chance 
there is of hinderance by broken bridges. While broken 
bridges would stop the convoy, they would have little effect 
upon the piu'suing Reds, who could undoubtedly cross al- 
most anywhere. 

To send the convoy by Germantown, Two Taverns, and 
the Low Dutch Road, while marching with the greater part 
of the battalion by T^Tiitehall and Boneauville, if the roads 
were good, at first sight would seem to offer a chance of 
escaping without a fight. But the Baltimore Turnpike is 
known to be in particularly bad condition. It crosses tlu*ee 
considerable streams, Alloway and Plum Creeks and Littles 
Run. The Low Dutch Road crosses a fourth. Each of 
these is an argument against the use of that route. Maj. A 
came down by Boneauville and Whitehall. He knows that 
road, and can make a pretty good estimate of its present 
condition. It runs along a ridge crossing the streams near 
their sources. It should consequently suffer comparatively 
little damage under the rains, and its surface should dry out 
quickly. Maj. A would hardly dare to start his convoy over 
the Baltimore Turnpike, Low Rutch route, without previous 
reconnaissance. That reconnaissance perhaps could be made 
to-night by one of his staff officers; but even if the partisans 
permitted the officer's return there would be little left in 
his horse for the necessarily hard work of to-morrow. 

To the junction of the Low Dutch and Hanover roads, 
by GeiTnantown and Two Taverns, from the convoy camp 
is about 8^ miles. To the same junction from Brushtown 
is less than 7 miles. While the distances to Boneauville, 
from the Blue and the Red camps, slightly favor the Blues, 
these distances to the junction of the Low Dutch and Han- 
over roads are considerably against them. The route by 
Germantown and Two Taverns would consequently require 
the enemy to be engaged by a delaying force for a much 
greater period. 

Another disadvantage of the Low Dutch route is the 
fact that for some hours the convoy and the bulk of the bat- 
talion marching by Boneauville would be separated by 
several miles, which in this very hostile territory might lead 
to the destruction of the convoy by partisan corps. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. Ill 

Tliere are no continuous intormediary routes to con- 
sider. 

Has Maj. A a reasonable prospect of getting by Bo- 
neauville with his convoy ? For, if the convoy does get by 
Boncauville without meeting the enemy, it will not be in 
much danger of being caught thereafter. Starting at 4 
o'clock, and averaging 2 miles an hour, the convoy, having 
4| miles plus its own length, 1 mile, or 5| miles to go, wiU 
clear that village a few minutes before 7 o'clock. If the 
enemy also starts at 4 o'clock, his advance, if uninterrupted, 
would reach there, at 2^ miles an hour, at 6 o'clock. For 
the convoy to escape, the enemy, therefore, must be delayed 
for something over an hour at the very least. Can this be 
done ? 

In answering the question it is necessary first to find 
out what Maj. A will have for a delaying force; and this 
requires the determination of the number of men that must 
be left directly with the convoy. The convoy is divided into 
four sections of 25 wagons each. Starting before daylight, 
every single driver 'must be carefully watched, or some wiU 
find means for seriously delaying the march. This requires 
a soldier for each wagon, or 100 men for this duty alone. 
Then each section should have in addition at least one squad. 
In furnishing the wagon sentries, the service squads of the 
companies — ^the quartermaster sergeants, cooks, clerks, and 
artificers— are available, and will help to the extent of some 
20 men altogether. By using these men, it is evident that 
a single company might furnish the police details enumer- 
ated above and in addition scratch up a couple of squads 
for the absolutely necessary advance and rear guards. De- 
tailing one company only with the convoy would, however, 
leave the troops with it available for security entirely too 
few, and nothing in reserve for meeting an emergency. 
There must be something at hand to meet the unexpected, 
otherwise delays in tlie convoy's march are almost certain 
to occur. Maj. A believes it better therefore to detail one 
company plus a platoon of another as the immediate escort. 

That leaves two and three-fourth companies to be thrown 
toward the enemy to hold him up for something over an 
hour. If he has only four companies, and the Blue com- 
panies can get between them and the convoy and have room 
for one or two delaying actions, to gain the required time 
should not be found impossible. 

Having decided to interpose the bulk of the battalion 
between the enemy and the convoy, the first objective and 



112 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

the route thereto must be selected. For the battalion to 
march by Felty S. H. on A. Rifle would be to run the risk 
of the enemy passing A. Rifle first, and then Maj. A would 
find the enemy between him and his convoy. Moreover, 
Maj. A does not wish to get any closer to Brushtown than 
is absolutely necessary, because the chances of a fight are 
constantly increasing as he a,pproaches that village, and he 
does not want to fight if a fight can be avoided. If the Blue 
battalion were to select the route at the other extreme, by 
Whitehall on Square Corner, the enemy might pick up the 
convoy behind the battalion by a march directly on White- 
hall. This might also happen if the battalion, marching by 
road forks 610, 611, 606, and 609, were to continue on to 
crossroads 601. But if the battalion marches to crossroads 
609, near the Font farmhouse, and waits there in readiness, 
it wiU be able to stop the enemy if the latter marches by 
crossroads 601, or can quickly oppose him if he marches 
south by Felty S. H., or west toward Whitehall. 

Crossroads 609 can be reached in a few minutes over 
an hour. While the animals of the convoy are desperately 
tired, the men of the battaUon are not necessarily so, and 
anyhow they can be counted on to recuperate more rapidly 
with a httle rest. The battahon, therefore, can start con- 
siderably before the convoy. If it were to start at the same 
time as the convoy, that is at 4 o'clock, it would be 5 o'clock 
before it reached crossroads 609. Meantime the enemy, 
without an excessively early start, could have marched by 
on the Hanover road; 3 o'clock, therefore, is the latest that 
the Blue Battahon can start and have a reasonable prospect 
of arriving in time. Any earlier than that hour seems out 
of the question if the men, who only reached camp at 9 
o'clock and will have to be up at least an hour before they 
march in the morning, are to have any real rest. 

Having considered all the ways of escaping with the 
convoy, Maj. A now asks himself, "Is the convoy worth the 
necessary sacrifice" ? Saving the convoy almost certainly 
means an engagement with the enemy; and an engagement, 
no matter how well conducted, means the loss of valuable 
lives. Are the stores worth so much? Would it not be 
better to destroy the convoy, and then with his unencum- 
bered battalion quietly slip away to the west? The major 
answers, no. The depot must be established and supphes 
therefor must be gathered. If a collecting detachment stops 
its work and runs every time an enemy threatens to interfere, 
not many supphes wiU get into the depot, and no very high 



BATTLION OP INFANTRY. 113 

opinion of Blue courage will be formed in the minds of the 
enemy. The major may yet come to the destruction of the 
convoy, but not until he has at least made an attempt to 
get away with it. 

Whether any troops are back of the battahon in Brush- 
town must be learned, and the enemy's movements must be 
watched. It is, of course, particularly important to know 
when and in what direction he marches. Maj, A has only 
the prescribed battalion mounts mth him. These should 
be fresh to-morrow to perform the important duty of main- 
taining communication between the battahon and the con- 
voy. There is nothing left but a dismounted patrol; and, 
notwithstanding the great distance to the hostile camp, a 
dismounted patrol will have to be sent. 

Maj. A expects to divide his command to-morrow into 
two main detachments, a right flank guard and the convoy 
itself. If the whole command were larger, it would prob- 
ably be better for Maj, A to appoint a commander for the 
flank guard and content himself with the general command 
of the two detachments. But he will, in any event, be with 
the flank guard as the more important detachment and, 
while there, he prefers to retain the command in liis own 
hands rather than to detach a captain therefor from that 
ofiicer's company. 

His decision consecjuently is: 

Three companies (less 1 platoon) to march at 3 a. m., via 
roadforks 610, 611, 606 to crossroads 609. 

The convoy, under the immediate escort of one and one- 
fourth companies, to march at 4 a. m., via Whitehall and 
Boneauville. 

To send an officer's patrol at once to Brushtown. 

Except to the patrol, no orders will be issued to-night, 
because the enemy, by a night march, may make all of Maj. 
A's intended dispositions impracticable and leave nothing 
for him to do but turn to the west or destroy the convoy. He 
will simply have the troops quietly aroused at 2 a. m. 

Before proceeding with the major's orders it will be well 
to see what v/ere his camp arrangements for security. A 
large body of troops obtains most of its security to the flanks 
by the lateral extension of its outpost line, and frequently 
by bending it toward the rear. With such extension the 
detour required for any large hostile body to pass by an 
extremity of the outpost line and reach the main body in 
prohibitive. With a small body, however, that detour may 
not be very great, and for proper protection a small command 
98755°— 17— 8 



114 



STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 



may, therefore, not simply outpost toward the enemy, but 
may have to bend back the flanks of that line until it is 
practically surrounded by its security detachments. In the 
case at hand, because of the Red partisans, Maj. A's enemies 
are on all sides ; moreover, he has them in his own camp in 
the persons of his impressed drivers. YVlien his outposts 



SKE TCH Nio.n. 



Con 




were established he knev/ of nothing to make the direction 
toward York very much more dangerous than any other. 

The wagons of the convoy v/ere in a square, with the poles 
and animals inside, immediately west of the clump of timber 
north of 558 W. The square was about 110 yards on a side. 
Eight sentries were posted about it. The battahon v/as 
camped north of the convoy. Four pickets of tw^o squads 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 115 

each were stationed — one on the nose northwest of Pleasant 
Hill S, H.; one on the knoll 621, south of camp; one 200 
yards northeast of 558 W. ; and one west of the clump of 
timber west of camp. The timber along the stream lines 
east and west of the camp and Ash Grove S. H. were fre- 
quently visited by patrols. One company furnished all 
details. No change was made in these dispositions after 
learning of the camp of the Red battahon at Brushtown. 
(See sketch No. 11.) 

AN INFANTRY PATROL. 

As soon as Maj. A learned of the hostile battahon at Brush- 
town, he directed the captain to send him Lieut. B of Com- 
pany A for patrol duty. When that officer reported, the 
major directed: 

A Red battalion came from the east into Brushtown thia evening and 
camped there. 

1 Avant you to verify the Red strength and find out whether they are fol- 
lowed by other troops. Also I particularly want to know when they march 
from their present camp and by what route. 

Select five men from your company to go with you and get this informa- 
tion. 

Messages will reach me at this camp until 3 a. m.; after that, with 
the battalion which will march at that hour by Pleasant Hill S. H. and 
road forks 610, 611, and 606 to crossroads 609. 

Lieut. B immediately reported the orders he had received 
to his captain, and asked by name for a sergeant, a corporal, 
and three privates. He asked also to have the packs of these 
men carried the next day by wagon. He caused the men to 
take their rations, including one cooked meal, and to march 
in the hght kit. In addition to the prescribed equipment, 
the lieutenant took an electric torch, by which to read his 
map and write messages. The patrol assembled at 10.30 10.30 p.m. 
p. m. The lieutenant inspected to make certain that the 
mess equipment had been so covered that it would not rattle. 
He then instructed the men as follows: 

A Red battalion camped this evening at Brushtown, about 4 miles north- 
east of us. 

This patrol is ordered to Brushtown to verify the enemy's reported 
ftrength, learn if any other troops are behind that battalion, and in par- 
ticular, when the enemy marches and by what route. 

Messages are to be sent to this camp up to 3 o'clock; after that, to the 
Pleasant Hill S. H., road forks 610, 611, and 606 road, along which our 
battalion marches at that horn-. 

The Ueutenant issued this order with his map spread. He 
pointed out places and roads as they were named, trying to 



116 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

leave a general idea of the lie of the important roads in the 
men's minds. He then marched the patrol to the picket 
north of Pleasant HiU S. H. The picket could tell him noth- 
ing new about the enemy. There he said to the members of 
the patrol: 

We will take the road to the right (the one passing over knoll 647). 

Sergt. B, with K, will march in advance. I \yill follow with S at 10 paces. 
Corp. L, with M, Avill follow as rear point at 10 paces from me. 

Take about a 3j mile gait. Move quietly on the side of the road. Be 
particularly careful when passing houses, the advance leaving the road 
whenever it seems best, in order to avoid awakening the occupants. Every- 
one should note the roads and landmarks as we go on, so as to be able to 
find his way back -svith messages. 

The patrol halted en route from time to time to hsten. 
Communication between its advance guard, main body, 
and rear guard were maintained verbally, in low tones. At 
crossroads 633 the heutenant halted, passed the word for all 
to join liim, then directed: 

We will move down the right-hand road to the east about a mile and a 
half until we reach the Littlestown-Hanover electric road. 

Three improved roads branch off before coming to the electric. The 
first one goes to the north a few hundred yards from this point ; the second 
one to the south a half mile out; and the third, near the electric, to the 
north. 

About half a mile west of us is a road which, with several big jogs, runs 
generally north and south. Our battahon marches by that road in the 
morning. Note the surroundings, as messages may have to be delivered to 
the battalion while thereon. 

Except for the excitation of some dogs, the march of 
the patrol to the vicinity of the electric road was without 
incident. In two or three places en route where the tele- 
phone lines could be reached, they were cut. At the electric, 
ii^a. m. the lieutenant, about 11.30 p. m., halted his men long 
enough to bring Sergt. B. back, to direct him to take the 
railroad tracks to the vicinity of the Little Conewago, nearly 
a mile to the northeast. 

Opposite 525 W the Heutenant signaled to move to the 
left of the raih'oad. Then he halted the patrol, the mem- 
bers of which immediately knelt or sat down, and going 
quietly up to Sergt. B. in a low tone, directed: 

The raihoad bridge is probably occupied by the enemy. Work qiuetly 
over with K. to find out. Don't be gone more than 15 minutes. I am going 
to send Corpl. L. to investigate the wagon bridge east of us. I will remain 
here then until you return. 

He then dropped back to the rear point and gave its 
corporal similar mstructions for the investigation of condi- 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 117 

tions at the wagon bridge. The sergeant rotiirned shortly 
and reported: 

There are several men on the east end of the bridge. I could not see 
anyone, but I heard movements and some talking. The stream seems to be 
20 to 30 feet wide, and has a sandy bottom. I didn't go into it to learn 
its depth. 

Corpl. L. also reportca that 525 W was occupied by at 
least a squad. He had seen seven or eight men and heard a 
little tallving. There was nothing to indicate that either the 
sergeant or the corporal had attracted the enemy's attention. 
The lieutenant then directed: 

We will move down the stream 300 or 400 yards below the raihoad bridge 
and ford it. 

No particular difficulty was experienced in effecting a 
crossing of the stream, whicli was found to be about waist 
deep. At 12.10 a. m., the patrol was in the timber just east 12aoa.n1, 
of the stream, with the point at the eastern edge of the tim- 
ber, some 30 or 40 feet in advance. The private of the 
point came back to the heutenant to report: "Some men are 
coming through the field to our left." The lieutenant 
directed his men to remain absolutely quiet where they were 
while he went up to the point. There he watched three Red 
soldiers file by a few feet outside of the timber and disap- 
pear in the direction of the railroad bridge. Needless to say, 
no effort was made to capture or molest any of the Red 
patrol, for firing or even shouting or a struggle would have 
attracted attention in the presence of the Blue patrol, which, 
of course, was about the last thing desired by Lieut. B. 
Even if it had been possible to make a certain capture of all 
three Reds without any commotion, nothing would have 
been gained to offset the burden so acquired. He then said 
to the sergeant: 

We are evidently on their outpost line. Bnishtown lies about off there 
[pointing] and can not be far away. We will go ahead in that direction as 
quietly as possible. 

After proceeding a few himdred yards they caught the 
sheen of some small fires behind scattered buildings immedi- 
ately ahead, and the outhnes of a grove of trees to the left 
(those west of road fork 547). The heutenant turned the 
patrol toward the timber and halted 50 yards outside, 
while the point went in to learn whether or not it was occu- 
pied. Upon its report of no enemy therein, the patrol 



118 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

took station in the soutliv/ostcrn corner. The lieutenant 
then directd the sergeant: 

Take charge of the men here. Post one man in observation to the south 
and keep every one alert and quiet. Those fires are probably at the Red 
camp. I am going to take L. with me and find out. If we don't return in 
half an hour you will proceed to learn whether there are any other Red 
troops between Brush town and McSherrystown; and then return to watch 
this camp and report when and how the Red battalion marches to-morrow. 
WTien we come back one of lis will halt out there [pointing south] and 
whistle so [illustrating]. Answer by a low whistle. 

Then to L, who had heard the directions to the sergeant, "Follow me at 
about seven paces." 

The lieutenant moved rapidly, generally in a crouching 
attitude, but halting every few minutes to watch and listen 
for hostile sentries and patrols, by a route to the south, and 
well outside of the Brushtown inclosure. He distinctly 
made out four company streets, and as many vehicles, south 
of the V-shaped streets of the village. One sentry was seen 
in the street west of the camp and one south of it. He con- 
tinued far enough to the east to make certain that all of the 
camp south of the Hanover Road had been seen, and then 
north across that road until he was sure there were no fires 
toward the west. A faint mdbn, wliich came up about 
12.40, helped in this reconnaissance. Returning then by 
the same route to the remainder of the patrol, wMch had not 
seen or heard anything during his absence, the lieutenant 
wrote the following message, lying flat on the ground, well 
withm the wood, and screening his electric torch by several 

hats : 

No. 1. 

200 yds. west Brushtown, 
1 a. m. 6 May, 1 a. m. 

Four companies are camped in angle streets Brushtown. No other Reds 
immediate vicinity. No indications j^et of an early march. 

B, Lieut enanl. 

This was read to M and K. The lieutenant then di- 
rected M: 

You M, in charge, and K will take this message to Maj. A. Go back to 
camp by tlie route we came. You should reach camp before the battalion 
marches out at 3 o'clock. Tell the major I am going east from this point to 
see if there are other Red troops following this battalion. 

Because of the possibility of the message falling into 
the hands of the enemy the sending detachment was not 
named therein, nor any address given, and the lieutenant did 
not put his further intentions in writing. Two messages 
were sent. One alone, with such a distance to go in very 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 119 

hostile territory, would have too small a chance of getting 
through. 

The lieutenant said to the remainder of the patrol: 

We will now go on to the east to lind out whether there are any otlier troops 
behind these. Serg. B, move ahead as the point. Pass the Red camp 
about 300 yards to the south. They have a sentry in the street east of ua 
and one immediately south of their camp. S and I will follow you at 10 
paces. Corpl. L will follow us at the same distance. 

East of Locust Grove S. H. the patrol took the Brush- 
town-McSherrystown Road. The outsldrts of the McSher- 
rystown were reached without discovering any indication 
of other enemies. The patrol then returned by the same 
route to the timber west of Brushtown, where it arrived at 
2.30 a. m. 2.30 a. m. 

The patrol had obtained some negative information of 
value — i. e., that there were no other troops east of Brushtown 
at a distance to be expected if the Red battalion were simply 
the advance guard of a larger body. Shall the patrol leader 
send this in at once, or wait until he has learned something 
to indicate when the enemy is going to march ? His patrol 
is, of course, in a very dangerous situation. Its presence 
may be discovered at any moment, and the entire patrol may 
be captured, with the result that its news never gets back. 
But under the conditions, no message can be carried by less 
than two men, and there are now only four left in the patrol. 
Two important bits of information still remain to be ob- 
tained — when the enemy marches and his route. Each of 
these will probably require a separate delivery, and such 
can only be made if the strength of the patrol is not reduced. 
If the enemy is going to move at all near dawn, his camp 
must soon be astir. Then the news of his preparations for 
marching and that no other Reds are near Brushtown can 
be sent back in the same message. The lieutenant decides 
to keep the entire patrol together a little longer in the wood 
west of Brushtown. 

Within a few minutes after 2.30 it was evident that the 
fires were being rebuilt. The patrol believed that the Red 
cooks were at work. 

At this time the patrol was lying in the southeastern 
corner of the wood, with the leader watching toward camp, 
and a sentry in observation of the ground to the south. 
Men were heard approaching through the timber from the 
northwest. From the sounds, they seemed to be only two 
in number, to be somewhat intoxicated Red soldiers, and in 
some uncertainty as to where their camp lay. The sergeant 



120 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

suggested that these men were probably unarmed, could 
easily be captured without noise, and could furnish consider- 
able information. The lieutenant prom.ptly vetoed the 
proposition. While he would like to question the men, the 
chances of capturing them without attracting the attention 
of other Reds were too small, and the difficulties of dispos- 
ing of them thereafter were too great. He therefore got 
his men to their feet and under cover close together, with 
instructions that he had no intention of bothering the Reds 
unless they noticed the Blue patrol; therefore the men 
would remain absolutely still except at his command, when 
the two Reds were to be jumped and secured by hand as 
quietly as possible. Fortunately, the Reds managed to find 
their way out of the wood without actually stumbling upon 
the Blue patrol. 

3 a.m. By 3 a. m. it was evident that the Red camp had been 

aroused, and that the men were strildng tents and gettmg 
ready to march. But to make certain that the latter was' 

3.20 a, m. the case, Lieut. B remained in observation until about 3.20. 
Then, since his messengers would have little chance of getting 
through the enemy's outpost after daylight, he decided to 
take the whole patrol to ground more favorable for escape, 
west of the Little Conewago, and send the information so far 
obtained back to Maj. A. 

Accordingly, he started back along the rail fence leading to 
the southwest, with the sergeant 7 or 8 ^mrds in advance, 
and the corporal as many yaj-ds in the rear. The lieutenant 
and Private S constituted the main body. Nearing the 
southwestern end of the fence, the sergeant suddenly crouched 
and a moment later told his ofhcor that several men, moving 
north along the timber from the south, were then imme- 
diately in front of the Blue patrol, while another party coming 
from the north was within a hundred yards of them. Some 
movement of the patrol in the moonlight must have attracted 
the Red attention, for there was a challenge from the party 
in front promptly followed by a shot. The lieutenant 
signalled the corporal to come up, and then in low tones said, 
"We'll charge those people in front and assemble vv^est of the 
Conewago. Don't shout." A few seconds after the hostile 
shot, the Blue patrol, as skirmishers, at 2 or 3 yards, went 
forward at a rim, without shouting, broke through the Red 
patrol and kept going imtil the men were across the stream. 
In the open field west of the Conewago, and south of the 
small stream that joins it a half mile from the Hanover 
Road, the patrol assembled. The sergeant was absent. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 121 

After calling for him a few times, the lieutenant decided he 
could not delay any longer, since the enemy's patrols ap- 
peared to be searching the whole neighborhood. So he 
directed : 

We will cross this stream (the small one, half a mile south of the ITanover 
Road), and move rapidly across coimtry due west. Corpl. L will lead, I will 
follow him, and S will come last. Take five paces between files. ' 

At 4 o'clock the patrol reached hill 607, between the **-™« 
Rebert and G. Martz farmhouses, where one man took station^ 
while the lieutenant, assisted by the remaining man in the 
timber west of the crest of the hill, wrote the following 

message : 

No. 2. 

Hill 607, NE. Felty S. H., 

6 May, 4-05 a. in. 
My No. 1 reported four Red companies at Brushtown. These started to 
break camp about 3 a. m. Have been into outskirts McSherrj'stown. No 
indications Red troops beside battalion at Brushtown. Remain here in 
observation. My signal " N " will mean enemy takes Hanover Road, " S " 
he goes by Felty S. H. 

B, Lieutenant. 

Lieut. B repeated the information of his first message, 
because very possibly his messengers did not get through. 
He then took the patrol duo west into the open field north 
of the H. Felty farmhouse, pointed out to the corporal the 
direction of crossroads 609, and directed him to deliver the 
message to Maj. A, who should appear very soon in that 
neighborhood with the battalion, xlfter a few mmutes 
he returned with Private S to hill 607. There the lieutenant 
climbed a tree near the crest, and as soon as it grew at all 
light began searching with his glasses the ground to the east. 
He cjuickly made out the Red battalion on the Hanover 
Road. By 4.25 a. m. its advance guard was a hundred 4.25a.m. 
yards west of the A. Rifle roadfork, marching tovi^ard Square 
Corner. It being still too dark to signal crossroads 609 
from his tree, the lieutenant, leading the private by 10 yards, 
started at a steady double for crossroads 609 through the 
field north of H. Felty. Noithwest of that house he was 
able to get his semaphored "N" acknowledged from one of 
the buildings at the crossroads. 

ORDERS, BATTALION COMMANDER. 

Let us now go back to the battalion near Littlestown. 
Maj. A had the cooks awakened, breakfast started at L30 i-so a. m. 
a. m., and the battalion awakened at 2 o'clock. The 2 a.m. 



122 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

adjutant personally gave the following order to each com- 
pany commander and to the quartermaster: 

The battalion (less Company D) will march at 3 a. m. Company D 
and the convoy at 4 a. m. All preparations -will be made with the least 
2.30 a. m. possible noise. The major will issue orders at 2.30 a. m. 

At 2.30 a. m, the major issued to his captains and staff 
verbal orders as follows: 

A Red battalion came into Brush town from the east last evening and 
camped at that place. 

Lieut. B started for Brushtowu at 10.30 p. m., in charge of a reconnoitering 
patrol. 

This battalion (less Company D and one platoon of Company C) will 
march at 3 o'clock on crossroads 609, to cover the passage of the convoy 
by Whitehall and Boneauville. 

Lieut. X (the battalion adjutant), with my orderly, will proceed rapidly 
by Felty S. H. toward the A. Rifle farm. I want the earliest possible 
information whether the enemy turns west or south at the A. Rifle croes- 
roads. 

Company C (less one platoon) will constitute the advance guard, marching 
by Pleasant Hill S.H. and road forks 598, 610, 611, and 606. Company C 
will send one platoon to report to Capt. D for duty with the convoy. 

Companies B and A, in the order named, will follow the advance guard 
at 300 yards. 

The convoy, directly escorted by C'ompany D and one platoon ox Com- 
pany C, will march at 4 o'clock by Whitehall, Boneauville, and Hunters- 
town. The march of the convoy will be expedited in every possible way. 
Let me know promptly when the convoy passes W^hitehall and again when 
it passes Boneauville. Capt. D will take the horse of the battalion adju- 
tant's orderly. 

The field train will march at the head of the convoy. 

I will be between the advance guard and the main body. 

We will form the battalion at 2.55. 

2.55 a. m. When the companies reported at 2,55, the major directed 
Company C, "Get your distances and take up the march." 

A COMPANY AS ADVANCE GUARD. 

The captain of Company C assembled his officers and non- 
2,40 a.m. commissioned officers and at 2.40 a m, ordered as follows: 

A Red battalion came into Brushtowu from Hanover last night and camped 
in that village. We have two reconnoitering patrols out in its direction. 
The convoy marches on Boneauville at 4 a. m., escorted by Company D 
and one platoon of this company. The remainder of the battalion marches 
to the north to cover the convoy. 

This company constitutes the advance guard. 

Lieut. R with the first squad as the point will precede the remainder of 
the company by 150 yards. March by Pleasant Hill S. H. and road forks 
598, 610, 611, and 606 [pointing out the route on the map]. 

Sergt. IC (left guide) will be on the alert for signals from the rear. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 123 

Sergt. M, with the third platoou, will report to C'apt. D for duty with the 
convoy's escort. 
Platoon leaders will tell the men of the situation at the first opportunity. 
The company v/ill be formed 7 minutes before 3 o'clock. 

All distances were shortened because of the darkness. 

When the major directed that the march be taken up, 
the captain ordered the point to move out, following it by 
connecting files at every 30 yards. The company marched 
as soon as the point had its distance. 

ARRANGEMENTS AND ORDERS, COMMANDER OF THE 
CONVOY. 

Capt. D made sure at onco, upon receipt of his orders, 
that the battalion quartermaster, who was in direct charge 
of the convoy, had provided all necessary arrangements to 
have it ready by 4 o'clock, including continual inspection 
to prevent intentional delays on the part of the teamsters. 
The convoy was parked in a square, each side formed by 
a section. The first section was on the north side, the second 
on the east, the third on the south, and the fourth on the 
west. 

The captain sent for his officers and sergeants, who were 
pretty well scattered among the pickets of the outpost. 
Sergt. M reported with his platoon from Com.pany C. 
Verbal orders were issued at 3.20 a. m. as follows: 3.20a.m. 

A Red battalion, coming from the direction of Hanover camped last 
night at Brushtown, about 3^ miles northeast of us. Our battalion (less 
this company and a platoon of Company C) has gone to a position a mile 
northeast of WTiitehall, from which to cover the passage of the convoy. 

We escort the convoy by Whitehall and Boneauville on Hunterstown. 

The first platoon (it then had two squads near Pleasant Hill S. H.) of 
Company D, under Lieut. A, will constitute the advance guard, preceding 
the main body by three-quarters of a mile. It will march from Pleasant 
Hill S. H. at 3.50 a. m. It will station patrols of four men each successively 
on knolls 647 and 627 north of Pleasant Hill S. H., near the Schild farm- 
house southeast of Whitehall S. H., and near the Small farmhouse east of 
Whitehall, to remain until the convoy has passed, and then join the rear 
guard. It will send a patrol of four men to march opposite the center of 
the convoy by the road roughly one-half mile west of the Pleasant Hill 
S. H.,\Miitehallroad. 

The main body, in the order — one squad of the third platoon of Company 
C, field train of the battalion, first, second, third, and fourth sections of the 
convoy, and one squad of Sergt. M's detachment — will march from camp at 
4 a. m. 

Details for the immediate guard of sections of the convoy will be as 
follows: First section: Platoon of Company C, and service detachment of 
Company C (Q. M. sergt., cooks, artificer, clerk). 



124 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Second: Sergt. K, fifth, sixth, and seventh squads of Company D, and 
service detachment of Company A. 

Third: Sergt. L, eighth, ninth, and tenth squads (eighth and ninth were 
then in the picket east of camp), and service detachment of Company B. 

Fourth: Sergt. M, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth squads (eleventh and 
twelfth were then in the picket west of camp), and service detachment of 
Company D. 

The noncommissioned officer in charge of each section will be responsible 
that his section moves exactly on time and in its proper place. As soon 
as this order is finished he will locate his section at once. On the road he 
will require wagons to keep closed at all times. Sections will follow the 
preceding one at 20 yards. In each section one man will be detailed to 
walk beside and be responsible for the conduct of each wagon. 

The rear guard, composed of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth 
squads (the fourteenth and fifteenth are now on knoll 621), Lieut. S, com- 
manding, will follow the main body at 1,000 yards. The rear guard will 
send a squad at once to the R. Sell farmhouse to remain there till the con- 
voy has passed Pleasant Hill S. H., and one to reUeve picket No. 4 (west of 
camp). It will have the timber along the stream, heading north of Pleasant 
Hill S. H., examined immediately. 

I will remain here till the convoy is on the road, and then ride near its 
center. 

There may be criticism of the above order upon the 
ground that it trespasses upon the province of subordi- 
nates by instructions in too great detail. It is beheved, 
though, that the pecuhar circumstances of the case require 
such detail. The commander of the advance guard is told 
just where to post and route certain patrols. But it will 
be noticed that these patrols are to be used not for the or- 
dinary purpose of advance guard patrols, in reconnaissance 
to the front, but entirely for flank protection, which, unless 
specifically mentioned in the order, the advance guard com- 
mander may consider lies outside of his province and is 
to be attended to by some one else. The matter is of too 
great importance to have any doubt whose duty it is, and 
therefore is provided for in the order. Similarly with the 
rear guard, v/hich is now largely taking over the functions 
of the outpost until the convoy has cleared camp, there must 
bo no doubt whatever as to who is responsible for security 
in certain important directions. Finally, the police detach- 
ments with the convoy require very definite instructions for 
the organization of the march, in order to prevent confusion 
in the unwieldly mass of wagons, where experience shows de- 
lays are so Hkely to arise. When the convoy is moving out 
of park, particularly as in this case before daylight, is a pecul- 
iarly favorable time for attack. If there happen to be no 
Red regulars yet in this vicinity, still some partisans may, 
very well, be lurking near for a favorable opportunity. Not 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 125 

to give such a chance, the movement must proceed smoothly, 
upon a very definite and uniform plan throughout the sec- 
tions, and that, of course, must be the plan of Capt. D. 

A BATTALION IN DEFENSE. 

Maj. A received Lieut. B's first message from Brushtown 
just before leaving camp. The second report with its indi- 
cations of an early Red march reached him near crossroads 
609 at 4.20 a. m. He halted the advance guard company *-^ ». m. 
at the above crossroads, except its leading squads, which 
were hurried on to crossroads 601, and caused Companies 
B and A to close on Company C. About 4.30 a. m. an ^-^o a. m. 
observation station, on the house north of the crossroads, 
reported that a Blue officer was running in across the field 
to the east and had semaphored ''N" a number of times. 
Almost immediately thereafter the detachment of Company 
C, sent on to crossroads 601, opened fire. A few minutes 
later the battalion adjutant raced in from the east to report 
that the hostile battafion had turned west at A. Rifle. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER' S ESTIMATE OF THE 
SITUATION. 

There remains for the major but little time to spend 
in further consideration of the situation. In fact, imme- 
diate action must be taken, for the two battahons, the Red 
and the Blue, are already in contact. This does not mean, 
however, that the major is surprised by the developments 
of the morning, or has not given the matter of the orders 
now to be issued the most careful consideration. In fact, 
he has thought of little else during the preceding march. 

The reports from his patrols, Lieut. B's signals, and the 
fii'ing to the north indicate the exact situation the major had 
expected. The enemy's strength seems pretty accurately 
determined as one battalion; that battalion appears to be 
entirely alone; and its objective from its early march is evi- 
dently the major's convoy. The major's mission is just as 
definitely to defend the convoy, and get it away, or, if to do 
the latter is found impossible, then to destroy it. The 
major, of course, long ago determined to have a try at its 
defense. 

The only question . now to be answered is the manner 
thereof. In answering this he is sorry he has not had a 
little more time for a daylight recoimaissance of the ground. 
Had he amved well before the enemy, he would have taken 
up a position in readiness with the battalion at this cross- 



126 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

roads, while he made a careful personal reconnaissance of 
the ground to the north, where he Ivnew the enemy was most 
likely to come; and then back to the southeast, to decide 
upon his action in that direction if the enemy happened to 
move that way. 

From crossroads 609 the major notes, in the rapidly 
increasing hght, that his map has given a very correct im- 
pression of the actual he of the ground. Before him for 
three-quarters of a mile to the northwest, north, and north- 
east are long gentle slopes practically unbroken, except for 
the two houses in the foreground. Near the 600-foot con- 
tour to the east, the ground falls away rather suddenly ; and 
would afford some cover for an attack from that direction. 

If the battalion were to continue its march, it could 
probably get into position squarely across the enemy's hne 
of advance at crossroads 601. A position there, however, 
has many disadvantages. The field of fire is short, because 
the gromid near the stream to the east drops away more 
rapidly that near 601, with dead spaces consequently not 
far out. Several folds north and south of the Hanover Road 
facilitate the covered advance of enveloping columns. The 
light timber east of Trostle enables an envelopment of the 
northern flank to get on that flank, and very close at hand 
mider perfect cover. A force enveloping the southern flank 
would tend to separate the battahon from the convoy and 
lay the latter bare. Finally, the position is a very poor one to 
v/ithdraw from because of the long glacislike slope behind it, 
which would have to be crossed under the enemy's fire. In 
Maj. A.'s situation a position wliich facilitates withdrawal 
is of importance, because nothing is gained by continuing 
the engagement after the convoy has safely passed St. 
Luke's church. 

A much better position is to be found right at hand, 
one facing northeast at the crossroads 609. It has an ex- 
cellent field of fu'e to its front and to both of its flanks. No 
advance toward Square Comer, except by a wide detour, 
can be made without attacking it. The road -on which the 
convoy is passing lies directly bchuid it, and more than a 
mile away. Any advance against this position will tend to 
drive the battalion toward its convoy and not to separate 
the two. Withdrawal is made very easy by the groves of 
timber immediately behuid, and the roUmg gi'omid and hghtly 
timbered stream lines farther to the west. An envelop- 
ment of its left is almost impracticable because of the wide 
expanse of perfectly open ground in that direction. An 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 127 

onvelopmont of the right is easier, and woiikl bo the natural 
movement in attacking, unless the hostile battalion advances 
too far before learning where the Blues have taken position. 

Besides, if the enemy's combat reconnaissance is so insuf- 
ficient that he fails to locate the battalion in this flanking 
position, and starts his attack straight toward Square Corner, 
his incorrectly directed firing lines may be thrown into 
serious confusion, and much valuable time thereby be gained 
by the unexpected flanking fire from the Blue main position. 
The Reds should, if possible, be led into this en^or by a very 
wide deployment of the detachment at crossroads 601, and 
its early development of a heavy fire. 

The right flank is the weakest part of the position, because 
rather easily approached under cover from the east to close 
ranges. The support will, accordingly, be posted behind this 
flank. 

It is, of course, a further advantage, that the position can 
be occupied at once, and by covered routes. 

The major has two and three-fourths companies with which 
to defend it. To obtain from the outset a strong develop- 
ment of fire in this delaying action, he requires two full com- 
panies in the firmg Ime. The advance guard company will 
then be dra\Ma back into support. It is most convenient to 
send its leading units to crossroads 601 to check the enemy's 
direct advance, in retiring therefrom to cover the left of the 
battalion, and to hold off any small detachment the enemy 
may make to get at the convoy in that direction. This com- 
pany will also have to send a squad to roadfork 582 to cover 
the right flank. 

There is no time to entrench. In fact any movement to 
do so now would simply invite hostile attention to the real 
position. 

If the battalion can hold until the convoy has passed the 
Shebley farm, the latter can then be considered safe. At 
4.30 a. m. the convoy's head is nearing roadfork 598, almost 
2J miles from Shebley. To pass that point it will have to go 
2i miles, plus 1 mile, its length, or 3| miles. The battahon 
then, with the convoy making 2 miles an hour, will have to 
hold its position for nearly two hours. Whether it can do so, 
without fighting to a decision, wiU depend very much upon 
the time taken by the hostile reconnaissance iji locating the 
Blue position. 

To be able to sweep the fold along the 600-foot contour 
the major is compelled to extend his right company to the 



128 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

first road bend soutlieast of the Font farmhouse. The left 
company will be astride the 601-609 road. 

His decision is to defend the position described above 
with companies A and B in the first line and Company C in 
support. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER's ACTIONS AND ORDERS. 

Maj. A directed the commander of the advance guard 
4.20 a. m. company at 4.20 a. m. : 

The enemy will very probably appear soon on the Hanover Road. 

The battalion halts at this crossroad. 

Send your two leading squads to the crossroads to the north on the Hanover 
Road to check the enemy when he appeal's. Halt the remainder of your 
company at this point and post small security detachments east and west of 
the battalion, which will be closed on Company C. 

When companies A and B came up they were halted, and 
directed to take cover in the timber west of the 601-609 
road. The captains and staff were assembled at the cross- 
roads. 
4.32 a. in. At 4.32 a. m. the major issued orders to those officers as 
follows : 

The enemy is marching west on the Hanover Road. His advance is 
already engaged with the detacliment of Coinpany C at the crossroads to 
the north. 

We will defend this crossroad. 

Company B will deploy between the Font farmhouse (pointing to it) and 
the first road bend to the southeast, to fire on tlie sector from the farmhouse 
to our right (the one northeast of road fork 594) to the one to the right front 
(pointing to the one 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601). 

Company A will deploy on both sides of this road (indicating the 609-601 
road), to fire on the sector fi-om the farmhouse to the right front (400 yards 
southeast of crossroads 601) to the one to the left front (Wcntz). 

Both companies will take every care to avoid attracting hostile attention 
in occupying the position. Do not open fire until ordered by me. 

Company C will withdraw under cover to a station in support at the farm- 
house south of us (Gebhai'dt). It will send a squad across the stream east 
of that farmhouse to cover our right, and will direct the detachment now on 
the Hanover Road, upon withdrawing to cover our left from the vicinity of 
the orchard to the left front (Noel). 

Issue ammunition at once. Empty combat wagons and the ambulance 
will take station in the drawhead 400 yards west of this point, at the disposal, 
thereafter, of the surgeon. 

Battalion headquarters at this point, with which semaphore communica- 
tion will be maintained. 

The major then told the battalion adjutant to describe 
the situation to Capt. D, in charge of the convoy, and to 
impress upon him the necessity for permitting r^o delay in 
the march of the convoy. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 



129 



SKETCH No. 12. 



SH-uation af 5 ^ A.M. May 6. 




Red Force 

98755°— 17 9 



Blue Force 



130 STUDIES IN MINOK TACTICS. 

He notified the battalion surgeon that he would withdraw 
as soon as the convoy was safely by, and that any wounded 
must go with the battalion. (See sketch No. 12.) 

THE WITHDRAWAL FEOM ACTION. 

The two squads of Company C had been in position at 
crossroads 601 but a few minutes, when a hostile detachment 
came over the rise west of the Rebert farm.. Fire was opened 
at once upon the Reds. The latter promptly sent parties 
under cover north and south of the Hanover Road, so that 
by 5 a. m the Blue detachment was flanked and compelled 
to fall back to the Noel house. The enemy occupied the 
crest at 601 and opened fire upon the retreating Blues. 

A Red patrol from the direction of the H. Felty house 
ran into the position of Company B, and the enemy conse- 
quently became aware that the Blues had something at cross- 
5a.m. roads 609. From 5 a. m. to 5.40 the Red patrols devel- 
oped an intense reconnaissance, the enemy evidently being 
in some doubt whether the Blues were to be found in strength 
5.45 a. m. toward Square Corner or toward the Font farm. At 5.45 
a. m. Red firing lines began to appear to the east. Shortly 
thereafter three of their' companies were deployed and fii-ing. 

Reports from the convoy indicated that its center was 
by this time (5.45) near St. Luke's Church. It was time 
to withdraw. 

The major accordingly issued orders as follows: 
F. 0. No. 9. First Battalion, 

6 a. m. 6 May, 6 a. m. 

1. The convoy has passed Wliitehall. 

2. The battalion will withdraw to St. Luke's Church. 

3. (a) The ambulance and combat wagons by farm road southwest of them 

and Whitehall at once. 

(6) Company C via Whitehall at once. 

(c) Companies B and A due west across country at my signal "To the 

rear." 

B, Major. 

This order was prepared between 5.30 and 6 a. m., the 
hour simply being left to be put in at the last. Copies 
were started simultneously for the three companies and 
for the surgeon. 

As soon as Company C and the ambulance and wagons 
had gained a few hundred yards the signal was given to 
Companies B and A, in turn, to start. Company A did not 
receive its signal till Company B was due south of 609. Each 
company was followed by a small rear guard. At road fork 
637 the battalion assembled and continued the march under 
the protection of Company A as its rear party. 



PART III.— A BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 



Attack of a Convoy. 

On May 5 Red and Blue armies are confronting each 
other in Red territory, on the hne Hmitei-s Rmi-Newville 
(sketch 10 and Guide Map). The Blue invading army has 
advanced from the southwest. 

Blue line of communication troops have been collect- 
mg supplies southeast of Littlestown. 

The First Battahon, First Red Infantry, marched May 5 
from York and camped at Brushtown about 8 p. m. It 
had been sent to drive off the Blue troops engaged in the 
work of coUectmg and to recapture any supphes they may 
have gathered. While the battalion is a regular organiza- 
tion its men are nearly 70 per cent recruits. The 20 mile 
march has pretty well exhausted these new men. 

By 9 p. m., through an extensive use of the telephone, the 
major in command has learned that the Blues, whose total 
strength is reported as 500 or 600 men, passed thi'ough Lit- 
tlestown earlier m the evening with a long convoy of im- 
pressed wagons; that they made camp a mile to the north of 
that town; and that the Blues came into Littlestown two 
days before from the northwest via Hunterstowii and 
BoneauviUe. 

Heavy rains have put aU roads in bad condition. 

The Red outpost consists of a squad at the Little Conewago 
crossing on the Hanover Road, another squad at 525 W, 
and a cossack post at the radroad bridge near 525 W; all 
from Company D. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER's ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

The major's mission was clearly stated in his orders. 
Nothing has arisen to cause any change therein. 

Of the enemy he has reports that the hostile strength is 
500 or 600 men and that the convoy is large. The estimate 
of the Blue strength, rendered by civilians, may be very far 
from the truth. Having come into Littlestown by way of 
BoneauviUe and Hmiterstown, the Blues will be likely, in 

131 



132 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

strange and hostile countiy, to return by the same route, 
unless they learn of the presence of the Red battalion. From 
Brushtown to Littlestown is about 4 miles as the crow flies. 
Since the Reds reached Brushtown late in the evening and 
the Blues likewise passed Littlestown late m the evening, it 
is very possible that the latter, in hostile comitry, have not 
learned of the presence of the Red battalion. If so, the 
Blues will probably move out at a customary hour to-morrow 
morning and along the route over which they came. If 
they learn of the Red's presence, they may march at a very 
early hour and perhaps by Gettysburg. In this case Maj. A 
will fail to catch the convoy unless he, too, marches to-night 
or at an exceedingly early hour in the morning. 

To march at once, however much he would like to do so, 
with his very tired troops, is out of the question. They have 
done from 20 to 22 miles over muddy roads, and are largely 
recruits. Even to march at dawn, which comes about 4.25 
a. m., wdU work considerable hardship, since experienced 
men would have to be up an hour beforehand, and these 
recruit organizations will need perhaps half an hour more 
for preparation. The major concludes, that if he starts at 
4 o'clock, he will require about all that is practicable from 
his men. 

More definite information about the Blue strength, dis- 
positions, and intentions must be obtained to-night. The 
men are too tired to be sent as a dismounted patrol. The 
adjutant and two mounted orderhes must, therefore, go on 
that duty. 

Assuming that the location of the hostile camp has been 
correctly reported, and having decided that he will march at 
4 o'clock, the major must next decide what is to be the 
immediate objective of that march. If he proceeds directly 
towards Pleasant Hill S. H., or towards Wliitehall, the 
enemy, by moving early, may get by before the Red battalion 
arrives. If he marches towards BoneauviUe, he will have 
the best chance of intercepting the convoy, provided the 
Blues return as they came. If they go instead via Gettys- 
burg, and both Reds and Blues start at the same time, and 
inarch at the same rate, the first, having 10 f miles to go, and 
the latter 9|, the Reds, considering the probable length of the 
convoy, should be able to cut it off at Gettysburg. The Reds 
should have no difficulty, in reahty, in moving very much 
faster than the convoy. There would, however, be great 
danger for the Reds in working so far in toward the rear 
of the main Blue army. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 133 

It seems best, though, to determine upon the route nov/, 
only as far as crossroads 601 ; to send out to-night a mounted 
patrol to remain in touch with the enemy; and to start dis- 
mounted patrols at an early hour to strike the enemy's most 
likely line of march by Whitehall and Boneauville at the 
salient points, in the expectation that by the time crossroads 
601 is reached, information will be at hand to determine the 
best course thereafter. If, at this point, the enemy seems 
to be still in camp, the Red battalion will march on Whitehall 
S. H. Wlien Whitehall S. H. is reached, if the convoy is . 
still in camp, the Red battalion will turn south to attack it. 
If it is then marching on Boneauville, the Reds wiU remain 
in position at WTiitehall S. H, If the Blues start west, on the 
Baltimore Turnpike, from their camp, there may be time to 
cut the convoy off by marching southwest between AUov/ay 
and Plum Creeks. If when crossroads 601 is reached, the 
enemy seems to have started for Gettysburg, the Reds will 
hurry their march by Square Corner and Boneauville. If he 
has started for BoneauviUe, the Red battalion, unless pre- 
vented by hostile covering parties, will continue via Square 
Corner. 

The major decides, therefore, to send a mounted patrol 
at once toward Littlestown, and three dismounted patrols 
at 3 a. m. for the Littlestown- Whitehall-Boneauville road, 
and to march the battalion at 4 a. m., provisionally on 
crossroads 601. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER'S ACTIONS AND ORDERS. 

The major and his adjutant were together at the tele- 
phone central in Brushtown, when the information of the 
Blue movements was obtained from Littlestown, and they 
noted the houses that have telephones connections north of 
Littlestown and along the Hanover road. The major at 
10 p. m. directed the adjutant: ^°p-"' 

I want you to take both our orderlies and proceed via Littlestown to 
learn the hostile strength and dispositions. It is particularly important 
to field out whether he will march to-morrow by Whitehall and Boneauville, 
or by the Baltimore Turnpike toward Gettysburg. The battalion will 
march at 4 a. m. to crossroads GOl. Its action thereafter will depend upon 
the movements of the Blues. Maintain telephone communication with me. 
I will leave messengers at each farmhouse as we pass. 

The major had the cooks awakened at 2 o'clock, and 
the battalion at 2.30. At 2 o'clock the major sent for the 2 a.m. 
captain of Company A and directed him : 

Littlestown reports that the enemy camped with a large convoy north of 
that town last night. We will march at 4 o'clock toward Boneauville. 



134 STUMES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Your company will be the advance guard. I want to send three patrols 
of aix men each, one under an officer, and all from your company, ahead 
at 3 o'clock. They will go by Square Corner toward St. Luke's Church, 
by crossroads 601 oq Whitehall S. H., and by Felty S. H. toward Pleasant 
Hill S. H. — the officer by the central route. Have them ready to march 
at 3 o'clock, and seod their leaders to me for ii^tructions about 10 minutes 
l>efore that hour. 

2.50 a. m. At 2.50 a. m. he instructed Lieut, M, and Sergts. K and S, 
as follows: 

Five or six hundred Blues, in charge of a large convoy, are reported 
to have camped last night north of Littlestown. Lieut. K (battalion adju- 
tant) with two mounted orderlies s'tarted via Littlestown at 10 o'clock last 
night to reconnoiter the hostile camp. This battalion will march at 4 
o'clock, provisionally on crossroads COl, about 2 miles west of Brushtowu 
on the road to Gettysburg. I want your patrols to proceed at 3 o'cloc'k to 
within sight of the Littlestown-Boneauville road and keep me informed of 
the hostile movements. Lieut. M will start the tkree patrols together. 
At the A. Rifle farm, about a mile west of Brushtowo, he will detach Sergt. 
S, with his five men, by Felty S. H. toward Pleasant Hill S. H.; at cross- 
roads 601, a mile farther to the west, he will detach Sergt, K, with his five 
men, by Square Corner toward St. Luke's Church; and will himself pro- 
ceed, with the remainder, by the Font farm toward WTiitehall S. H. Make 
every practicable use of telephones in reporting information obtained. 
I will station messengers at all telephones we pass on the Hanover road. 

2a.m. At 3 a. m. the major assembled his captains and staff, 

less the adjutant, and ordered: 

Littlestown reports that 500 or 600 Blues camped last night, in charge of a 
large convoy, about a mile north of that town. Lieiit. K (battalion adju- 
tant), with two mounted orderlies, left at 10 o'clock last night to reconnoiter 
the enemy's camp. Three dismounted patrols from Company A are now 
starting toward St. Luke's Church, \Miitehall S. H., and Pleasant Hill S. H. 

We will march at 4 o'clock, provisionally on crossroads 601, 2 miles west 
of Brushtown on the road toward Boneauville, to attack that convoy. 

Company A will constitute the advance guard, and will clear the Brush- 
town road fork at 4 o'clock. This company will place men at each farm 
telephone, as passed, to receive and transmit messages fi'om our patrols. 

The main body of the battalion in the order — ^B, C, and D Companies — 
will follow at 600 yards. 

The outpost detachments will close in on the Hanover road in time 
to join their company at the crossing of the Little Conewago. 

The field train will be assembled in camp as soon as the battalion has gone, 
and will await orders. 

I will march with the advance guard. 

ORDERS, COMMANDER OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 

The captain of Company A assembled that organization 
3.50 a. m. ^t 3.50 a. m., marched it to the Brushtown road fork, halted 
it with its tail at that point, and directed: 

Littlestown reports that 500 or 600 Blues, escorting a large convoy, camped 
last night about a mile north of that town. Our battalion is marching to 



BATTALIOX OF INFANTRY. 135 

attack the convoy. We have one mounted and three dismounted patrols 
out to the west and southwest. 

This company is the advance guard. 

The first platoon, as advance party, will precede the remainder of the 
company by 400 yards, marching by the Hanover road toward Boneauville. 
It will get its distiince at once. 

The first lieutenant immediately set his platoon in march. 
When he had gained 400 yards he halted the platoon, and 
directed his sergeant: 

Take the first squad forward as the point. Get 200 yards distance and 
halt until I signal, "Forward." 

Both the lieutenant and the captain sent connecting 
files forward at about 30 yards apart, for although there was 
a moon, it was not bright. Exactly at 4 o'clock the cap- 
tain signaled, "Forward march." 

At the A. Rifle road fork a patrol of four men was sent 
south to crossroads 581, thence west by the H. Felty farm 
and crossroads 609, to come back to the Hanover road at 
crossroads 601. 

AN INFANTRY PATROL. 

For the first hour the march of Lieut. M's reconnoitering 
patrols was without particular incident. The one, the 
route of which led by Square Corner, arrived in the vicinity 
of the road fork between St. Luke's Church and the Shebley 
farm at 4.20 a. m. ; and the one by Feltj^ S. H., in the vicinity 
of crossroads 633, northwest of Pleasant Hill S. H., at 4.10 
a. m. En route this patrol was passed by two Blue hoi'se- 
men, one an officer. The Red patrol heard the enemy's 
horses in time to clear the road, and permitted the hostile 
patrol to pass without attempting a capture; but the fact 
of the Blue's passage was reported in the first message sent 
back. 

Lieut. M., with the central patrol, came to crossroads 609 
about 3.50 a. m., and finding a countryman already up milk- 3.50 a. m. 
ing the cows at the nearby house, learned from the man that 
no Blues had been seen in the neighborhood, and that the 
night had been a quiet one. The patrol marched south from 
that point, with an advance guard of the corporal and one 
man, followed at 10 yards by the lieutenant and one man, 
while the other two, as the rear guard, were 10 yards behind 
the lieutenant. At road fork 606, as the patrol tm-ned 
toward the Small farmhouse, its passing disturbed some dogs 
at the house near 606. Their barking died away after the 
patrol had passed a hundred yards or so, but a few minutes 
later started up again most persistently. The lieutenant 



136 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

decided something was happening behind him which required 
investigation. He immediately signaled his patrol to move 
into the field to the north. After waiting quietly there for 
a short time, without anyone passing toward Whitehall and 
yet with the barking continuing at the crossroads, the lieu- 
tenant directed his patrol to stay where it was, while he with 
one man moved across the fields to the east. Crouching 
within a few yards of the 606-609 road, he watched some 100 
Blue soldiers move north thereon, followed. at 200 or 300 
yards by a couple of companies, three escort wagons, and 
one ambulance. The lieutenant waited 15 minutes to see 
whether other hostile troops were following them. By this 
time, 4.20 a. m., it was evident that dawn was near at hand. 
The patrol could not remain many minutes longer in the 
open field without great risk. The information the heuten- 
ant had just obtained was of the greatest importance, and 
must be sent to the major as promptly as possible. To get 
that information back would not, however, warrant his re- 
turning vnih the whole patrol. His mission v/as by no m.eans 
completed. He had not yet located the convoy, and did not 
know where the Blue battahon v\^as going. The first thing, 
though, to do before proceeding to obtain more information, 
was to get his patrol into some sort of cover, then write and 
forward his report of what had just been seen. To find out 
where the convoy was, would require a movement westward 
while the Blue battalion was marching north, and his reports 
had to be sent to the east. To split his patrol in the three 
directions while attempting to attend to all of these matters 
at once, was higldy inadvisable, as upon his personal obser- 
vation and leadership must very largely depend the value of 
the information obtained, and the likelihood of its getting 
safely back. The most important immediate duty was to 
get his message started to the east, and it would seem to 
have a better chance of safe arrival, if he moved the whole 
patrol east of the hostile line of march before detaching his 
messengers. But before starting to put this decision into 
effect, on the chance of being able to telephone, he moved 
back to the farmhouse, 400 yards northwest of 606, where 
he learned not only that they had no telephone, but that none 
was to be found in any of the nearby houses. Returning 
then to the main body of the patrol, he conducted it rapidly to 
the south of the 606, Small road, and thence east into the 
light timber southeast of road fork 611 . The patrol worked 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 137 

into the northern part of the grove. One man climbed 
a tree a few yards south of the 611-582 road to observe to 
the north, in the direction the enemy's battalion had gone. 
And one man was stationed, some 10 yards out, on each of 
the remaining sides. The lieutenant, in the center of the 
group, wrote the following message: 

No. 1, Near Road Fork 60G, 
One Mile East of Whitehall, 

May 6, 4-30 a. m. 
Three Blue companies passed road fork 606 marching toward 609 at 4.10 
a. m. 

M., Lieutenant.- 

Two of the men were directed to take this to the bat- 
talion, by moving along the stream hne heading east of the 
timber in which the patrol was then. They were to tell the 
major that Lieut. M. intended to follow the enemy. 

Within five minutes after the departure of the messengers 
the lookout called to the lieutenant that he could see the 
hostile transportation halted a few hundred yards up the 
road to the north. The lieutenant joined the lookout. As 
it grew lighter, he made out two Blue companies in the road 
southwest of crossroads 609. A little later these, evidently, 
drew their extra ammunition; then the wagons and ambu- 
lance disappeared in the timber west of the road, Avhile one 
company deployed across the road east of the crossroads 
(609), and another deployed farther to the east, with its left 
at the Font farmhouse. Presently a weak compan}'^ came 
back from the crossroads and took station in the clump of 
timber east of the inclosure about the Gebhardt farmhouse. 
This was the Blue situation as the Red patrol leader saw it 
at 4.45 a. m. He had obtained very definite information of 
the greatest possible value, provided it could be got to the 
major without delay. He had seen the enemy take up a 
position that flanked the proper hne advance of the Red 
battalion and which might cause the battalion a maximum 
of trouble unless promptly detected. Lieut. M must, of 
course, hurry in his report. Shall he take his whole patrol 
back to effect the delivery, or simply send another pair of 
messengers? Two men should be able to shp through with 
less chance of detection than four men, and the heutenant 
has yet a part of his mission to accomphsh. While the 
convoy is probably coming by Whitehall, he has not seen it, 
and the major will want facts from him, not guesses. He 
decides to send a written message by two men, and then 



138 STUDIES IN MINOK TACTICS. 

work over to the west with the remaining man, to locate the 

convoy. 

No. 2, Near Road Fork 606, One Mile 

East of Whitehall, 

6 May, 5 a. m. 
Two Blue companies have deployed on line crossroads 609, Font farm- 
house. A third company is in support at Gebhardt farmhouse. Sketch 
on back. Am moving west to locate convoy. 

M, Lieutenant. 

The corporal and one man were sent with this by the 
route of the first messengers. They were cautioned that 
they were likely to meet hostile patrols, but that it was of 
the utmost importance, not only to get through, but to get 
through very promptly, or the information would reach the 
major too late to be of value. 

The lieutenant with the one remaining man, moved to 
the southern part of the wood, then up the draw to the south- 
west, and into the timber west of road fork 599, where he 
5.10 a.m. arrived at 5.10. Climbing a large tree, he saw the whole 
mile-long convoy stretched out on the Littlestown-Boneau- 
ville road with its head nearing Whitehall. He had now ob- 
tained all of the information he had sent for, and there 
seemed nothing further to be learned that would warrant 
his delaying a moment in starting back with what he had 
just acquired. To use a single messenger, even in this very 
friendly country, would not be advisable, because any route 
by which the message could be carried without a wide 
detour, must be made very dangerous by the enemy's pa- 
trols. The lieutenant started back via the wood and stream 
southeast of the Gebhardt farm. Near road fork 599 he 
found an intelligent farmer who told him the telephone 
lines in the vicinity had been cut by the Blues, but that he 
would be glad to go to the houses to the south, and try to get 
the lieutenant's message through from there. The follow- 
ing was hurriedly penciled and handed him: 

Major A: Hanover road between Wentz and Rebert farms. 
Convoy moving on Boneauville. Head nearing Whitehall at 5.10 a. m. 

M, Lieutenant. 

The lieutenant proceeding rapidly along the route de- 
cided upon, fell into an ambuscade that the Blues had set for 
him near road fork 582, was captured with the soldier fol- 
lowing him, and some time later had the mortification of join- 
ing his second pair of messengers near the Gebhardt farm. 

He had obtained definite insight into all of the enemy's 
dispositions, but, as will be so frequently the case, was un- 
able to get the information to the headquarters where it was 



BATTALION OF li^'FANTRY. IS'O 

needed. It is one thing to obtain information, but anotlier, 
and frequently a much more difficult matter to transmit it. 

A BATTALION ATTACK ADVANCE GUARD RECONNAISSANCE. 

At 4.30 a. m. the point of the battalion, coming over the 4.30 a. m. 
rise west of the Rebert farm, received such a fire from the 
crest half a mile to the west that the men were compelled io 
take cover from and return it. The lieutenant in com- 
mand of the advance party deployed a second squad along- 
side the first, and started his remaining one and one-half 
squads; four men of his platoon had been sent south at A. 
Rifle, in two patrols to work west under cover of the stream 
lines, north and south of the Hanover road. The rest of 
Company A turned up the southern stream line, and follovv^ed 
the left patrol, which by that time was some 400 yards up 
the draw. At 4.50 a. m. this patrol reached the house and 4.50 a. m. 
orchard 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601, immediately 
deployed, and opened fire toward 601. By 4.55 a. m,, when 
the company was about a hundred yards east of the farm- 
house, the captain ordered his second platoon into the 
orchard to reinforce the patrol then there. Upon the deploy- 
ment of this platoon, the enemy's fire at once slackened, and 
by 5 o'clock had entirely stopped. The second platoon 5 a.m. 
advanced a hundred yards beyond the crossroads, and again 
ojiened fire toward the west. From the farmhouse the cap- 
tain, a few minutes before this, had seen one man of his 
flanking patrol in the field north of the H. Felty house. He 
concluded, therefore, that if the enemy had anything near 
crossroads 609, that fact would be determined before many 
moments by the flanking patrol. Meantime, and until the 
leading platoon had also gained a little more ground to the 
west, he would hold the company under cover east of the 
farmhouse. About 5.10 a. m. a single man came running in s.io a. m. 
from the southeast to report that the other three men of his 
patrol had been captured by a number of Blues, about 500 
yards southeast of crossroads 609; that he had been the 
rear point of the patrol, and by hard running had escaped, 
although several shots were fired at him. A noncommis- 
sioned officer, from crossroads 601, also reported that whea 
the platoon went over the crest from 12 to 15 widely ex- 
tended Blues were in rapid retreat about 600 yards west of 
that point; that these disappeared immediately in an orch- 
ard (Noel), from which fire was opened a few minutes later; 
and that the second platoon was now gaining some ground 
in that direction, but not at all rapidly. 



140 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The captain of the advance guard company, altlioiigh 
much time had been lost already, had so far not been a])le 
to do very much toward clearing up the situation. The 
enemy might liave only a strong patrol in front of him and 
another toward crossroads 609. And yet, since the enemy 
might be in strength in either of these directions, the bat- 
talion could hardly advance till more had been learned. 
6.12 a.m. f]^Q captain accordingly issued orders at 5.12 a. m. to his 
first lieutenant, who had come up v/ith the bulk of the orig- 
inal advance party, to vSergt. Y, and Corpls, B and C, as 
follows : 

The second platoon is driving a party of Reds along the Hanover Road 
toward Square Corner. Our left flank patrol found a number of Blues near 
that farmhouse (Font) to the southv/est. 

We must determine at once where the enemy's strength is. 

Sergt. Y will reinforce the second platoon with the ninth and tenth squads. 

The first platoon will move up this draw west of us, and advance straight 
toward the crossroads (609) to the southwest. 

Corpl. B, with three men of his squad, will work rapidly over to the house 
(Wentz) a half a mile west of us, and thence to the southwest. 

Corpl. C, with three of his men, will move by the house due south of this 
point (indicating the one northeast of road fork 594). 

Messages to this house (400 yards southesat of 601). 

The second platoon by 5.25 a. m. bega,n to gain ground 
toward the west by long rushes; the first platoon had 
reached the house 350 yards southwest of crossroads 601 
and was stopped there by heavy fire from both sides of the 
601-609 road; the patrol working southwest from the Wentz 
house also was stopped by fire from the inclosure 300 
yards northwest of crossroads 609, and the patrol to the 
south had not been able to get beyond the house 200 yards 
northeast of road fork 594. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER' S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUA- 
TION. 

Turnincr now to the battalion commander we find that 
the major received reports somewhat as follows: At 4 
o'clock, from the battalion adjutant by telephone, that the 
hostile battalion marched north at 3 o'clock; and about 
5 o'clock, also by telephone, that the convoy marched on 
Whitehall at 4 o'clock. No reports were received from 
either of the dismounted patrols by Square Corner or by 
Felty S. H. At 5.10 a. m., Lieut. M's No. 1 came in, re- 
porting that three hostile companies had passed road fork 
606 at 4.10 a. m. 



C.25 a. m. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 141 

During the advance-guard reconnaissance the main body- 
was assembled west of the stream line west of the Rebert 
farm. The three captains joined the major at the farmhouse 
400 yards southeast of crossroads GOl. 

The latter, by 5.10 a. m., had a pretty clear idea of the 
enemy's general dispositions. The Blues had apparently 
sent three companies out to meet the Red battalion while 
the convoy was passing by Whitehall and Boneauville, At 
first, while the enemy still held the 601 crest, there was con- 
siderable doubt but that he would be fomid with the greater 
part of his three companies directly m front of the Reds. 
As soon as the flanking patrol to the south reported that a 
number of Blues were in the direction of crossroads 609, 
and that the crossroads at 601 had been cleared of the enemy, 
the major concluded that they were probably in strength 
at 609: 

It would not do to wait much longer for exact informa- 
tion. The hostile convoy had been on the road for more 
than an hour and would soon be beyond reach. 

If the major attacks toward crossroads 609, and the 
Blues happen to be in the direction of Square Comer, no 
harm Vv^ill be done, because he should still be able, by a rapid 
advance, to strike the convoy on the WhitehaU-Boneauville 
road. But on the other hand, if the Blues are in strength 
at 609, and he attempts to march by, toward Square Corner, 
the battalion wiU be stopped by the fire from the enemy's 
position. Any thought of a detour to the north, with the 
idea of striking the convoy somewhere north of Boneauville, 
is at once dropped. The best way to get at the convoy is to 
beat its escort, and that escort appears now to be offering 
an engagement. 

While the major is considering the matter, the platoon of 
Company A starts toward 609, and draws a heavy fire there- 
from. That removes the last doubt in the major's mind 
that the Blue battahon is at 609. 

An envelopment of the hostile left would require too 
great a detour to get troops in position for attacking, and the 
ground m front of that flank is open to long ranges. An 
envelopment of the hostile right is favored by the stream 
line, which permits the attacking column to get fairly close 
in, under good cover. But it has the disadvantage that the 
two attacks wiU be separated by too great a distance, since 
the weak advance-guard company should continue its attack 
do\vn the 601-609 road. It seems better, therefore, to 
make a frontal attack with three companies, while causing 



142 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

the fourth company to follow along tlie stream to envelop, 
if to do so becomes expedient as the attack proceeds. 

In attackmg a convoy, it is usually advisable to make a 
detachment the sole function of which is to get the convoy. 
While eveiyone's attention is attracted by the events of the 
engagement, that detachment will, quite frequently, find its 
opportunity somewhe-re. The present case does not differ 
in this respect from the normal. Company A has six squads, 
under an officer, that are rapidly driving an inferior Blue 
force toward Square Comer, in which direction there 
should now also be the patrol of six men that left Brush- 
town at 3 o'clock. If assigned the mission of getting the 
convoy, this detachment may, very likely, assisted by the 
timber along the stream lines south and southwest of Square 
Corner, be able at least seriously to delay it. 

The major decides to attack frontally with three com- 
panies ; 

To have the fourth follow the left of the attacking line 
along the stream by H. Felty; and 

To assign the reinforced Second Platoon of Company A 
the mission of stopping the convoy. 

THE BATTALION COMMANDER's ATTACK ORDER. 

He accordingly issued orders to the four captains, at 
5.20 a. m. 5.20 a. m., as follows: 

The enemy appears to have three companies in position from the cross- 
roads (609) southwest of lis to the road bend 200 yards southeast of the 
red (Font) farmhouse. The convoy marched to\yard BoneauAdlle at 4 a. m. 

We will attack at once. 

Company A (less its reinforced second platoon) toward the crossroads 
(609) to the southwest. I will order that reinforced second platoon to 
move rapidly west to get the convoy. 

Company B, deploying with its right 50 yards southeast of this house 
(one 400 yards southeast of crossroads GOl), will attack the red (Font) 
farmhouse. 

Company C will advance up the draw 400 yards southeast of this house 
(one 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601) to attack in the direction of the 
yellow house (Gebhardt). 

Company D, in support, will follow Company C at 200 yards along the 
stream line to the south. 

Issue ammunition at once and move out promptly. Empty ammuni- 
tion wagons will assemble at the Rebert farmhouse (the sergeant major 
attends to this) . 

I will go with the support. 



BATTALION OF INFANTRY. 



143 



SKETCH No.l3. Si-fua+ion a-|- 6'5 A.M. Ma/ 6 




144 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

First Battalion, 

6 May, 5.25 a. m. 
Commander Second Platoon, Company A: 

Blue Battalion is in position on Font farm. Convoy left camp at 4 a. 
m.j and is marching via \Miiteliall. Our battalion attacks Blue Battal- 
ion. Your reinforced platoon will proceed rapidly west and stop the 
convoy. 

B, Major. 

The captains started for their companies at 5.25 a. m. 
Extra ammunition was issued by 5.35 a. m., and the deploy- 
ment began. Company A did not attempt to draw ammuni- 
6.45 a. m. tion. By 5.45 a. m. three companies were deployed on the 
hne of the farmhouse, 400 yards southwest of crossroads 
601 and H. Felty, and had opened fire. Twenty minutes 
later it was plain that the hostile lines were withdrawing. 
The major urged everything forward, but the ground fa- 
vored the hostile retirement too greatly to permit the attack 
to bring them again to bay. (See sketch No. 13.) 



PART IV.— CAVALRY PATROL. 



Situation. 



A foreign (Red) Army has taken possession of Baltimore 
and Washington. A Blue Army is being assembled to the 
northwest of the territory occupied by the Reds, and has 
sent forward covering detachments, one of which is at 
Carlisle, 30 miles north of Gettysburg. 

On June 30 the commanding general at Carlisle sent 
for Lieut. A, First Cavalry, and gave him the following order 
at 5 p. m. : 

Small hostile parties, probably all cavalry, were reported to be very 
active in the general vicinity of Gettysburg this morning. All wire com- 
munication with that place ceased at noon to-day, and inhabitants sent 
south in. automobiles have been either held or, learning ©f hostile parties 
on the road they were on, have turned back. The Carlisle-Center Mills 
road, as far as Center Mills, was free of the enemy at the last report a few 
moments ago. Your squadron will be Pssembled this evening at Carlisle 
and will march on Center Mills early in the morning. 

Yovir troop will be relieved of its present duties and will go with the 
squadron. 

In the meantime you will take two noncommissioned officers and eight 
men of your troop and patrol toward Gettysburg, starting as soon as you 
can get ready. I desire accurate informationof the strength and movements 
of the enemy that has appeared around Gettysburg. Send reports to me 
here. Return when you have cleared up the situation. 

The weather is warm and clear; roads dusty; streams low; 
moon rises at 10 p. m. 

The main road from Carlisle to Gettysburg runs through 
Center Mills. 

REQUIRED. 

(a) Details of the assembly and march of the patrol till 
Center Mills is reached, no enemy being encountered up to 
that time. 

(h) Lieut. A's reasons for the action taken. 

PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS. 

Lieut. A first obtained from his captain the men and 
horses that were to accompany him. The horses were 
next inspected to see that they were in good physical con- 
dition and well shod, the captain's assistance being requested 
98755°— 27 10 145 



146 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. n, 

in replacing poor horses and in substituting suitable animals 
for those of conspicuous color or those that were known to 
neigh when alone. The horses finally selected were then 
inspected, and the captain requested to have the horseshoer 
tighten or reset all loose shoes. The horses were then 
watered and fed, and the men instructed to get their supper. 

As soon as they had finished eating, the men were in- 
structed to obtain a cooked meal to take with them, to fill 
their canteens with cofi"ee, and to provide themselves with a 
half feed of grain, to be carried in nose bags; to leave their 
extra clothing, toilet articles, and shelter tent equipment 
tied up in bundles in charge of the troop quartermaster 
sergeant, but to take with them their slickers and one reserve 
ration each. 

While the men were making these preparations, Lieut. A 
ate his supper and then tried to secure for his men as many 
as possible of the following articles: Six wire cutters, so that 
he and every other man would have a pair. 

For each of his noncommissioned officers, the following: 
Pad of message blanks, pencil, compass, map, and field 
glasses. 

AU of these articles were obtained, except the field glasses 
and maps. However, Lieut. A made for each noncommis- 
sioned officer a tracing of his own map which indicated the 
roads and streams and the higher hills. 

Lieut. A had his own kit complete, including a pocket flash 
light. The patrol then saddled up and mounted, and the 
Ueutenant inspected each man to see that he carried just the 
articles he was told to take, and no others, and that arms and 
equipments were so disposed that they would not rattle. 

The situation and Lieut. A's intentions were then explained 
to the whole patrol. 

We will assume that these preparations were completed by 
6.30 p. m. 

Just before starting Lieut. A inquired at headquarters 
whether any further information had been received. 

The patrol then moved out by the main road in the fol- 
lowing order: 

Point, Corpl. X and one private (distance 200 yards); 
Lieut. A and the remainder of the patrol, less two privates 
(distance 100 yards); two privates. 

The march to Center Mills was made at a rate of 5 to 5 i 
miles per hour, the distances being reduced by half as dark- 
ness fell. 



CAVALRY PATROL. 147 

REASONS. 

Lieut. A is starting on a ride of indefinite duration. He 
must take the time for careful preparation before starting, 
in order to insure physical conditions that will admit of 
accomplishing his mission. More time would eventually be 
lost than gained by rushing off with men and horses hungry, 
and otherwise unprepared for extreme exertion. If the men 
had already eaten supper and horses had been fed, as would 
frequently be the case at 5 p. m., a much earlier start could 
be made. 

Lieut. A has authority to exchange unfit horses or men, 
or to take the horseshoer from the work assigned him by 
the captain, or to add to the load of the troop baggage 
wagon. For these arrangements he must consult his cap- 
tain, who will render aU the assistance the situation of the 
troop, as a whole, warrants. 

Should Lieut. A's patrol be gone for several days, as seems 
not unlikely, he will have to subsist his men and horses off 
the country; but this will not be difficult in friendly farming 
country, and will be better than burdening the horses with 
the weight of rations and grain. On the other hand, it is 
best always to have ready one meal for men and horses, so 
it may be consumed when needed without delaying to pro- 
cure it. It win then be replaced at the first favorable op- 
portunity. 

The time of year, state of the weather, and conditions of 
the march thus enable the horses to be relieved of much 
weight, which will increase their speed and endurance. 

As the road as far as Center Mills is reported free of the 
enemy, Lieut. A will not waste time and energy in elaborate 
measures for the protection of his march, but will proceed 
by the main route, merely putting out a couple of men in 
advance so he will not be surprised and captured, should 
conditions have changed before he reaches Center Mills. 
This will require no extra exertion of horses and men, and 
is a necessary precaution. 

Over this roUing country in hot weather a gait of 5 to 5^ 
miles per hour is as fast as the horses can go and still retain 
sufficient energy for a long-continued march or a burst of 
speed in an emergency. 

Situation (continued) : Lieut. A reached, without incident, 
the northern outskirts of Center MiUs at 10.15 p. m., and 
found the village quiet and most of the houses dark. 



148 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Required: Conduct of the patrol at Center Mills. 
On approaching Center Mills, Lieut. A sent a man forward 
to his point with this order: 

Join Corpl. X and tell him that his party is to trot straight through the 
village, while the patrol halts here. He will then halt as a march outpost 
and send you back with a message, if all is clear, in which case the patrol 
will move into the village and halt there for a few minutes, while Corpl. X 
and companion remain on watch at the first road fork south of the creek 
that runs through the village. 

10.30 p. m. On return of the man from Corpl. X, Lieut. A rode with 
his patrol into the village, dismounted it, after posting one 
man as a lookout, called and questioned some of the inhab- 
itants, and telephoned to detachment headquarters at Carlisle 
a report of his arrival at Center Mills, a summary of the 
statements of the inhabitants, and a statement that the 
patrol would continue south at once. 

Mail in the post office was not examined, as the people 
were friendly and willing to give all possible information. 

PROVISION FOR TRANSMITTING INFORMATION. 

The owner of two good horses was found and instructed 
to hide the horses, so that no hostile patrols could find them, 
and to be ready to turn them over to any messengers Lieut. 
A might send back. The above was done in case the tele- 
phone failed to work, and the messengers' horses should be 
exhausted. 

The telephone office and the place where the owner of 
the horses could be found was then pointed out to aU the 
members of the patrol. 

Situation (continued) : At Center Mills it was learned that 
aU wire connection south of the Conewago had ceased during 
the afternoon, and that farmers living just north of the 
Conewago had reported seeing numerous small parties of the 
enemy late in the afternoon, but that no hostile party 
seemed to have come closer than about 2 miles to Center 
Mills. 
10.45 p. m. At 10.45 p. m. Lieut. A is ready to proceed. 

Required: (a) Conduct of the patrol from Center Mills to 
the Conewago. 

(b) Reasons for action taken. 

Lieut. A moved the patrol forward till he was in touch 
with Corpl. X, and then ordered: 

To Pvt. Z— 

Fall back until the patrol is about 100 yards in front of you and retain 
that position. Watch to the rear so that we shall not be surprised from 
that direction, and should the patrol encounter the enemy, keep out of the 



CAVALRY PATROL. 149 

fight. Should the patrol be ambushed and captured, you will hasten to 
Center Mills and telephone a report of the matter to headquarters at Carlisle, 
and then proceed back along the route we have come, and join our squadron. 
Do not rush off with a report that the patrol has been captured till you 
are sure that no part of the patrol, which you could join, has escaped and 
gone off in a different direction. Repeat your instructions. All right. 
Take your place. 

To Sergt. Y— 

Take charge of these six men, as the main body of the patrol, and follow 
the point at about 150 yards. Have the men ride on the grass at the side 
of the road, so the horses will make little noise. Talking and smoking are 
forbidden. I will be with the point. Should the point hastily fall back 
toward you, you will gallop to the rear till I can join you and reorganize 
the patrol. 

Lieut. A then joined Corpl. X and his companion, and 
having directed them to move noiselessly on the turf beside 
the road, proceeded south on the main road, at a walk. 

REASONS. 

Lieut. A moves at a walk, because the enemy may soon 
be encountered, and he does not wish to be ambushed. 
Trotting horses can be heard for a considerable distance, 
and thus at night, when hearing is the sense most used, the 
enemy would know the patrol was coming, in time to lay 
a trap for it. Furthermore, when riding at a trot, one's 
own horse makes so much noise, that one can hear nothing 
else, unless the sound be very loud. 

Until he knows the direct road is barred, Lieut. A will 
keep to it, as being shortest and but little more danger- 
ous than any other; besides, it is necessary to know just 
where the enemy does bar this main road, and by keeping 
on it the possibility of getting lost is removed. On meeting 
the enemy, the patrol may be fired upon, but night firing is 
generally ineffective. 

To patrol to the right and left at each crossroad be- 
fore proceeding, would greatly delay the patrol, which, 
moreover, passes such a point in a short time and does not 
stand so much in need of this precaution as would a longer 
column. 

Situation (continued): At 1L20 p. m. Lieut. A's patrol "^op. m. 
reached crossroad 600 (near Hill 646, three-quarters of a 
mile north of Table Rock) without incident. Here Lieut. 
A dismounted and, using his pocket light, made a careful 
study of the tracks on the road. He could tell that a few 
mounted men had passed in both directions along each of 
the road branches, but could not determine how old the 



150 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

tracks were, because the artificial light made their color 
quite different from the appearance of tracks in dayhght, 
and the dew had not yet affected the dust in the road. As 
farmers in this vicinity seldom ride, and it was known that 
no Blue troops were near, Lieut. A judged that hostde 
patrols had been on these roads during the afternoon or 
evening. The patrol then proceeded to the top of Hill 646. 
Here Corpl. X and his companion were sent, as a march out- 
post, 300 yards south on the road, the patrol has halted, and 
the inhabitant of the house on the hill was wakened and 
questioned. The latter stated that a few hostile patrols had 
been seen late in the afternoon, gomg sometimes in one di- 
rection and sometimes in the other. A small party of the 
enemy had entered his yard and house and looked about; 
but except from stealing a few edibles and destroying his 
telephone, had not molested the inhabitants. The last 
hostile party seen had passed toward Table Rock at about 
8 p. m. No inhabitants had come north smce about 4 
p. m., when the first hostile party had appeared. 

A RUSE. 

Lieut. A mounted his patrol and led it to where Corpl. 
X had halted. The corporal reported nothing observed, 
except that there was a loose horse grazing along the road 
about 300 yards to the south. The corporal stated that 
he had been much exercised about the movements of this 
horse, and finally investigated and found that the animal 
was lame and wore no harness or equipment of any kind. 

The patrol, in its previous formation, then proceeded to 
road junction 553, the old horse keeping just ahead of the 
patrol as it advanced. Here Lieut. A directed Sergt. Y: 

Halt here with the patrol. I am going to take Corpl. X and reconnoiter 
the bridge. Should we be driven back and pursued, we will turn up the 
west fork of the road, and you can then, as a surprise, charge any one who 
pursues us. 

As the old horse kept constantly ahead of Lieut. A and 
his companion and could not be quietly passed or caught, 
Lieut. A dismomited and acquired a handful of stones 
which he threw at the animal, thus causing it to keep a 
considerable distance ahead of him on the road, along which 
members of the party rode in such manner as to keep as 
much as possible under cover of the weeds and bushes. 
Suddenly they were challenged in a foreign language; 
whereupon Lieut. A and the corporal stopped, but made 
no reply. At once the old horse wheeled about and came 



CAVALRY PATBOL. 151 

back toward them. As the old horse passed, Lieut. A and 
his companion allowed their horses to turn and follow for a 
little way and then halted and Hstened. A few words in a 
foreign language were heard, followed by a laugh. 

By taking advantage of an unforeseen circumstance, 
Lieut. A had gained information without disclosing the 
presence of his patrol. First, he had learned that the 
bridge was guarded by the enemy, and, second, that the 
guard was composed of cool, dangerous men, who did not 
shoot whenever they thought something moved, but quietly 
waited till they were sure they had seen an enemy. 

A CHANGE OF ROUTE. 

Lieut. A quietly rejoined his patrol, cut the fence, and 
taking his previous formation moved across country to the 
southwest. 

By midnight the patrol had forded the Conewago, and 
was at the junction of the country roads, 400 yards east of 
Table Rock station, which was found to be free of the enemy. 

Required: Action and orders of Lieut. A. 

SIMULTANEOUS RECONNAISSANCE IN SEVERAL DIRECTIONS. 

Lieut. A posted a lookout on each of the three branches of 
the road, at a distance of 200 yards from the road junction, 
assembled the remainder of the patrol behind a bush, and 
had them look at his map by the aid of the flash-light, the 
glow from which was hmited by holding a slicker over it. 

He then ordered: 

Sergt. Y, take Pvts. and with you and go by the country' 

road to the west till you strike the main north and south road at Texas, 
about a mile west of here. I want to know whether or not the bridge across 
the Conewago, about one-half mile north of Texas, is held l)y the enemy, 
and whether or not a party of the enemy is at or near Texas, or at the cross- 
road three-quarters mile south of that place. I am going east to the main 
road we just left, and then north. Pvts. and will accom- 
pany me. 

Corpl. X, you and Pvts. and will accompany me east to 

the main road, then go south and find out whether or not there is any party 
of the enemy at the main crossroad, about a mile south of where we enter 
the main road. 

Pvts. and will recross the ford and remain on the north 

of the stream, prepared to cover the crossing of any of our three parties, 
should one be driven back.' 



1 Leaving these two men at the ford is objectionable because it splits up the patrol too much. 
For this reason they might well be kept with Lieut. A. Left where they are, they would give 
warning by firmg should the patrol unexpectedly be trailed by a hostile party; would afford 
a well-marked point for reassembly in the darkness, and, should all the parties south of the 
stream be cut off, would insure word of their capture being sent back. 



152 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

I will be back here in an hour and a half and will expect the other two 
parties either to be at the ford, where we just crossed, or to send a report 
there by that time. Mount up and move out. 

Lieut. A and one private then preceded the remainder of 
his own and Corpl. X's parties by about 100 yards, and moved 
quietly to road junction 1,000 yards southwest of Table 
Rock. No enemy being found there, Corpl. X and party 
turned south, and Lieut. A and party turned north in the 
formation — Lieut. A, distance 20 yards; one man, distance 
100 yards; the other man. 

Road junction 567 was reached without incident, no 
enemy being found there. 

Required: (a) Lieut. A's estimate of the situation (brief 
and informal). 

(6) Further conduct of his party. 

{a) Lieut. A knows that the bridge at Table Rock is held 
by the enemy, whether by infantry of cavalry, a small party 
or a large one, he does not know, but wishes to find out. As 
no firing has been heard to the south, he thinks it likely that 
Corpl. X found no enemy at Table Rock schoolhouse, but 
this is not certain. He knows that there is no enemy at 567 
or at the road junction between that place and Table Rock 
schoolhouse. He, therefore, estimates that the party at the 
Table Rock bridge is rather isolated and probably not large, 
or the bivouac of its main body would have been encountered 
by now. Coming upon this enemy from the rear, he woidd 
probably be mistaken for a friendly patrol or messenger, and 
might ride boldly into their camp with little danger. By so 
doing he would however, probably spread alarm, and pursuit 
of him might easily cut off Corpl. X. On the other hand, 
should Corpl. X be attacked and pursued, Lieut. A can easily 
cut the fence and rejoin the patrol north of the river, by 
fording the stream and working up its course. 

He therefore decides to cut the fence, conceal his horses 
in the orchard opposite 567, and try to approach dismounted 
tiU he can determine the strength and composition of the 
hostile party, without liimseK being discovered. 

(6) He therefore moved about 100 yards off the road, 
and, leaving his men and horses concealed in the edge of the 
orchard, went alone through the field toward the bridge, 
observing toward the road and the village of Table Rock 
as he advanced. 

Situation (continued) : Lieut. A found what he estimated 
to be 20 horses, with men bivouacked near them, in the 



CAVALRY PATEOL. 153 

fork of the road in Table Rock village. By using his glasses 
he was able to make them out quite distinctly without 
himself being discovered. (Any good field glass of moderate 
power is capable of being used as a "night glass.") He 
returned to his horses, mounted, and started to return the 
way he had come. On the return journey he kept his men 
close to him, as the road to the rear is known to be closed, 
and united action can be better obtained with the men close 
to the leader. 

As he approached the road junction between 567 and 
Table Rock schoolhouse, a few horsemen were heard ap- 
proaching along the road from the south. They appeared 
to be south of the road junction, and nearer to it than was 
his own party when they were first observed by Lieut. A. 

Required: Action of Lieut. A, and his reasons therefor. 

Lieut. A dropped back to his two men and whispered: 

We will ride at a walk toward those fellows. Should they prove to be 
hostile, I will charge. Be ready to go with me. Do not speak. 

He then rode forward noiselessly at a walk. 

REASONS. 

This is most likely Corpl. X and his party, but it must 
be quickly and silently identified. To go quietly to meet 
it, will make a mistake in identification impossible, and will 
avoid any possibihty of two Blue patrols engaging in an 
encounter with each other in the dark. Should the party 
prove to be hostile, it will most hkely think Lieut. A's party 
a friendly one, tiU it is suddenly surprised by a charge and 
so scattered as to enable the Blue patrol to escape. Lieut. 
A's best route back to his rendezvous point is by the road 
beyond the point where he will meet the approaching party. 
A sudden charge would probably open that route, and 
would not, in case of failure, make it much more difficult 
to go back to 567, ford the stream near the orchard, and 
return to his party by that route. 

Another fine of action would have been to halt and wait 
to see whether the other party turned west at the road 
junction; thus giving additional color to the supposition that 
it was Corp. X. In circumstances such as these, a quick 
decision, followed by bold action on the hne adopted, is of 
more importance than a fine balancing of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the different possible courses of action. 



154 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

COMBAT OF A PATROL. 

The party developed to be hostile, was charged, and re- 
treated rapidly to the south. At Table Rock schoolhouse 
the enemy took the branch of the road that leads to the 
southwest, and Lieut. A halted his men. One of the enemy, 
on a slow horse, was captured. He was disarmed, and the 
patrol quickly returned with the prisoner to the rendezvous, 
Lieut. A questioning him en route. Owing to imperfect 
knowledge of the foreign language, aU Lieut. A could learn 
was that the prisoner belonged to the First Red Cavalry; 
that he had been a member of the patrol that was keeping 
up connection between different parts of liis squadron, which 
was on contact duty; and that the prisoner's regiment, 
starting from Baltimore, had been marching for the past 
two days, but that he did not know where any part of it, 
except his squadron, was to-night. 

On reaching the rendezvous Corpl. X was found there. 
He had been up to the crossroads (608) as directed, found no 
one there, and had returned without incident, probably 
having passed the road junction where Lieut. A encountered 
the hostile patrol a few moments before that occurrence. 
1 45 a. m. j^^ J 45 a. m. Pvt. T, who had been with Sergt. Y, returned 
alone and reported that the remainder of his party had been 
captured. Sergt. Y, he reported, had turned south, after 
reaching the main road (Texas), and had advanced about a 
mile when the party was challenged just as it stumbled upon 
a hostile bivouac. Pvt. T saw a long hne of horses there, 
he thinks more than 100, with men bivouacked beside them. 
His party hastily retreated, pursued by mounted men; but 
before it regained the crossroad, another hostile party rode 
into it from the north. He escaped by jumping his horse 
over a fence beside the road, and, after some wandering, 
returned to the rendezvous. The others were captured. 

Required: Further actions and orders of Lieut. A. 

By the aid of his flash light held under a shcker Lieut. A 
wiote the following message: 

No. 1. 

From Patrol First Cavalry, at , near Table Rock Station. 

1 July 2 a. m. 

To Commander Carlisle. 

Hostile cavalry is observing the crossing of the Conewago north of Gettys- 
burg. I saw about 20 hostile cavalry at Table Rock Bridge. Pvt. T saw 
about a hostile squadron (foreign) bivouacked just west of Goldenville. 
Have encountered hostile connecting patrols south of the Conewago on 
both roads to Carlisle. Prisoner from First Red Cavalry, sent herewith, 
reports his regiment marched from Baltimore the 29th. Have lost Sergt. Y 

and Pvt. , captmed. I go south. 

A, Lieutenant. 



CAVALRY PATROL. j- 155 

DISPOSITION OF A PRISONER. 

He then ordered Pvt. T and Pvt. (whose horse is 

weakening) : 

Take this prisoner in charge, move northeast until you strike the main 
road by which we came, and then go to Center Mills. There telephone to 
our detachment headquarters the following message: "This is Lieut. A's 
patrol. Lieut. A found hostile cavalry observing the crossings of the 
Conewago, with a hostile squadron near Goldenville in their support. I am 
bringing back a prisoner from First Red Cavalry. Lieut. A is going south. ' ' 
After telephoning, go on back and deliver the prisoner and this written mes- 
sage to the first Blue officer you encounter and ask him to help you. If you 
are in danger of capture at any time, destroy the message and give instead 
the one I told you to telephone. When you are relieved of the prisoner, 
rejoin your squadron. Move at alternate walk and trot after reaching the 
main road. Repeat to me the message you are to telephone. All right; 
now repeat yoiu* instructions. All right. Move out. 

The horses were then offered water, and the patrol mounted 

and moved out in the formation: Lieut. A and one 

private, distance 100 yards; Corpl. X and three pri- 
vates, distance 100 yards, one private. The patrol moved 
south across country till the Mummasburg-Hunterstown Road 
had been crossed and then took the main road toward 
Gettysburg. At 2.40 a. m. the vicinity of hill 527 was 2.40 a. m. 
reached, and Lieut. A decided to give his horses a rest and 
feed and wait for daylight. 

(Horses can do more than these animals have done, but 
they have already had to stand the heat of yesterday, and 
then work nearly all night. To keep them in condition for 
further severe exertion they must have a rest now. With 
all the rest and care he can give them, Lieut. A's horses will 
be so exhausted by a few days of this kind of work that they 
wiU require weeks to recover. If not given frequent rests, 
feed, and, above all, in this hot weather, water, it wiU take 
but a few hours to so exhaust them that they will be in- 
capable of taking a fast gait for more than a moment or two, 
and thus will be rendered entirely useless in an emergency.) 

Lieut. A went to the farmhouse south of hill 527, which is 
off the main road, woke the farmer, and obtained some hay, 
which was carried inside the small orchard. He then placed 
one man on watch, had the others loosen cinchas, feed the 
hay to their horses, and rub the horses' legs. (Oats could 
not be safely fed until the horses had rested and cooled. 
Hay wiU not hurt them now, and will partially fill their 
stomachs and blunt their appetites, so that they wiU not 
bolt the oats when fed a httle later. The horses could graze 
at this time of the year, but when hay is available, it should 



156 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

be fed as being less likely to cause running of the bowels and 
consequent weakness.) 

The men were then directed to eat their cooked meal, feed 
to the horses the oats they had with them, and rest until 
called; the man on watch being relieved from time to time. 

Having quickly given orders for the above, Lieut. A, while 
eating his own meal, talked with the farmer and from him 
learned the following: 

Hostile cavalry yesterday afternoon requisitioned a wagon 
load of grain from the farm; a large force of cavalry and ar- 
tillery camped just north of Gettysburg at dark last night, 
their bivouac being visible from the attic windows of the 
house; the hostile forces came from the southeast, the main 
body arriving at Gettysburg about 2 p. m. 

Accompanied by the farmer, Lieut. A went to the upper 
windows. From there he could see enough camp fires to be 
sure that the bivouac was still occupied. 

Required: Decision of Lieut. A and his reasons. 

Lieut. A decides to remain as at present until daylight, 
allowing his horses and men to rest as previously planned. 

REASONS. 

Lieut. A, at dayhght, which will begin in about an hour, 
can learn much by observation from his present location, and 
indications are that he will be able, from here, to get 
information back to the command. Should he go farther 
toward the hostile camp, he is in danger of encountering the 
hostile exterior guard, runs additional risk of capture, and 
may so arouse the hostile observing parties as to jeopardize 
any chance of further success. 

Having come to a decision that his horses and men need 
rest, he should stick to it. There is nothing which so quicldy 
exhausts and demorahzes a command, be it large or small, as 
constant changes of plan by the commander. Having once 
come to a decision, a commander should stick to it until 
absolutely forced to change. 

Situation (continued): As day began to break and the 
details of the terrain could be seen, Lieut. A had liis patrol 
move to the small woods 500 yards northeast of hill 527 and 
remain in hiding there. Accompanied by the farmer, he 
remained in observation of the camp. An orderly, tying his 
horse and that of the lieutenant in a shed near the bouse, 
kept a sharp lookout to prevent a surprise by any hostile 
party. 



CAVALRY PATROL. 157 

While waiting for something to happen in the hostile 
bivouac, Lieut. A wrote the following message in triplicate: 

No. 2. 

From Patrol, First Cavalry, at 2 miles north of Gettysburg, Pa., 

1 July, , a. m. 

To Commander Carlisle: 

My No. 1 reported hostile cavalry observing line of Conewago. Hostile 
cavalry, accompanied by artillery, bivouacked last night just north of 
Gettysburg. I estimate . 

After daylight the enemy had breakfast, saddled up, and, 
what appeared to be an advance guard started north a little 
later. 

OBSERVATION OF HOSTILE MAIN BODY. 

Through his glasses Lieut. A was never able to see the 
whole bivouac, on account of intervening objects, but he 
could see that such a bivouac was on the small hill near the 
almshouse, and from the portions he could observe was able 
to tell approximately its whole size. By 4.15 a. m. he had 
added to his written messages, "I estimate one brigade of 
cavalry and one battery, from what I can see at a distance of 
2 miles." 

As soon as the hostile advance guard began to move out at 
4.45 a. m., Lieut. A added to his messages, "Hostile advance 
guard has just started north. I remain in observation ; " then 
signed the messages, filled in the time in their date lines, and 
hastened to his horse. 

Quickly mounting, Lieut. A and his orderly, screened by 
the house and the orchard, galloped to the patrol, where 
Lieut. A ordered: 

SENDING BACK IMPORTANT INFORMATION. 

To Pvt. R : 

You and Pvt take this message. Ride at alternate trot and gallop. 

Go northeast along the bed of this stream till you come to its head, then 
northwest from there to Center Mills. At Center Mills get fresh horses, at 
the place I pointed out to you while we were there, and continue on by the 
main road toward Carlisle till you meet your squadron. If you are in 
danger of capture, destroy the message and make this verbal report: "Hos- 
tile cavalry brigade with a battery marched north from Gettysburg at 5 
a. m. " While you are changing horses at Carlisle try to telephone that same 
message to headquarters at Carlisle. Each of you repeat the message. All 
right; mount and move out. 

ToCorpl. X: 

You and Pvt take this message. Ride at about 6 miles per 

hour, unless you can later get fresh horses, when you may go as fast as the 
gi'ound permits. Take this by-road to the northeast and then go by the 



158 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

pike that leads in the same direction. When approaching the Conewago, 
keep off the roads and cross by fording. Near Plainview (pointed out on 
the corporal's sketch) turn northwest. Go east of Chestnut Hill, and then 
work toward the Carlisle Road. Get the message to headquarters at Carlisle 
and to our squadron. Ask any Blue officer to assist you. If you are in 
danger of capture, destroy the message and in its place make this report: 
"Hostile cavalry, brigade with a battery marched north from Gettysburg 
at 5 a, m. " Repeat the message. All right; move out. 

To the remaining two privates : 

Mount and follow me. 

Lieut. A followed the wooded stream lines, keeping 
as much as possible under their cover, and moved at alter- 
nate trot and gallop, first southeast to the stream fork, then 
northeast to the next fork, then along the south branch of 
that fork to the foot of Granite Hill. On Granite Hill the 
horses were held under cover of the woods, while Lieut. A 
spent 20 minutes in observing through his glasses in all 
directions. He saw nothing except that on the Gettysburg- 
Center Mills road clouds of dust, gradually moving north, 
showed that the lieutenant had not been mistaken in 
beheving the party he observed going north to be an ad- 
vance guard. He was relieved to observe this, as he had 
previously had to report from indications only; a thing that 
should not be done if verification is possible before the re- 
port must be sent. Otherwise, the indications only should 
be reported, not the conclusions drawn from them. After 
sending off the report from near hill 527 Lieut. A realized 
that the hostile party moving north might be an independent 
party or a flank guard. His statement that it was an 
advance guard, and the verbal reports he had ordered, to 
the effect that the whole hostile force was moving north, 
were both unjustified. It requires a cool head to avoid 
making such unjustified reports, which may lead a superior 
commander into making most serious tactical errors. From 
Granite HiU Lieut. A moved south and, by inquiry among 
the inhabitants, learned that the enemy came yesterday by 
the Baltimore Pike; so he turned southeast by that route, 
reaching Littles town without incident at 8 a. m. Here it 
was learned that wire communication had been interrupted 
in all directions but that no enemy had been aeen or heard 
of since noon yesterday, when the tail of a hostile cavalry 
brigade accompanied by artillery had passed through the 
town going toward Gettysburg. He also learned that there 
were several automobiles in the town. 

Required: Further action of Lieut. A. 



CAVALRY PATROL. 159 

UTILIZING FRIENDLY INHABITANTS. 

Lieut. A had his men care for and feed the horses in 
Littlastown and then rest, while the citizens kept watch to 
see that no enemy approached unobserved. He then as- 
sembled several citizens who had automobiles, and induced 
them to ride out in all directions. They were instructed to 
go about 20 miles, find out from the inhabitants whether 
or not any enemy had been seen, learn where wire communi- 
cation with Carhsle could be obtained, and then return and 
report. In case any enemy should be encountered they were 
to give business in the nearest town as their reason for 
being out; to remain silent about Lieut. A's patrol, but to 
teU about having seen hostile cavalry, in order to give an 
air of truth to their statements. 

SITUATION (continued). 

By 11 a. m. Lieut. A learned that no enemy could be found 
on any road within 20 miles of Littlestown ; that from Spring 
Grove, 15 miles northeast of Littlestown, the wires were 
open to Carlisle; and that the last of the enemy had left 
Gettysburg before 9.30 a. m., when one of the automobiles 
passed through that place, all having gone north according 
to the reports of inhabitants. 

Required: Lieut. A's estimate of the situation (brief and 
informal) and his decision. 

Lieut. A estimates that a hostile cavalry brigade with a 
battery is making either a raid or a reconnaissance; that it 
is not followed by other troops; and that the alteration in 
the direction of its march on leaving Gettysburg was made 
either in compUance with fresh orders received, the informa- 
tion they had gathered, or a desire to confuse the Blues 
and thus gain freedom of action, while spreadmg alarm over 
a wide area. As main roads lead in all directions from 
Gettysburg, the stop of the Reds at that place would not 
indicate their objective; and had they originally intended 
moving toward Carhsle, advance by way of Gettysburg 
would thus be advantageous, and would leave the direct 
Carhsle-Baltimore road available for a return journey. 

GOING AROUND HOSTILE FLANK TO SEND INFORMATION. 

With jaded horses and tired men, Lieut, A can not pro- 
ceed, mounted, far enough to do any service. He can go 
by motor to Spring Grove m an hour and report direct to 



160 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

his commander by wire. From the rear of the hostile force 
he is in a position to learn much, and is able to transmit the 
information by motor and wire. It may be that the com- 
mander will desire him to remain in rear of the enemy. On 
the other hand, some other service may be more important. 

DECISION. 

To leave his patrol to rest in Littlestown while he goes by 
auto to Sprmg Grove and reports by wire to the commander. 



PART v.— RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK 
PROTECTION BY A SQUADRON. 



Reconnaissance and Flank Protection by a Squadron. 

general situation. 

The Conewago is the boundarjT^ between two small hostile 
States — Red, north ; Blue, south. War was declared Novem- 
ber 24. 

SPECIAL SITUATION (bLUE). 

On the night of November 24 orders were received at 
Gettysburg for the troops at that place, consisting of First 
Infantry Brigade, First Field Artillery Battalion, and First 
Squadron, First Cavalry, to move rapidly to Carlisle and 
destroy the important railroad junction at that place. 
(Carlisle is 30 miles north of Gettysburg. Both wagon road 
and railroad directly connect the two places). 

At 1 a.m., November 25, the detachment commander gave 
Maj. A, commanding First Blue Squadron, the following 
instructions : 

Oiu- detachment is ordered to marcii to Carlisle and destroy the railroad 
junction at that place. Carlisle is known to be garrisoned by not less than 
1,000 of the enemy. 

The detachment will march at 6 a. m. by the Gettysburg-Table Rock- 
Center Mills-Carlisle Road. I expect to march about 15 miles to-day. 

Your squadron will march at 5.30 a. m. You will reconnoiter sufficiently 
far in advance of the brigade to give ample security, but I do not desire to 
alarm the enemy unnecessarily by the appearance of your squadron beyond 
points which must be occupied to proAdde security for the night. 

The march order, when issued, will designate your squadron as inde- 
pendent cavalry. 

One noncommissioned oflScer and nine troopers will report to the brigade 
adjutant at 5.45 a. m. 

I will march at the head of the main body. 

Note. — The ground is bare and damp, temperature 40 degrees, weather 
clear. 

The officers of the squadron have the s^zhrs Geological Survey Map. 

Required: (a) Maj. A's orders for the march exactly as 
issued. 

(6) Briefly, the reasons for the dispositions made. 
To his adjutant, verbally : 

Notify the troops that breakfast will be at 4.30 a. m., and that the troop 
will be formed ready to march at 5.25 a. m. All officers will report for 
orders at 5.15 a. m. 

Have Second Lieut. B and Sergt. of Troop A report to me now for 
orders. 

98755°— 19— 11 161 



162 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

DISTANT PATROLS. 

To Lieut. B and Sergt. C, on their arrival, verbally: 

It is reported that Carlisle, about 30 miles north of here, is occupied by 
the enemy. Our detachment marches to-day at 6 a. m., on Carlisle, by 
the Gettysburg-Table Rock-Center Mills-Carlisle Road, but will advance 
only about 15 miles to-day. 

Our squadron will march in advance of the detachment, but will not 
approach nearer than 10 miles to Carlisle. 

Lieut. B, you will obtain six selected men from your troop and march 
at 4.30 a. m., by way of Plain view and Heidlersburg, and thence generally 
north, keeping several miles east of the route of the detachment. I desire 
early information of the movements of any hostile bodies larger than patrols. 
If any such body is discovered I wish to know its size and the direction of 
its movement. I shall expect a report at the crossroads 2 miles north of 
the Conewago, on the Table Rock-Center Mills Road, covering the fol- 
lowing points: Conditions along your route for at least 5 miles north of the 
Conewago; state of roads and bridges; information of the enemy. I expect 
to reach that crossroad about 7.15 or 7.30 a. m. Should I move on before 
a message is received from you, I shall leave a post there to direct messen- 
gers. After this first report, send messages only when you have something 
of importance to report. Keep concealed and do not approach closer than 
5 or 6 miles to Carlisle. Return to the squadron by dark, before which 
time new patrols will be sent out. Unless the action of the enemy pre- 
vents, a post for directing messengers and returning patrols will be estab- 
lished where the railroad crosses the Center Mills-Carlisle Road 3^ miles 
north of Center Mills. 

To Sergt. C similar orders were given, except that he was 
sent by way of Biglerville-Brysonia-Bendersville. (Benders- 
ville is 4 miles northeast of Brysonia.) 

To assemble officers at 5.15 a. m.: 

It has been learned that the enemy, at least 1,000 strong, occupies Car- 
lisle. Oirr detachment marches at 6 a. m. on Carlisle, by the Gettysburg 
Table Rock-Center Mills-Carlisle Road, but will advance only 15 miles 
to-day. To avoid unnecessarily alarming the enemy, our patrols should 
not go closer than 5 or 6 miles to Carlisle to-day, and should keep concealed 
when beyond the point where the detachment will camp. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C are now out with patrols well to the flanks of our 
line of march. Both patrols will send reports to meet the squadron about 
2 miles north of the Conewago. 

Troop A will send one noncommissioned officer and nine men to report 
to the brigade adjutant at 5.45 a. m. 

This squadron, as independent cavalry, marches at once by the route to 
be taken by the detachment. 

Troop A (less detachments) will constitute the advance guard. It will 
keep a small patrol 2 or 3 miles to its front. The advance guard should 
average about 4 miles per hour, including halts. 

The main body, in the order, Troops B, C, and D, will follow the advance 
guard at about half a mile. 

All wheeled transportation will join the detachment trains. 

I will ride at the head of the main body. 



KECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 163 

REASONS. 

The ordinary routine would not call for such an early- 
breakfast. Horses also must be fed earlier than usual. 
Troops must, therefore, be notified at once of the intended 
march, so that the cooks and stable crews may attend to 
these matlers in time. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C are to start earlier than the squadron. 
They also must be notified at once, so they can secure and 
inspect their details, feed their horses, and have breakfast 
for their men in advance of the rest of the squadron. 

It takes time for patrols to do their work, and it also 
takes time for their messages to be transmitted to the com- 
mander. To permit information to be gathered by patrols 
and transmitted to the commander in time to be of use to 
him, these patrols must have an early start, or the rate of 
advance of the column must be very slow; or time allowed 
by a combination of these two methods. Patrols do not go 
at a fast gait dii-ect to the only point from which they may 
see anything, arrive there at the exact time when the most 
can be seen, and send a message at high speed to the exact 
point where the commander will have just arrived to receive 
it. Troop horses are not of a quality to stand this kind of 
pace. The patrol has to search for its information, spend- 
ing much time in quiet observation from available points be- 
fore anything is seen; and probably moving to verify what 
it has guessed from the few things observed. Messen- 
gers can not find the most du"ect route. Accidents happen 
to horses. Bridges are found destroyed or fords impass- 
able, and a route has to be searched for and found. The 
commander has to be hunted up after the messenger does 
get in contact with some troops of the column. If these 
things are not considered, the commander's patrols may 
gain some information, but they will never be able to trans- 
mit it in time to be useful. 

While, in general, patrols do not send m messages unless 
some positive information has been gained, in this situation 
it is desirable to have reports as to the condition of the roads 
and bridges in the valley of the Conewago, and to know that 
the patrols, on crossing the border, have found no hostile 
troops. For these reasons, Lieut. B and Sergt. C are ordered 
to send messages to meet the squadron. 

At least six men must go with the leader of each of the 
above patrols, as a message requiring a double messenger 
(in hostile coimtry) is required from each patrol; also 



164 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

enough men to keep up the observation, after one additional 
message has been sent, should be provided. As patrols of 
this size will probably just be able to do the work required 
of them, they should not be larger. Larger patrols are more 
conspicuous, and, what is worse, the detachment of large pa- 
trols soon greatly depletes the effective strength of the main 
fighting force. 

Until the enemy has been encountered it is best to keep 
a small patrol well m front of the advance guard. Such a 
patrol will greatly facilitate the orderly march of the column. 
Knowing that the comitry for 2 or 3 miles in front of the 
advance guard is passable, apparently free of the enemy, 
and contains no important and unexpected conditions 
to be met by the command, the commander can designate 
crossroads in advance where patrols are to send reports; 
can make his march at a regulated gait; can stop to water, 
in security, at the most favorable place; and can be advised 
of broken bridges or impassable places in the road in time 
to turn the column off by a passable route without coimter- 
marching. Such a patrol lends security to the column, but, 
above all, it conduces to an orderly, well-regulated march, 
which conserves the strength of the command. 

It is quite possible that the advance guard commander 
would send this patrol ahead without specific orders; 
but the practice of sending such a patrol ahead of the 
advance guard is not sufficiently well established in oiu* serv- 
ice to make it certain that he would do so. Hence, Maj. A 
gives specific instructions to the advance guard commander 
to have a small patrol precede the advance guard. 

Wlien the commander marches at the head of the main 
body it is usually better to tell the advance guard commander 
at what rate to march, rather than impose on him the very 
difficult task of regulating his inarch on the head of the 
main body. The latter method is difficult and imsatis- 
factory, and requires the advance guard commander to 
keep his attention to the rear instead of to the front, where 
it should be centered . 

When near the enemy, cavalry commands smaller than 
a brigade must not be hampered by wheeled transportation. 
If a severe encoimter is to be anticipated, extra ammu- 
nition must be issued before starting and carried on the 
horses. If supplies can not be brought up in the evening, 
the cavalry must live off the country. The mission, how- 
ever, must be borne in mind when making a decision about 
transportation. For example, a squadron sent to a distance 



BECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 165 

to work some particular destruction to the enemy's line of 
commimications, might be obliged to carry witli it the neces- 
sary tools and explosives, even though the only practicable 
method of so doing would be in wagons. 

Situation (continued): At 5.30 a. m. the squadron started 
pursuant to above order. 

Required: Conduct of the advance guard mitil a point 2 
miles north of the Conewago is reached, nothing of impor- 
tance having been discovered in the meanwhile. 

At 5.30 a. m. Capt. A, commandmg Troop A, momits his 
troop and issues the foUowmg order: 

To troop, verbally: 

Our detachment marches north to-day by the main road (pointing), 
which passes through the villages of Table Rock and Center Mills and leads 
to Carlisle, about 30 miles north of here and garrisoned by the enemy. It 
is called the Carlisle Road. 

Our squadron as independent cavalry, precedes the detachment by a 
few miles and marches by the route that will be taken by the detachment. 
The squadron will make 4 miles per hour, including halts. 

This troop will be the advance guard for the squadron. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C, with patrols, are now out to the flanks of our route. 

Corpl. X, with four men, you will go ahead of the troop, making about 
6 miles per hour till Conewago Creek is crossed, and thereafter about 4 
miles per hour. About 1 mile north of Gettysburg the road forks; take the 
right-hand road, which goes through Table Rock and Center Mills. You 
will give me prompt warning of the appearance of any hostile troops, and 
also promptly report any impassable places in the road, or information of 
anything else which will interfere with the march of the squadron. If not 
recalled before that time, you will halt about 10 miles north of Conewago 
Creek and send a messenger for orders. Move out. 

Capt. A then placed himself at the head of the troop and 
commanded, "Right by twos; march." 

The country around Gettysburg is friendly. If any enemy 
were in the immediate vicinity his presence would have been 
reported. The advance guard formation will therefore be 
gradually assumed, but need not be fully developed for the 
first few miles. To send out flankers or flank patrols at 
first, will unnecessarily weary that many men and horses. 

Cavalry ordinarily marches in column of twos when far 
from the enemy, and when the number of troops that must 
use the road is not so large as to necessitate shortening the 
column. This formation is less fatiguing to both men and 
horses. 

When the road fork where two Carlisle roads branch came 
in sight, Capt. A ordered: 

Sergt. T, we will halt here for 10 minutes. Take four men and go ahead 
about 400 yards as march outpost. When the march is resumed you will 
act as point, keeping about 400 yards ahead of the troop. I will send out 
connecting files. 



166 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Then to one of his trumpeters: 

My compliments to Maj. A, and say that the advance guard is halting 
for 10 minutes. After delivering the message return to me here. 

Capt. A then signaled, "Halt; dismount," and ordered: 

Corpl. W, take three men and follow that road which branches off to the 
left. March on that road. It goes almost due north till you reach Ben- 
dersville, which is nearly 10 miles from here. You will pass through a 
small town called Biglerville, about a mile north of the Conewago. Do not 
confuse the two places. If nothing has happened by the time you reach 
Bendersville, you will bear to the east till you reach the road on which the 
squadron is marching. You may encounter some part of Sergt. C's patrol, 
which is operating in that direction. Make about 5 miles per hour. 

I want information of the appearance of any parties of the enemy; also 
a report on the condition of the bridge over the Conewago and the condition 
of the roads. After you are well across the Conewago I want to hear from you, 
whether you have anything to report or not. You can send a single mes- 
senger, as the squadron will not be far from you. The road on which the 
squadron is marching will never be over 2 miles to the east of your route. 
If you make 5 miles per hour, any messenger you send should reach any 
point on the squadron's route at about the same time the squadron reaches 
the same point. 

About 10 minutes after halting, Capt. A signaled, "Mount; 
forward; march." He moved at a trot from time to time 
when road conditions warranted it. 

In this way he is progressing at about 5 miles per hour 
while moving. This will allow for hourly halts when a de- 
sirable location is reached, and will also allow for a stop to 
water the horses when they have marched far enough to 
drink well. In this way his rate of march will average about 
the desired 4 miles per hour. 

The "hourly halts" will not be made exactly at a definite 
time, as is done in a long column, but when a defensible 
locality is reached after the time for such a halt. 

At the road junction, 2 miles north of Gettysburg, a patrol, 
of Corpl. S and three men, was sent out to go by way of 
Goodintent School and Bender's Church, with orders similar 
to those of Corpl. W's patrol. 

Troop A consisted of 3 officers and 8G men. They were 
distributed as follows: 

With the wagons, quartermaster sergeant, two cooks, wagoner 4 

Captain's trumpeters 2 

In ranks: 

First platoon, Lieut. D and 20 men (and 1 officer) 20 

Second platoon, first sergeant, commanding, 20 men 21 

Third platoon, Sergt. R, commanding, 18 men 19 

Fourth platoon, Lieut. B, 20 men (and 1 oflScer) 20 

Total 86 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 167 

At this time they are distributed as follows: 

Patrol to northeast, Lieut. B and 6 men (and 1 officer) 6 

Patrol to northwest, Sergt. C'a patrol 7 

At brigade headquarters 10 

Total 23 

The above were all taken from the fourth platoon, except 
3 men required to complete the quota for brigade head- 
quarters, taken from the third platoon, thus reducing that 
platoon to 16 men. 

Later there were sent out (men) : 

Patrol to front 5 

Point 6 

Patrol via Bendersville 4 

Patrol via Bender's Church 4 

18 

These details used up the third platoon and required one 
additional man from the second platoon. So out of his 
troop Capt. A now has left with him one officer, the two 
trumpeters, and the first and second platoons, less one man 
on patrol and two connecting files. 

When Capt. A, at the head of the main body of his troop, 
reached the farmhouse on top of the ridge 500 yards south 
of Table Rock schoolhouse (4| miles north of Gettysburg) 
he signaled "Halt," and ordered: 

Sergt. R take two fours from the second platoon as advance party from 
here on. For the present, precede the troop, water when you cross the creek 
ahead, and then go on to the top of that hill [pointing to hill 646, 1,200 
yards north of Table Rock — see 3-inch map], and act as march outpost 
while the troop waters. Send patrols to reconnoiter one-half mile to each 
flank of your route as you ascend the opposite slope of this valley. Halt on 
top of the hill I pointed out and remain there till ordered to move forward. 
The point is placed under your orders. Notify Sergt. T to that effect. 

Note. — The map shows in tliis vicinity two hills 646 and 
four hills 647. When one is mentioned the student should 
. be sure he finds the right one. 
Then to Lieut. D : 

Take two orderlies with you and ride northeast behind this ridge. 

Thoroughly reconnoiter, through your glasses, the valley of the Conewago. 
Rejoin me at Table Rock, where I will be in about 20 minutes. (Lieut. D 
rejoined at Table Rock, having observed nothing.) 

Here we have illustrated the advantage of Maj. A's method 
of giving his advance guard orders to make a certain average 
speed, and then allowing the advance guard to suit its march 
to conditions. A march in set formation, conducted by a 
commander at the head of the main body, would not per- 



168 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

mit of a valley like this being properly reconnoitered, and 
of placing troops of the command on the opposite crest 
before the whole squadron was badly exposed to unexpected 
artillery, or even infantry fire. In such a formation, with 
a commander striving to keep set distnaces, the main body 
of the squadron might easily be surprised by fire at 500 
yards from an enemy concealed in the small woods 600 
yards west of Table Rock, whose presence there the advance 
guard had had no chance to discover, and against whom it 
would be very difficult to take effective action. 

Situation (continued): The march of the advance guard 
continued witliout incident. Capt. A halted the bulk of the 
troop on hill 646 (1,200 yards north of Table Rock), with the 
advance party on hill 647 (one-half mile beyond), while the 
squadron was watering near the ridge at Table Rock. 

While on hill 646 Capt. A, at 7.30 a. m., received the fol- 
lowing message by two men from Corpl. X's patrol (this 
message was sent from Mount Olivet schoolhouse — 3-inch 
map): 

At 7 a. m. two long railroad trains were unloading Red troops at Center 
Mills Station. WTiile I was watching them detrain a hostile squadron, 
escorting a battery, came into Center Mills from the north. All the troops 
of the hostile squadron were noticeably smaller than our troops. I will 
continue in observation, falling back toward the squadron if the enemy 
advances. 

Required: Action of the advance guard commander. 
Capt. A to the messengers from Corpl. X : 

Take your message on to Maj. A, who is near the bridge about one-half 
mile behind us. Report to Maj. A that I am advancing to the next ridge 
ahead. Rejoin the troop when Maj. A is through with you. 

Capt. A then signaled to Sergt. R (commanding the ad- 
vance party, now on hill 647), ''Forward; trot; march." 
He then commanded, "Mount; forward; march," and after 
descending the steep slope, "Trot; march." 

He halted the troop behind the crest of hill 647, that he 
might take a long look to. the north through his glasses be- 
fore exposing the bulk of his troop in the broad valley 
beyond. 

Situation (continued): As Capt. A dismounted to look 
through his glasses, Corpl. S's patrol rode up, having been 
directed back from 576 by Sergt. R. Corpl. S reported that 
there was no bridge, but a ford, at the crossing of the Cone- 
wago about one-half mile southeast of Bender's Church. 
The ford was in good condition, water about three feet deep. 
Looking through his glasses, Capt. A sees the following: 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 169 

Two Blue troopers trotting east about one-quarter of a mile 
west of 582; Sergt. R's party halted near 582; two or tlu-ee 
Blue troopers, hotly pursued by a small party of Reds, 
coming down the slope about 600 yards north of 582. (It 
later develops that the two troopers seen approaching 582 
from the west were messengers from Sergt. C, carrying also a 
message from Corpl. W. It was some moments, however, 
before this was learned). 

Required: Capt. A's actions and reasons therefor. 

AN ADVANCE GUARD ACTION. 

Capt. A mounted his horse and commanded, "Forward; 
gallop; march." 

REASONS. 

It is the business of the advance guard to clear the way 
for the main body. This can be done only by offensive 
action. In this case, offensive action appears doubly im- 
portant because it is necessary to gain working room for the 
detachment north of the Conewago. Now, at 7.35 a. m., 
thg head of the Blue Infantry should be near 608, about IJ 
miles south of the crossing of the Conewago at Table Rock. 
This assumes the infantry to have marched 3 miles per hour, 
while in motion, and to have made one halt. The enemy 
in strength is known to be only a short distance away. If 
the enemy advances it is probable that the squadron will 
have to fight a delajdiig action to enable the infantry to cross 
the Conewago before the crossings of that stream come under 
hostile fire. Each succeeding height to the north which is 
secured will be an advantage. On the other hand, as the 
enemy is known to have artillery, the squadron can not 
expose itself on the road in the broad valley north of hill 
647 till smaller bodies of Blue troops hold the ridge beyond. 
Capt. A made a try for these heights; it would not be equally 
advisable for Maj. A to risk the bulk of his squadron in the 
same way. 

Situation (continued) : As Capt. A passed 576, heavy firing 
was heard to his front, the sound of the shots showing that 
Sergt. R was engaged in dismounted action with a hostile 
force which had a greater volume of fire. 

Required: Capt. A's action and his reasons. 

Capt. A stopped his troop, cut the fence, and turned out 
of the road westward, halting his men behind the nose just 
northwest of 576. Leaving Lieut. D in command, he 
galloped forward through the fields toward Sergt. R's men. 



170 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

REASONS. 

Evidently the road ahead of Capt. A will be under fire. 
Should he continue forward on the road, he will suffer severe 
losses with nothing to be gained thereby. His attempt to 
get to the heights north of 582, ahead of the enemy, has 
failed, but the attempt was nevertheless justified. With 
the enemy, apparently in some force, already holding these 
heights, Capt. A, by moving to the nose west of 576, will 
be in a stronger position, suffer less loss, gain the ability to 
maneuver freely, and still command the road. He gallops 
to the front so he can see what is going od, and thus be able 
to plan for his next move. Lieut. D will be able to take 
immediate action with the bulk of the troop, should any- 
thing unexpected happen while Capt. A is gone. 

As soon as the troop was halted behind the nose, a combat 
patrol should have been sent to the higher ground just west 
of the troop. Perhaps Lieut. D will have the sense and 
initiative to do this; if not, it will be one of those things that 
are of no importance unless some move of the enemy brings 
out the omission, in which case both Capt. A and Lieut. D 
will be held to have been inexcusably negligent. In the 
hurry of a meeting engagement, such omissions are not 
infrequent with the best troops. They are sometimes very 
costly; so a commander must make every effort to avoid 
making them, thereby reducing the risks he runs to a 
minimum. 

SQUADRON SUPPORTS ITS ADVANCE GUARD. 

Maj. A, on receiving the message transmitted from Corpl. 
X's patrol, ordered the squadron, under Capt, B, senior cap- 
tain, to follow at a trot, and himself galloped ahead to join 
the advance guard. He reached hiU 647 just after Capt, A 
had started forward at a gallop. Maj. A halted to view the 
scene. He saw Sergt. R's party behind the farm buildings 
at 582, and a moment later saw it rush out and attack some 
Reds who were pursuing six or seven Blues down the road. 
(Corpl. X's party having joined the point in the valley, both 
were swept back on Sergt. R. Maj, A, however, knows only 
what he sees.) Upon Sergt. R's mounted attack the Reds 
retreated north on the road, and in a moment a hostile party 
of a platoon or more opened fire from near the orchard 650 
yards north of 582. Sergt. R's party hastily took cover 
behind the farm buildings, dismounted and opened fire. 



KECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 171 

As the squadron was heard trotting up in the rear Maj. A 
signaled "Halt," and continued in observation. In a few 
moments Capt. A was observed to have turned westward off 
the road. (Sergt. R's party now numbers — point, 5 men; 
advance party, 9 men; messengers from the west, 2 men — 
16 men, less such losses as he has suffered up to tliis time.) 
In this study the care of the wounded, burial of the dead, 
etc., will not be touched upon. It will be good practice for 
the student to assume a few losses as he goes along, and then 
decide upon the sanitary measures that should be taken. 

As Maj, A watched, the enemy redoubled his fire and two 
troops galloped down the slope off the road, taking shelter 
in the stream bottom just north of 582, while Sergt. R's party 
mounted and galloped through the fields to join Troop A's 
main body. 

Required: Action of Maj. A and his reasons. 

1. Sends combat patrol to hill 586, from there to send 
scouts toward Friend's Grove S. H., and another combat 
patrol to hiU 674 (one-half mile east of Biglerville), to send 
scouts from there toward Guernsey. 

2. Forms squadron in mass off the road, and orders all 
fences in the vicinity cut to permit easy passage of troops in 
any direction, 

3. Directs his adjutant: 

Tell Capt. A to occupy that nose (the one 1,000 yards northwest of hill 
647, where Maj. A now stands) dismounted. The squadron will stay here 
and will support Capt. A if he is attacked. 

REASONS. 

Knowledge that the enemy has infantry and artillery 
close by makes it imwise for Maj. A to attack the hostile 
Cavalry in the low gromid, which is commanded from the 
heights held by the enemy. The same knowledge makes it 
unwise for him to engage in the obvious turning movement. 
Such a turning movement wiU at once open the road and give 
the enemy a chance to occupy, unopposed, the heights which 
command the crossings of the Conewago. For the present 
Maj. A's mission requires him to stay between the enemy 
and the main body of the Blue detachment. Were the hos- 
tile squadron known to be, or strongly suspected of being 
unsupported, it would be Maj. A's duty to attack it and 
drive it off. He should then want to use a method which 
promised decisive results, not one that would merely result 
in driving the hostile cavalry from position to position in a 
long series of delaying actions. For such a quick and de- 



172 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

cisive result he would prefer mounted action if he could 
maneuver the enemy into dispositions that would admit of 
such action. 

PUBSUIT PREVENTED. 

Up till 8.30 a. m. the following had occurred: 

The hostile cavaby at first acted offensively, and it looked 
for a time as if it might walk into a trap, but at 8.10 a. ra. 
it was observed that it was withdrawing north. Pursuit 
was prevented by hostile infantry in position at the orchard 
650 yards north of 582. 

Reports had been received from Lieut. B and Sergt. C 
showing that up to 6.30 a. m. no enemy had been discovered 
in the area 3 miles north of Heidlersburg or 2 miles north of 
Brysonia. 

Sergt. C's messengers brought a message from Corpl. W, 
dated Biglerville, 7 a. m., saying that he had so far encoun- 
tered no enemy, and that the bridge over the Conewago 
Creek, south of Biglerville, was intact and the roads good. 
Nothing else had been heard from Corpl. Ws patrol. 

The following members of Troop A have now rejoined, viz: 

Messengers from Lieut. B 2 

Messengers from Sergt. 2 

Corpl. X and his patrol 5 

Point (Sergt. T). . . ., 5 

Advance party (Sergt. R) 9 

Corpl. S and his patrol 4 

Total 27 

The following are still out: 

Lieut. B 's party (and 1 officer) 4 

Sergt. C 'a party 5 

Corpl. W's party 4 

At brigade headquarters . 10 

Total (and 1 officer) 23 

Thus, this troop now has its first and second platoons 
complete, and a provisional third platoon, of a strength of 
19 men, which is composed of members of the original third 
and fourth platoons. 

Patrols do not always return at the expected time and 
place. Some are always out, some are lost, and some get 
captured. If too many detached parties are sent out, or if 
they are made too strong, the effective strength of an organ- 
ization is soon dissipated. A balance between what forces 
must necessarily be detached for reconnaissance and other 



BECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION. 173 

purposes, and what must be retained to give necessary fight- 
ing strength, should always be maintained. 

In the above study, the principle of making detachments 
of such strength as not to break up organizations has at 
times been violated. Thus Lieut. B's patrol was given a 
strength of six men. On the general principle that if half 
or more of an organization is detached, the whole should be 
sent, this patrol should have consisted of two fours. But 
for the purposes of this patrol, selected men and horses were 
required. If both Lieut. B and Sergt. C had been given two 
fours, there would have been an unnecessary loss of four 
men to the troop. Now, in spite of aU theories to the con- 
trary, the fours in a troop (squads under the proposed drill 
regulations) are never permanent. They are constantly 
changing in time of peace and even more so in time of war. 
There is always the hue of file closers into which an extra 
man or two can be introduced, and these extra men can be 
used the next time a small party is sent out. This principle, 
though an important one lor large organizations where the 
method of messing, supply, and administration is affected, 
is seldom of any importance in deaUng with fractions of a 
troop or company and never in dealing with detachments 
or fractions of a platoon. 

It will be good practice for the student to go over all 
the detachments made in this study, and decide whetJier in 
each case a larger or smaller detachment would have been 
better, and why. 

By 9 a. m. Maj. A had assembled the squadron near hill 
647, on the Table Rock- Center Mills road, and had posted 
one platoon of Troop D under an officer about 700 yards 
south of Guernsey, and the First Platoon of Troop A at 
Friend's Grove schoolhouse. Red infantry was in evidence 
on both sides of the road near the orchard 650 yards north of 
582, but did not attempt to advance beyond that point. 
It appeared to be intrenching. Nothing had been seen of the 
Red cavalry since it retreated north. 

At 9.30 a. m. the detachment commander, from the posi- 
tion of the cavalry on hill 647 on the Table Rock-Center 
Mills road, issued orders for an attack enveloping the hostile 
left, one infantry regiment to advance west of the road 
and one east of the road, with the reserve of one regiment 
following, echeloned behind the eastern outer flank of the 
regiment. 



174 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

FLANK PROTECTION. 

The orders for the quadron were : 

The cavalry will reconnoiter around both hostile flanks and will cover the 
right flank of oiu* attack. 

Just after receiving the above order Maj. A, squadron 
commander, received the following message from the leader 
of the platoon which was in observation to the right front, 
and dated 9.35 a. m.: 

At 9.05 a. m. the hostile squadron that retreated north from the front of 
our squadron retxu-ned south, moving on Friend's Grove echoolhouse. Ib 
now at the woods surrounding that schoolhouse and is making defensive 
preparations. This platoon remains in observation from hill three-quarters 
of a mile southwest of Friend's Grove schoolhouse. 

Required: Maj. A's estimate of the situation, decision, 
and orders. 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Mission. — Maj. A is ordered to "reconnoiter aroimd both 
flanks and cover the right flank of our attack. " He can have 
no doubt as to what is intended by the order for reconnais- 
sance. The latter part of his orders, however, require con- 
sideration in connection with the situation. The Blue de- 
tachment is attacking, intending to envelop the enemy's 
eastern flank. The hostile cavalry is in a position from which 
it can attack this enveloping movement either mounted or by 
fire. If allowed to stay near Friend's Grove schoolhouse, 
the hostile cavalry will be a great impediment to the Blue 
envelopuig movement. In order to assure the success of the 
Blue infantry attack, the Red cavalry must be dislodged. 
Maj. A's mission to cover the right flank of our attack, there- 
fore, makes it necessary for him to attack the hostile cavalry 
and drive it off, or keep it so busy that it can not interfere 
with the attack of the Blue infantry. 

The enemy. — ^Maj. A's immediate enemy is a squadron, 
reliably reported to be depleted m numbers. That it feels 
itself weaker than Maj. A's squadron is shown by its continu- 
ally taking a defensive attitude and avoiding a decisive 
action. Like Maj. A's squadron, it probably has a certain 
proportion of its strength detached for reconnaissance, etc. 
It evidently has as its mission the protection of the left 
flank of the hostile position, and it is not likely to be aided 
by its main body, except by artillery, and possibly by in- 
fantry fire, should Maj. A, in making his attack, expose his 
command. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANK PROTECTION. 175 

Our forces. — Maj. A's squadron has had some sUght initial 
successes and its morale should be good — somewhat better 
than that of the enemy. 

The Blue detachment is forming under cover for a well- 
organized concerted attack on the hostile position. It has 
its own duties to attend to, and the detachment commander 
expects Maj A to accomplish, without assistance, his part of 
the program. Maj A should not expect assistance, but he can 
notify the artillery commander when he is about to launch 
his attack and request artillery support. He can not be sure 
that the circumstances wiU not be such that the artillery may 
at that time be obliged to use aU its fire elsewhere. 

Terrain. — In general, the terrain consists of a series of 
ridges, running mostly east and west, parallel to the Cone- 
wago, with a branch vaUey extending north from the Cone- 
wago in the region just outside of the left flank of the hostile 
main position. These ridges offer cover for the formation 
and advance of the Blue infantry and give good artillery 
positions. The Blue artillery wiU most likely be posted 
behind the 646, Benders Church Ridge and between the points 
named. It will be 2,500 yards from the Red position, and 
2,800 yards from the grove held by the Red cavalry. 

The valley, just south of ridge 647-586, together with the 
trees just north of 534, and the vaUey just east of that point 
offer good cover for a flank march of the squadron, by which 
it can uncover the front of its infantry and reach a location 
from which an attack on the Red cavalry can be launched. 

In crossing the valley near 534 it is possible that the 
hostile artillery may locate the squadron ; hence a formation 
that is little vulnerable to artillery fire and a fast gait are 
to be employed there. 

The ground southeast of the hostile cavalry position 
offers good cover for a dismounted attack, or for a mounted 
turning movement by way of 587 or 632. The woods north 
of Beatrick will offer concealment and protection for led 
horses from hostile artillery fire. 

There are several v4re fences in front of the hostile posi- 
tion; that position is in the edge of the woods, and the enemy 
is known to be preparing defenses. All these conditions 
render it probable that, on arriving where the ground toward 
the enemy can be clearly observed, it will be found that a 
mounted attack has little prospect of success. 

Plans. — Maj. A must make plans for two things — recon- 
naissance around the hostile flanks and combat with the 
hostile cavalrv squadron. The reconnaissance around the 



176 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

hostile rignt and the protection of the Blue left can be 
readily provided for by the platoon of Troop D, now 700 
yards south of Guernsey. 

Under cover of an attack on the hostile cavalry, patrols 
can probably easily work around to the east and north of 
the hostile squadron and obtain good information. 

For the engagement with the hostile cavalry the following 
plans may be considered : 

(a) Move to the vicinity of hill 586 and from there protect 
the rear of the Blue's right flank. This does not completely 
carry out Maj. A's mission, and, in case of a Blue success, 
leaves the Blue squadron in a poor position from which to 
take up the pursuit, and the Red squadron in position to 
best protect its infantry. Rejected. 

(b) To move around the Red cavalry and thus turn 
it out of its selected position, or else gain the Red rear 
imopposed. All the near-by routes for such a movement are 
exposed to view, giving the Red cavalry plenty of oppor- 
tunity to change front or change position to meet the move- 
ment. The effect of the action of the Blue squadron would 
be delayed, united action in conjunction with the infantry 
attack would be lost, and, in the end, the Blue squadron 
would still be confronted by its opponent in a selected 
position. 

To move north around Chestnut Hill takes the Blue 
cavalry entirely out of the zone of the main action and may 
well result in keeping the Blue squadron entirely out of the 
fight at the critical stage, when every man is most needed. 
Rejected. 

(c) To move to the ridge northeast of 534 and engage 
the Red cavalry by fire only. This is less objectionable, but 
is playing a safe course for the cavalry at the expense of 
rendering the most effective cooperation to its infantry. 
Rejected. 

(d) To move to the ridge northeast of 534 and from 
there launch an attack in cooperation with the infantry 
attack. This promises to be the most effective com-se. 
Until the conditions which exist at the time the attack is 
launched are known, and the ground in front and flank of 
the hostile cavalry position has been reconnoitered, the 
exact nature of such an attack can not be determined upon. 
The chances are that it will be a dismoimted attack, with a 
mounted reserve acting by way of 587 as soon as success 
seems assured. Due to some move of the hostile cavalry 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION, 177 

in the meanwhile, mounted action may be possible. Mounted 
action will be preferred if it has any chance of success, as it 
is quicker and more effective. 

DECISION. 

To issue orders for reconnaissance at once, and then march 
the squadron under cover, changing formation when neces- 
sary, to the ridge northeast of 534, for the purpose of launch- 
ing a dismounted attack from there. The Blue artillery 
to be notified when the attack starts and artillery support 
requested. It will not be relied upon, as the artillery may 
be otherwise fully occupied. 

ORDERS. 

To his adjutant, verbally: 

Send me a noncommissioned officer and two privates for messenger 
service. 

Maj. A then writes the following message: 

From Fii'st Squadron, No. 6 
To lieutenant Y, Tr. D. 

1 mile north of Table Rock, Pa., 

25 November, 1915, 9.40 a. m. 
One-half mile south of Guernsey. 

Our detachment attacks hostile position three-quarters of a mile east of 
Guernsey. Give Gen. A prompt information of any hostile move by way 
of Guernsey. He will be found near the Table Rock-Center Mills road. 
You will send patrols to reconnoiter in rear of the hostile right. 

A, Major. 

The above is sent by the noncommissioned officer and the 
two men as soon as they report. 
Maj. A then orders, verbally: 

Capt. B (senior captain), march the squadron behind this ridge to that hill 
[pointing to 586]. I will meet you there. 

COVERING THE FRONT. 

Accompanied by his staff and a couple of orderlies, Maj. A 
then rapidly joins the platoon at hill 586 and orders verbally: 

Lieut. D, the squadron is marching on that woods [pointing to woods one- 
half mile northeast of 534]. Your platoon will precede the squadron. Cuta 
way 100 yards broad in each fence and reconnoiter through the woods. I 
will give you further orders when the squadron reaches the woods. 

PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK. 

As Capt. B approaches with the squadron it is formed in 
column of troops, and after Lieut. D has cut the fences and 
reconnoitered the woods, it is marched at a trot in column of 
98755°— 17 12 



178 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

troops to the woods. This formation is used as being the 
one least vulnerable to possible artillery fire. 

Just before leaving hill 586, Maj. A selects a noncommis- 
sioned officer and two men from the leading troop and orders : 

Remain here iu observation. Notify both Gen. A and myself, promptly, 
of any movement of the enemy which you are able to observe. Gen. A will 
likely be found neai" that hill [pointing to 646]. 

Arriving at the woods further orders, including those for 
reconnaissance around the hostile left, wiU be issued accord- 
ing to the circumstances existing at that time. 



PART VI.— CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON). 



Mounted Action by a Squadron, 
situation. 

The Pennsylvania-Maryland State line is part of the 
boundary between hostile States — Red, north; Blue, south. 
War was declared October 6. Red troops are concentrating 
at York. Red infantry is reported near Gettysburg, and 
about a squadron of Red cavalry was known to be at Littles- 
town at noon, October 6. 

Blue troops are concetitrating at Frederick, and a brigade 
of Blue infantry at Woodsboro has sent the Third Battahon, 
Third Infantry, to the vicinity of Taneytown to watch the 
railroad. The First Squadron, First Cavalry, Maj. A com- 
manding, is temporarily attached to this brigade 

The squadron camped the night of October 6-7 about 3 
miles east of Harney (800 yards north of hill 567, which local- 
ity is just south of the boundary). It had instructions to 
watch the boundary, but not to cross into Red territory 
without orders. 

At 10 p. m., October 6, Maj. A received the following order 
from the brigade commander, dated Woodsboro, Md., 6th 
October, 1913, 9.30 p. m.: 

It is reliably reported that a squadron of Red cavalry, coming from the 
direction of Littlestown, camped at dusk this evening about 1 mile south- 
west of Germantown; also that a brigade of Red infantry is now at Gettys- 
burg and will probably march to-morrow to Littlestown. Move early to- 
morrow, defeat this cavalry, determine the strength of any hostile columns 
moving from Gettysburg toward the east or southeast. Send reports to 
Taneytown. 

In compliance with this order Maj. A made an early start, 
and at 5.45 a. m., October 7, halted the squadron on the 
Palmer-520 road (road fork 520 is 1| miles a Httle east of 
south from Germantown and 300 yards west of D. Spangler), 
at a point about 2 miles south of Germantown, to await re- 
ports from patrols sent out before daylight. The advance 
guard first platoon. Troop A, Lieut. W) is at 520, with a 
patrol of three men, at the road fork just east of the D. 

179 



180 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Spangler house, and the point, consisting of one noncom- 
missioned officer and five men, at road fork 561 (west of 520). 

The rest of the squadron (less second platoon, Troop A, 
on patrol duty) is in column of twos, the head about halfway 
between Palmer and 520. The field and combat trains, 
under the squadron quartermaster and commissary, have 
been sent to Taney town. The extra ammunition in the 
combat wagon has been issued to the men and is being car- 
ried on the horses. Between 5.45 and 5.50 a. m. Maj. A, 
who has his adjutant, sergeant major, and Lieut. W with 
him at road fork 520, receives the following information: 

From Sergt. K's patrol, 1 mile southeast of Germantown 
(road fork 547): 

Baltimore Pike, this vicinity, and road leading from Germantown are 
clear of enemy. I remain in observation. 

From Lieut. L's patrol, hill 606 (1 mile west of 520) : 

A squadron of hostile cavalry is just starting to break camp in an open 
field three-quarters of a mile northeast northwest of here. There is a 
farmhouse just north of the camp and another (Collins) several hundred 
yards to the southwest of the camp. Can see an outguard near the Trustle 
house. Another outguard was at road fork (586) three-quarters of a mile 
north of Trustle, but it has been withdrawn toward the camp. I remain 
here in observation. (Sent 5.40 a. m.) 

From Sergt. M's patrol at woods west of G. Hoffman: 

Can see hostile outguard at the G. Hoffman house and another at west 
edge of woods north of the Strangler house. I remain in observation. 
(5.30 a. m.) 

Required: 1. Maj. A's estimate of the situation. 
2. Maj. A's action and orders at this time. 
Maj. A has 3" map of Gettysburg with him. Weather 
fair after a rain; wind from northwest. 

MISSION. 

Maj. A's mission is to defeat the hostile caralry. Until 
this is doue his task of finding out what troops are moving 
from Gettysburg toward the east can not be accomplished. 

THE ENEMY. 

All reports received seem to confirm the belief that the 
hostile cavalry consists of but one squadron. If Maj. A can 
defeat it or drive it away, the remainder of the task ought 
to be easy unless other hostile cavalry should appear on the 
scene. 

The enemy has no artillery, and no machine guns have 
been reported. His nearest infantry supports were at Get- 



CAVALRY COMBAT. 181 

tysburg when last reported. The hour is po early that there 
is little likehhood of these having yet left that place. 

What are the intentions of the hostile cavalry commander? 
He has probably been sent to watch tlie frontier west of 
Littlestown, or to cover the march of the hostile infantry, 
which, it is reported, will take place to-day from Gettys- 
burg to Littlestown. 

OUR FORCES. 

Maj. A can expect no reinforcements. Only about one- 
fourth of Troop A is absent on patrol duty. Another pla- 
toon is in the advance guard. 

The roads and weatlier are excellent. The absence of 
dust will favor the movements of the Blues. Everything 
seems to indicate that they are not yet discovered by the 
Reds. A successful march has been accomplished without 
mishap. Information of the enemy is definite. The men 
are in good spirits. To reap the full benefi.t of these advan- 
tages, Maj, A must attack at once. 

TERRAIN. 

The terrain is rolling and in many places wooded, thus 
favoring dismounted action. Numerous fences would seem 
to limit the chances for mounted action, though there is con- 
siderable open ground near the place where the camp is 
reported to be. Maj. A does not need to worry about his 
line of retreat. His cavalry is so mobile that it can avoid 
any infantry that is likely to appear. Unless there is more 
Red cavalry around than has yet been reported, Maj. A 
need not fear about his retreat in open country, even if 
defeated. 

Whether discovered or not, Maj, A must attack. His 
mission is to defeat the hostile cavalry. He can hope to do 
this only by offensive action. There are some circumstances 
which seem to favor a mounted attack. (Student should 
see if he can not enumerate them.) 

Maj . A would commit a serious error, however, if he decided 
upon a mounted attack, and gave orders for it at once. 
Thirty minutes will have elapsed from the time Lieut. L 
made his report, 5.40 a. m., until the Blues get within strik- 
ing distance. 

By the time he arrives at the point from which to launch 
the attack, the situation may have materially changed. The 
enemy may have discovered him, and be himself advancing 
to the attack. The enemy may be marching on the road. 



182 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

across the fields, or even retreating, and a blow ordered now 
may spend its energy in the air. The Reds may even have 
taken up a dismounted position in the woods near their 
camp. 

Maj. A must get closer before giving the order for the 
attack, so as to be able to make it conform to the conditions 
which exist at the moment of combat. 

PLANS. 

(a) He may move straight across country, over hill 606, 
on the enemy's camp. 

(&) He may advance via 520 and across country to 587, 
then along 587-586 road, and launch his attack from the 
woods west of 586. 

(c) He may advance via 561-588-598, and attack the 
enemy from southeast. 

(d) He may divide his forces and send part of his force 
by (b) and part by (a) or (c), or part by (c) and the remainder 
by (a) or (b). 

A detour to the north or south might also be made, but 
either would take too much time, and the squadron would 
be almost certainly discovered, particularly if the detour 
was to the north, via 549 and the Germantown, 563, C. H. 
Bang highway. 

Plan (a) : As the squadron passes over hill 606, it will be 
discovered. The hill is too far off to permit dismounted fire 
to be used effectively against a fleeting target. As soon as 
fire is opened, the enemy will seek shelter in the adj acent 
woods, and opportunity for mounted action will be gone. If 
it is intended to launch a mounted attack from hill 606, the 
fences and woods will delay the advance and give the enemy 
time to prepare for action. 

Plan (b): This plan has much in its favor. By moving 
northwest from 520, cover can be secured all the way to 587. 
From 587 to 586, corn shocks, woods, hedges, and other vege- 
tation along the sides of the road will give cover nearly all 
the way. The wind favors this route, as it will blow the 
sound away from the hostile camp. The hostile outguards, 
through error or otherwise, have been recalled from 586. The 
way seems to be open. It is as short in point of time as any 
other route. If the enemy is defeated he wiU be driven west 
toward the difficult, if not unfordable Rock Creek, and there 
will be a strong probability of his being cut off from his 
infantry supports at Gettysburg. 



CAVALRY COMBAT. 183 

Plan (c) : This route is guarded by the hostile detachment 
at the Trustle house. There are a number of fences to be 
cut. The worm fences, woods, and slope of the ground to 
northeast wUl interfere with dismounted fire, should it be 
necessary to resort to that form of attack. If the enemy is 
defeated, he wlQ be driven back toward his infantry supports 
at Gettysburg, or on the Baltimore Pike. 

Plan (d): Maj. A's force is too small to divide. He can 
afford to run no chance of failure to secure coordination. 
He must keep his command together and put every man in. 
As soon as a force is divided, the commander loses more or 
less control of that part not with him. In this problem, 
whatever happens will happen quickly, so that Maj . A should 
keep his troops in hand until the critical moment arrives. 

Plan (b), then, is the one that seems to give the best 
promise of success. 

In approaching 586 the gait will be a brisk trot. If the 
command moved at a walk there would be a loss of valuable 
time. The squadron at a gallop might become elongated 
and out of hand on the narrow country lane, 587-586. Maj. 
A should not waste time in riding to hill 606 or in assembling 
his officers. He has such an accurate map, and the informa- 
tion from Lieut. L is so definite, that he feels that he can act 
at once. 

DECISION. 

To move rapidly, with present advance guard formation 
from 520, across country to 587, and thence via 587-586 
road, to woods west of 586, and then to attack mounted or 
dismounted, or by combined mounted and dismounted ac- 
tion, as may be warranted by conditions found to exist 
upon arrival within striking distance. 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS. 

It is assumed that Lieut. W, the sergeant major, and the 
squadron adjutant are famihar with the three messages 
just received, and that the messengers who brought them 
are stdl with Maj. A. 

APPROACHING THE ENEMY. 

Maj. A, the squadron adjutant, Lieut. W, and the sergeant 
major are still at 520 and are famihar with the map, as they 
have been studying it while awaiting reports. Maj. A 
shows them the map and orders: 

The squadron wdll move at once by this route, at a brisk trot, to road fork 
586 (indicating 520, across country, 587-586 road on map and pointing out 



184 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

direction on the ground aa far as it can be seen). Lieut. W, your platoon 
will continue to act as advance guard. Have fence cut at 586, andrecon- 
noiter woods just west of there; but do not let your men show themselves 
west of the woods. Lieut. W, send Capt. B (senior captain) word to have 
main body follow advance guard at 400 yards, in column of fours. 

Lieut. X (squadron adjutant), you will take the point of the advance guard, 
now at 561 yonder (pointing to it), and precede Lieut. Ws platoon. You 
will be under his orders until the squadron reaches 586, when you will join 
me turning the point over to the noncommissioned officer now with it. 

I will gallop to 561, but ■will join advance party as it crosses the field 
toward 587. Move out. 

GUARDING THE FLANKS. 

Maj. A then turns to messenger from Sergt. K and orders: 

Go back to Sergt. K and tell him I am going to attack one squadron of the 
enemy which has been located about 2 miles west of road fork at which you 
left him. Tell him to move northwest, keeping near the Baltimore Pike, 
and look for hostile troops coming from Gettysburg by that road. 

Maj. A, Lieut. X, the sergeant major, and two orderhes, 
and the messengers from Lieut. L and Sergt. M, then gallop 
to near 561 and halt imder cover. 

Maj. A orders: 

Lieut. X, move out. 

Then turning to the sergeant major he orders: 

Inform Lieut. L that I attack at once from 586 and desire any new infor- 
mation he may have. Lieut. L's messenger will guide you. Hurry, time 
is important. 

Maj. A then gallops with his orderly to rejoin Lieut. W 
and the advance party. 

(Note. — On country roads, Cavalry will habitually march 
in column of twos when the military situation permits; but 
as soon as an encounter with the enemy appears probable, 
it must, at once, shorten its column so as to facilitate deploy- 
ment when the moment of action arrives. Maj. A has not 
yet informed Lieut. W that Lieut. L is to cover the left, as 
something may happen to prevent the sergeant major from 
fuiding Lieut. L. No word is sent to Sergt. K to cover the 
right, for the messenger may not fuid that sergeant, and, if 
he did, the latter's patrol could hardly arrive in the vicinity of 
549 in time to perform that function.) 

COMMENT. 

This study is adapted from an old problem used for 
the Army School of the Line. 

In solving this problem, the following were the princi- 
pal errors committed by students: 



CAVALRY COMBAT. 185 

1. Many made no special provision for protecting the 
flanks. Notwithstanding the instructions contained in 
Cavalry Drill Kegulations as to combat patrols, it is believed 
that specific orders should be .given in important cases, 
for protecting the flanks. 

2. Many issued their attack orders from road junction 
520. This is a decided error. The last news of the enemy 
was from Lieut. L at 5.40 a. m. It will be 6.10 a. m., per- 
haps later, before you arrive within striking distance. In 
that time the situation may change very materially. It 
certamly will do so if t>he enemy has discovered the Blue 
squadron. 

Maj. A can not determine the nature of the attack, nor 
how it wUl be made, until he arrives within striking distance. 
Should he do this, he would run the risk of precipitating an 
attack, which did not fit the actual conditions, and which, 
therefore, would probably result in defeat. 

3. Many sent word to the brigade commander as to what 
was about to happen. The brigade commander himseK 
sent you word where the enemy was to be found, and or- 
dered you to go and attack him. That you are doing it, 
will be no very important news to him. What he would 
like to know is how the fight came out. You ought to 
know this very soon, and will then have some real news 
for him. If it were a combat of large forces, or one which 
might last a long time, then it would be proper to send 
word to the brigade commander. 

4. Many assumed that Blue patrols had been seen. These 
patrols reached points of observation before daylight, and 
concealed themselves. The chances seemed good that they 
had not been discovered up to the time the problem opened. 

5. In sending messages to Lieut. L and Sergts. K and M, 
many did not make use of the messengers from them, who, 
of course, knew where to find them, provided they had not 
been forced to move in the meantime. 

6. Many depended upon Sergt. K with his patrol to pro- 
tect their right and sent him word to that effect. It is 
doubtful if he could have come up in time to do so during 
the attack. 

7. Many wasted time sending Maj. A to hiU 606 to look 
over the country. Maj. A had an excellent map and very 
definite information from Lieut. L. He could see very little 
more from hiU 606 than he already knew. It was consid- 
ered correct to send the adjutant or sergeant major to Lieut. 



186 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

L to find out if the situation had changed; but this could 
be done without delaying the advance. 

8. Many left the squadron halted and assembled troop 
commanders; some at 561, some at 520, some at B. D. 
Snyder's, and some even on hill 606. In each of these cases 
it was considered an error, because time was lost, and 
because the moment had not arrived for giving the attack 
order. 

Situation (continued) : At 6.12 a. m. Maj. A has his squad- 
ron massed just west of road fork 586, covered by the woods 
to the west. 

Lieut. W with the advance guard, now reduced to about 
eight troopers, is about 150 yards to the left front of the 
squadron. Patrols from the advance guard cover, from 
concealed positions, the northern, western, and southern 
edges of the woods (woods north of the Faulk house). 

Maj. A is at the western edge of the timber with his 
adjutant, sergeant major, and several orderlies. 

He sees the Red squadron in an open field about 600 
yards to the west. The guidons have their places in column 
facing east, and a few dismounted men have fallen in along- 
side the guidons; the other men seem to be busy saddling. 
The last wagon has just pulled out of the field onto the 
country lane leading from the farmhouse just north of the 
camp to the main highway 400 yards farther north (Ger- 
mantown-563-C. H. King road). 

Apparently the enemy does not suspect the presence of 
the Blue squadron. 

Required: Maj. A's orders: 

INSTANT ACTION REQUIRED. 

Maj. A decides to attack, mounted, and at once. He 
rides back to the squadron accompanied by his adjutant, 
sergeant major, and orderlies, sending one orderly to Lieut. 
W with following order : 

Tell Lieut. W to report to me at the squadron at once. 

The squadron is in order from right to left Troops D, C, 
B, A. 

ORDERS FOR MOUNTED ATTACK. 

Assuming all captains to be at their posts, Maj. A signals 
them to join him in front of the center of the squadron and 
issues verbal orders as follows : 

The hostile squadron is in an open field about 600 yards west of these 
woods. The guidons are mounted, but the rest of the men are leading into 



CAVALRY COMBAT. 187 

line or saddling. The guidons are facing this way. The wagons have left 
camp and gone behind the woods just north of camp toward the main road. 

We will attack the hostile squadron at once, mounted. Troops D and C, 
Capt. D (senior to Capt. C), commanding, will form the attacking line. 
Capt. D, take advantage of that opening in the woods 150 yards to our front, 
and attack the enemy in close order, mounted, as soon as you clear the woods. 
Lieut. X (squadron adjutant) will accompany you to point out the enemy's 
position. 

Capt. B, your troop will be the support, and will follow the attacking line 
at 150 yards, looking out for the right flank. 

Capt. A, your troop (two platoons) will be the reserve and will follow the 
attacking Une at 400 yards, echeloned behind the left flank. Lieut. W, 
you, with the former advance guard, will cover the left flank. Signal 
nearby patrols to join you. 

I will be with the reserve. Move out at once. 

COMMENT. 

(a) Many students lost time sending for troop commanders 
to come to the westeiTi edge of woods. The situation is so 
clear that the order to attack can be given at once. The 
adjutant or sergeant major can be sent to accompany the 
commander of the attacking line and point out the enemy 
to him. 

(6) Many gave no task to Lieut. W and his eight men. 
Give every part of your command something to do. 

(c) Many did not protect flanks. (See 1 above.) 



PART VII.— CAVALRY REGIMENT. 



Combat by a Regiment. 

SITUATION (blue). 

Conewago Creek divides the Red (northern) and the Blue 
(southern) States. A Blue division is concentrating 15 miles 
south of Gettysburg. It having been reported that the 
enemy was advancing from the northeast, the First Blue 
Cavalry was ordered to move via Littlestowoi and New Oxford 
to determine the nature of the hostile movement. 

Troops A and B, as contact troops, moved out in advance — 
Troop A via the valley of Little Conewago, Troop B by the 
high ridge 2 to 3 miles farther west. 

At 10 a. m., October 5, when the regiment, marching on 
the Kingsdale-Littlestown road, has just cleared Kingsdale, 
Col, A, commanding the regiment, learned that Trooj) A had 
encomitered hostile cavalry, estimated at more than a 
squadron, and was falling back by the 566-Lefevre road. 
(566 is just west of Bashore Mill.) 

REQUIRED. 

Col. A's action at this time and his reasons therefor. 

SUPPORTING A CONTACT TROOP. 

It is to be assumed that Col. A was marching in regular 
march formation with an advance guard and the usual atten- 
tion to covering his flanks. Probably he would send out 
patrols to the flanks, from time to time, whenever the ground 
indicated that they could get a good view, or roads jomed his 
route which could not be efficiently reconnoitered from some 
nearby high point. This march protection for the column 
is independent of the contact troops, which are not concerned 
with protecting the main body of the regiment. His action, 
then, is to direct his advance guard to march toward Troop 
A, and to signal for increased gait. If, on account of narrow 
roads, the regiment has been marching in column of twos. 
Col. A will also signal "Form fours." 

189 



190 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

KEASONS. 

Contact troops are sent out to find the enemy's forces. 
They are made strong enough to drive off hostile patrols 
and thus uncover larger forces. When one such contact 
troop encounters superior force, it can gain no further in 
formation till the superior hostile force is disposed of. It 
must be reinforced to do this. When one contact troop 
finds strong opposition and the others do not, the chances 
are that the main force is on the route where the enemy 
has developed strength. It would therefore be foolish to 
divide the regiment and run the chance of being defeated 
in detail. 

If, on the other hand, the force uncovered by the contact 
troop is only a fraction of the hostUe force, Col. A will have 
great superiority over the few troops of hostile cavalry 
and can quickly dispose of them; thus having his whole 
force ready to meet the other forces o To drive off hostile 
cavalry reported as more than a squadron, it is evident that 
a fight will be necessary. The more quickly Col. A can 
bring on this fight the less the enemy will be able to prepare 
for it, so the regiment should be closed up ready for quick 
action and the gait increased as much as the terrain permits. 

Situation (continued) : Col. A pushed rapidly forward on 
the Littlestown-622-623 road with the first squadron (less 
Troops A and B) as advance guard, Maj. B commanding. 

When Col. A, at the head of the main body, was about 
halfway between 622 and 623, he saw his advance guard 
form for a charge just south of hill 636 and charge over the 
hill (this point is 800 yards east of the eastern exit of Littles- 
town). 

Required: Col. A's action and his reasons therefor. 

ACTION WHEN THE ADVANCE GUARD IS SEEN TO FORM FOR 

ATTACK. 

On seeing the advance guard form for a charge. Col. A 
turned the head of the column toward the hill occupied by 
the advance guard and ordered, ''Second Squadron, line of 
fours; gallop." Then to his adjutant, "Third Squadron to 
form line of fours at a gaUop 100 yards in rear of the Second 
Squadron." Then to the lieutenant colonel, "Lead the 
regiment at a trot toward that hill [points to the one just 
left by the advance guard]. I will gallop forward to get a 
look from that hill." 



CAVALRY REGIMENT, 191 

REASONS. 

The opportunities for a mounted charge are quickly 
lost if any hesitation or delay occurs. When the advance 
guard commander saw his opportunity he jirobably had no 
time to wait till he could report to the regimental com- 
mander. 

Troops which have just engaged in a mounted charge 
are in great disorder and are peculiarly liable to be over- 
thrown by a counter attack, even by a very small number 
of formed hostile troops. Whenever nearby cavalry is seen 
to launch a charge it is, therefore, made the duty of all 
mounted troops observing the charge to hasten to the sup- 
port of the charging cavalry, and thus be able to clinch the 
victory; or in case of a repulse, to cover the reforming of 
the charging line. There is no time for sending formal 
messages or requests for assistance; or usually, even to 
notify adjoining commanders or nearby superiors of the 
intention to charge. 

Col. A sees that his advance guard is about to engage in 
mounted combat. He therefore orders his troops into a 
compact formation from which he can quickly act in any 
direction, moves his troops as rapdily as practicable toward 
the combat, and himself hastens forward to gain a view 
of the situation so as to be able to launch his troops in the 
most favorable direction and formation. He should have 
marched with the support of his advance guard when 
action was imminent, for there he could get more prompt 
information of the enemy and could take the necessary ac- 
tion more quickly and with a better understanding of the 
situation. 

Situation (continued) : Before Col. A reached hill 636, the 
advance guard came back over the hill and started to reform. 

On reaching the top of the hill Col. A saw the situation as 
follows : 

Advance guard reforming just behind the crest of the hill. 

Second squadron in "line of fours," about 500 yards south 
of hiU 636, moving forward at a trot with the machine-gun 
troop on its left. 

Third squadron forming in line of fours at a gallop in rear 
of second squadron. 

Troop A, dismounted and deployed on the east shoulder 
of hill 646 (near Lefevre), firing to the north. 

A hostile firing line, about 200 yards long, just leaving the 
west edge of the woods between hiU 636 and road-junction 
609, and moving toward hill 636 at a double time. 



192 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

A mounted column, just appearing over the steep slope 
which hides from liis view the bend of the road 200 yards 
north of Valley Grove schoolhouse, is moving southwest at 
a trot, in column of fours, the head of the column approach- 
ing the lane that leads west from 609. It stretches north 
from there toward the bend of the road. Farther north on 
the road, where it can be seen, and extending to 566, a hostile 
cavahy colunm, apparently part of the same column, seems 
to be trotting south in column of twos. 

As Col. A passed the advance guard commander, the latter 
reported : 

I smashed the leading hostile troop, but two others were in the woods 
where I could nDt get at them. 

Required: Col. A's estimate of the situation, decision, and 
orders. 

Note. — The terrain is to be taken exactly as shown on the map. Corn ia 
standing, but it is of poor quality and sparse growth. Other crops have 
been cut. Leaves have begun to fall but trees are not entirely bare. 

Col. A finds himself in a position facing such rapid changes 
that his success will depend entirely upon the extent to 
which he may possess that quahty of "coup d'oeil," so often 
spoken of as necessary in a good cavalry commander. In 
this map problem we attempt to follow in a deliberate 
manner the impressions made on his mind, the deductions he 
makes, and the decisions at which he arrives; though in 
reality, in the field, all of this would pass through his mind in 
a second or two. 

MISSION. 

Col. A's mission is to move via Littlestown and New 
Oxford in order to determine the nature of the hostile move- 
ment reported to be taking place in that direction. The 
information received at Littlestown does not change his 
mission, but indicates an obstacle to its accomphshment. 
The Blue commanding general evidently wishes the country 
reconnoitered as far as New Oxford. To determine the na- 
ture of the hostile movement, Col. A will need to know 
whether or not there are troops of any kind behind the cav- 
alry that has been encountered. To do this, it wiU probably 
be necessary to defeat the hostile cavahy. Col. A will never 
get information by defensive or timid action. He will also 
wish to prevent hostile reconnaissance of the Blue main body. 
The easiest and surest way of doing so is to defeat the bulk 
of the hostile cavalry. His immediate mission, then, pri- 



CAVALRY REGIMENT. 193 

marily resolves itself into defeating and driving back the 
hostile cavalry. 

The hostile force consists of a dismounted skirmish line 
about 200 yards long. This would indicate about 100 men, 
and together with horse holders, patrols, etc., would account 
for about two troops. (This assumes a skirmish line similar 
to the one used under Cavalry Drill Regulations, 1909. 
Should the more dense skirmish line of one man to the yard 
be the one employed, Col. A can, of course, see which is in use 
and would then reckon twice as large a force). One troop 
has just been dispersed. 

About 400 yards of mounted men, in column of fours, is 
about one squadron, and 1,000 yards of mounted men, in 
column of twos, is four or five troops. The accuracy of the 
last two deductions depends on the amount of elongation 
that has taken place in the hostile column. With Col. A on 
the ground, it would not be a case of measurement and cal- 
culation ; the impression that the enemy numbered about a 
regiment would be the same, but would be instantaneous. 

Whether or not the hostile cavalry covers other troops is 
Col. A's mission to find out. At any rate, no such troops 
are close enough at hand to take part in the impending 
action. The hostile cavalry is pushing forward with energy 
and determination, but its poor formation indicates that 
the Red commander, at least till the last few moments, has 
expected his advance guard to be ample to deal with the 
Blues in his front. The fact that the inhabitants are hostile, 
has undoubtedly assisted in keeping the Red commander in 
ignorance of the real situation. 

(Note. — Not to be too hard on the Red commander for being caught in 
such formation, we may note that, had he been two minutes earlier and 
Col. A two minutes later in changing from road formation, the situation 
would have been exactly reversed. Then the Blues, at the very least, 
would have lost their advance guard and Troop A, and would have had 
their further advance effectively blocked.) 

The Blue forces and their dispositions are stated in the 
problem. Troop A is probably firing at that portion of the 
enemy near the small woods. Col. A is 12 to 15 miles from 
supportiag troops. 

THE ENEMY. 

The enemy appears to be making a determined attempt 

to gain possession of hill 636. He has evidently been caught 

in a poor formation for fighting, and is trying to change 

formation at a gallop, while stiU advancing the head of his 

98755°— 17 13 



194 STUMES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

column on hill 636 at a trot. If left to continue these move- 
ments, the enemy's dismounted men v/ould reach hill 636 in 
400 yards-J-160, equals 2| minutes, and the head of his 
mounted column in 700 yards -^- 235, equals 3 minutes. 
The mounted column could accomplish this change of 
formation at a gallop en route. 

So far nothing has developed to show what was the 
original intention of the hostile cavalry, whether to seek 
information, cover hostile movements, or simply make a 
raid. 

TERRAIN. 

The immediate terrain consists of a hill, occupied by the 
Blue cavalry, with a comparatively gentle slope toward the 
enemy. The ground between the 566-Lefevre Road and 
the electric road is open, except for a small amount of corn 
of sparse growth, which will not greatly hinder movement, 
and for the small climip of woods, which is an obstacle to 
moimted movement in close formation, though foragers 
could easily pass through it. 

Fences on both sides of the 566-Lefevre Road and of the 
electric railroad would somewhat delay any mounted move- 
ment that required them to be passed, though the delay 
would be shght, for wire fences are serious obstacles to 
moimted movement only when they are mider effective fire. 

The lane west from near 609 is imfenced, while the one 
west from 619 is fenced with wire — what kind could not be 
told at the distance from which Col. A sees it. 

The slope of the groimd is nowhere too great for mounted 
action which is, therefore, suited to the terrain. From his 
horse Col. A can see all the ground in the vicinity, except a 
small piece behind the clump of woods, the bottoms of a 
few ravines, and the foot of one steeper slope. 

PLANS. 

1. Any move that Col. A can make, which does not con- 
template attacking and driving off the Red cavalry, will 
necessitate his giving up his mission. This is not to be 
considered. 

2. Col. A might dismount his whole force to fight on foot. 
This woidd be dangerous and, as it gives up the initiative, 
it also practically abandons his mission, and for no good 
reason. 

3. He might use partly mounted and partly dismounted 
action. For the moment Troop A is dismounted. It would 



CAVALRY REGIMENT. 195 

take some time to reach it with orders, and it may be doing 
effective work where it is now; hence this small fraction of 
the force should be the last to receive orders. As regards 
the balance of the regiment, to dismount Troops C and D 
would simply take time and place both men and led horses 
in the way of moimted action by other parts of the regiment. 
To use these two troops mounted against the hostile skir- 
mish line would stop it sooner, would probably be successful, 
and, if so, would give the greatest results. To wait for the 
machine guns to go mto action anywhere would simply 
waste time. The use of the combmation of dismomited 
with mounted action by the main body of the regiment is, 
therefore, to be rejected. 

4. Col. A may order Maj. B, with Troops C and D, to 
charge the hostile skirmish line and have him act at once. 
These two troops are re-forming. They can be rallied in a 
second or two for a charge, either in line or as foragers, 
while moving toward the enemy. To dismount they must 
get into regular formation and count fours, thus losing time 
while remaining in the way of the other squadrons. 

The formation of the approaching second squadron is 
favorable for a charge to the front, and there is nothing to 
be gained, and a good opportunity to be lost, by an attempt 
at a turning or enveloping movement. In fact, a charge 
straight to the front is bound to result in all the envelopment 
that would be useful. 

For such an attack combat patrols are necessary. Troop 
A sufficiently protects the right flank. The full view to the 
front and left front, taken together with the probable 
protection from that quarter of the left flanking group of 
the former advance guard, will be sufficient for the moment. 

Should the action continue for any length of time, a 
patrol should occupy hill 637, unless the flanking group of the 
former advance guard can be observed to have already done 
so. The left flank also has some protection from the two 
wire fences, though it must again be urged that the protec- 
tion from a rapid hostile advance afforded by wire fences is 
very slight, indeed, unless such fences can be brought under 
effective rifle fire. 

In going into action with his mounted troops. Col. A 
will find the machine-gim troop in the way if it is sent to hill 
636; besides, if placed on that hill, it can neither gain a 
field of fire unobstructed by our own troops, nor effectively 
assist in covering a possible reverse. 



196 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

In case of initial success, which is to be expected, an 
advance of Troop A north toward 5G6 will be likely to reap 
a rich reward. 

The second squadron will be ample for the first attack on 
the hostile column, and will be most effective on a compara- 
tively narrow front, say of two troops in the first line. This 
will leave the whole third squadron as a reserve with which 
Col. A can himself influence the action. Troop B is too 
far away to be recalled. Its existence might not even enter 
Col. A's mind at the present time. 

DECISION. 

Col. A decides to attack the enemy mounted and at once; 
to send Troops C and D against the hostile skirmish line and 
the second squadron against the mounted column; to use 
the third squadron according to the way the fight develops; 
to order the machine-gun troop into action near the railroad 
cut, but not to wait for it; and for the present, to leave 
Troop A where it is. It is taken for granted that a patrol 
from the advance guard has been on or near hill 637. 

Note. — Part of the above estimate had ah-eady been made by Col. A. 
Each event, as it came to his notice before and during the march, having 
left its impression. The remainder of the estimate and the decision in the 
field would be almost instantaneous. The object of map problems of tliis 
nature is to prepare the mind to make such instantaneous decisions, based 
on a quickly realized conception of the opportimity. In war, such decisions 
will have to be reached in a very short time. The commander's mind will 
act more quickly and logically under stress if peace time study has devel- 
oped the channels of thought which must be brought into play. 

DISPOSITION AND ORDER FOR THE ATTACK. 

To Maj. B, advance guard commander: 

Charge in two lines against that (pointing) skirmish line. Move at once. 

To Maj. C, commanding second squadron, wliich should 
arrive on the hill by the time Maj. B has started his charge: 

Charge in two lines. That mounted column ("pointing) your objective. 
Third squadron will be in reserve. 

To his adjutant: 

Have the machine-gun troop go into action from near that railroad cut 
(just west of hill 636). 

USE OF THE ATTACK. 

Further orders wOl depend on the result of the move- 
ments already ordered. The third squadron has not been 



CAVALRY REGIMENT. 197 

halted, being available for use as a reserve against any un- 
broken portions of the enemy, the led horses of the dis- 
mounted line, or any formed bodies of the enemy that may 
come forward from the road; or it may be sent in pursuit. 
On the first signs of success. Troop A will be mounted and 
sent in pursuit up the road. As soon as time permits. Troop 
B and the Blue division commander will be notified of the 
action and of its results. 



PART VIII.— LIGHT ARTILLERY. 



A Battery in Rencontre — Enemy on the Offensive. 

SITUATION. 

A Blue force, consisting of Third Infantry, Troop A, Third 
Cavahy, Battery D, First Field ArtOlery, under command of 
Col. A, is marching on Hunterstown via the Littlestown- 
Pleasant Hill Schooihouse-Boneauville Road. The coimtry 
is hostile to the Blues. 

Battery D is marching near the head of the main body. 
The reconnaissance officer with one scout and one signaller 
are with the reserve of the advance guard. 

At 9 a. m., when the head of the main body has reached 
the small creek 400 yards northwest of Pleasant Hill S. H., 
the cavalry advance party is stopped by rifle fire from the 
village of Whitehall. 

Upon hearing the firing, Capt. D, commanding battery, 
taking with him his executive officer and two musicians and 
the chief of fifth section who has with him the B. C. telescope, 
rides to the front with Col. A, who informs him that it is 
urgent that the march be continued and that an attack may 
be necessary. 

ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES. 

At 9.30 a. m., at the farmhouse 300 yards southeast of 
AUoway Creek, Capt. D receives the following order from 
Col. A: 

About a regiment of infantry with a battery of artillery is taking up a 
position on both sides of this road near 637. A part of our advance guard 
is in the village of Whitehall. We will attack the enemy at once, envelop- 
ing his left flank. Place your battery in position on this side of Alloway 
Creek and support the attack. Develop the enemy's artillery as soon aa 
possible. 

Capt. D also hears Col. A's orders for the disposition of the 
other troops in the attack. 

The artillery reconnaissance officer rejoined his captain 
and reported that he had been unable to locate the position 
of the hostile artillery, but that one of his scouts, at 9.15 
a. m., had seen artillery near the farmhouse southeast of 

199 



200 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS. 

Sweet Home schoolliouse and that it was moving toward 
St. Luke's church. 

The battery is halted at 598, while the head of the main 
body has arrived at Capt. D's position. 

Required: 1. Capt. D's estimate of the situation in so far 
as it relates to the disposition of his battery. 

2. Orders and messages issued by Capt. D in getting his 
battery into position. 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Requirement: 1. Capt. D's mission is to divert the atten- 
tion of the hostile artillery as soon as possible from the Blue 
infantry, and then to assist this infantry in its attack on the 
enemy's position, as soon as it comes within range of the 
enemy's rifle fire. 

2. The enemy's strength and position is better known than 
would, many times, be the case. Capt. D has been informed 
that our advance guard has observed about one regiment 
of hostile infantry deploying on both sides of the road near 
637; he knows, also, that the enemy has one battery of artil- 
lery, which was seen approaching St. Luke's church from the 
northwest at 9.15 a, m. It is not probable that this Red 
battery advanced beyond St. Luke's Church, as it would 
surely have been discovered had it done so. Neither is it 
likely it went back the way it came. The chances are that 
it is in readiness back of the ridge on which St. Luke's 
Church stands; but whether north or south of the road, and 
how far from the road, can not now be told. That it is not 
yet in position, may be inferred from the fact that the Blue 
infantry on the road, where it is certainly visible from St. 
Luke's Church, has not drawn its fire. 

It is almost certain that observers will be posted in the 
steeple of St. Luke's Church, or in the trees near that point. 
It will soon be hazardous for Blue troops to appear in vulner- 
able formation in possible sight of these enemy observers. 

3. Capt. D also has full information as to Col. A's inten- 
tions ; that the latter proposes to attack the enemy by envel- 
oping his left. Over what gromid wiU this attack pass ? In 
all likelihood, the frontal attack will be made along or near 
the Whitehall-St. Luke's Church Road, on either or both 
sides, while the enveloping attack will move over the ground 
in the vicinity of the stream lines northeast of Shebley's. 

4. Capt. D clearly sees that his mission requires him to 
select a position for his battery which will admit of the fol- 
lowing conditions being fulfilled: 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 201 

(a) Bring an effective fire on the neighborhood of St. 
Luke's Church and of road junction 637. 

(b) Have an observation station in connection with this 
position, from which can be seen the vicinity of St. Luke's 
Church and of 637, and the ground over which the Blue 
attack will pass. 

(c) Be out of view of the enemy observers in steeple of 
St. Luke's Church or trees or building near enemy's position. 

(d) Be capable of being quickly occupied and as far as 
possible in such manner that the enemy may nowhere see the 
battery. 

(e) And the position must, in accordance with Col. A's 
orders, be southeast of Alloway Creek. 

5. In the half hour which Capt. A has had since leaving 
his battery, not more than 10 minutes were needed to ride 
forward to his present position. He has had 20 minutes to 
spare which he has employed in reconnoitering neighboring 
positions, and receiving the report of his reconnoissance 
officer as to positions the latter had visited. With the 
knowledge obtained from these reconnaissances, and from 
his map, Capt. D, upon Col. A's orders, can at once decide 
as to the disposition of his battery. 

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE BATTERY POSITIONS. 

6. The following possible positions are considered by 
Capt. D: 

(a) Hill 627. The north end of this hill is bare and affords 
a position for either direct or mdirect fire, good place for 
observation station in trees on south end of hill. Can be 
approached under cover. Range to 637 about 3,850 yards, 
and 350 yards more to St. Luke's Church — rather long to 
obtain good results from shrapnel fire. A good place if the 
Blues were to fight a defensive action, but too distant for 
supporting an attack if a closer position can be found. 

(b) Hill 647. Bare sjwt about center of this hill, with 
trees or buildings on both sides, limiting field of fire. Top of 
hni quite flat; guns can not be run up readily for direct 
fire. Ranges to targets too groat. Similar to (a). 

(c) Saddle between hill 627 and Schild's hill. This posi- 
tion is so shallow — only 5 feet lower than the crest in front — 
that even after making allowance for crops on ground con- 
cealing the battery itself, the gun flashes would at once be 
located by hostile observers. 

{e) Near 610. This position can be quickly reached by 
going across country west of hill 627, the crops being probably 



202 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

high enough to conceal the movements of the battery. But 
a better route would be by the ravine east of hill 627, north- 
westwardly, past the group of houses northeast of Schild's, 
thence southwest along edge of woods. Another method of 
approach would be to pass Grawmer's on the road at a 
rapid gait, turning northeast up the ravine 300 yards north- 
west of that point. At the head of the ravine the walk 
should be taken, all men dismounted, and horses led in 
order to reduce the chance, of being seen. 

There is a good position for an observation station on 
Schild's house or the ridge in front of it; or, better, in one 
of the trees just northeast of Schild's. The woods here are 
heavy, and, at a distance, all trees in a wood look alike. It 
might be necessary to cut out a few branches to give the 
observer an unobstructed view, while still leaving him con- 
cealed, but this can be easily done. 

Range to 637 is about 3,050 yards — a good artillery range. 
But the position of a battery near 610, while not visible to 
an observer on the ground near 637 or St. Luke's Church, 
would probably be visible to an observer in the church 
steeple or in some of the trees near there. It would cer- 
tainly be betrayed by the flashes of the guns. 

(e) Ravine northwest of Grawmer's. This position would 
be a concealed one, which could be approached most of the 
way under cover, but on account of the ridge lines and houses 
in front and rear of this position, on which the enemy could 
accurately observe his fire, and the fact that the gun flashes 
would be visible and at once attract the enemy's attention, 
the position is a poor one. 

Positions c, d, and e have the worst feature an artillery 
position can have — lack of horizontal depth. Once located 
by hostile artillery, a battery in such a position can be kept 
inamobile as long as the hostile artillery chooses to maintain 
its fire. Even a direct-fire position should have depth, ena- 
bling the gmis to be withdrawn by hand to where the limbers 
may come to them. Generally speaking, a narrow ravine is 
a poor place for artillery. 

(/) In ravine of Alloway Creek. Not enough cover to 
permit position being reached, without long and delaying 
detours. 

ig) South of Pleasant Hill S. H.-Whitehall Road. Same 
objection as (/), with added one that no good observation 
stations exist, especially with reference to observing the 
progress of the enveloping attack. 



LIGHT- ARTILLERY. 203 

(h) Field 600-800 yards northeast of Schild's. This posi- 
tion can be reached under cover, via east side of hill 627 and 
houses on road northeast of Schild's. The woods in front 
make a perfect screen and afford some protection. Obser- 
vation station could be located in a tree on west side of these 
woods, and would give an excellent view of all the terrain of 
the expected action. 

Guns at the fence running north from the group of houses 
600 yards northeast of Schild's will clear the trees when laid 
for a range of 2,000 yards; about that required for the line, 
E. Ecker's-Whitehall-road fork 595, as short a range as is 
likely to be needed. 

7. If position 6 (h), is selected, limbers and combat train 
can be located on either flank of the battery, under cover 
from the enemy's observation, and behind the trees shelter- 
ing the battery from view, or behind the trees south of the 
road 610-633, west of north from hill 627. The latter posi- 
tion is best protected from possible hostile cavalry patrols. 

8. Capt. D considers the advisability of establishing an 
auxiliary observation station. Possible places are: 

(a) House about 300 yards northwest of road junction 
606; or in trees 300 yards west of this house, and north of 
Small's. 

(h) E. Ecker's. 

(c) House on hill 607, northeast of Whitehall S. H. 

(d) Whitehall. 

(e) House 1,000 yards southwest of Whitehall. 

Of these positions (a) appears the most promising, as 
giving a near view of the enveloping attack. It might, 
later, as events develop, be pushed forward. If the recon- 
naissance officer be sent to this place, he could, if communi- 
cation can be maintained, report as to the effect of the Blue 
artillery fire, the advance of the Blue infantry, counter 
attacks of the enemy or other hostile movements, etc. The 
reconnaissance officer and one signaller are present. A 
musician, as horse holder, can also be given him. The sig- 
naller, by utilizing wire fences and connecting them up 
across roads and open spaces with his buzzer wire, can 
estabhsh a telephone line with not too much delay. He 
might even find, for at least part of the way, existing farm 
telephone lines which he could use. Failing this, flag com- 
munication could be established with a party stationed at 
the Schild house. 

9. Capt. D sees no necessity to ride back and personally 
bring up his battery. His executive officer, whom he 



204 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

brought up with him for this purpose, and who has accom- 
panied him for the last half hour, becoming thoroughly 
oriented in tliis time as to the situation and his captain's 
views, can be given suitable instructions, and sent back to 
lead the battery into its position. 

10. It is not necessary for Capt. D to indicate the exact 
spot which the battery is to occupy. While this is fre- 
quently necessary when many troops are to be in the same 
neighborhood, there is no need to take up valuable time, 
when one battery, which has ample ground in which to man- 
euver, is the only one concerned. Capt. D can best employ 
his time, while his battery is moving into position, by estab- 
lishing his station and by careful, continuous observation 
of the terrain, endeavoring to locate as many hostile targets 
as possible. 

DECISION OF THE BATTERY COMMANDER. 

11. To post his battery 400 yards east of the woods north 
of 610; the battery observation station to be on west edge 
of same woods (near south end); reconnoissance officer to 
establish an auxiliary station at house northeast of Small's; 
limbers and combat trains to be south of the 610-633 road 
behind trees southeast of 610; an agent to be provided for 
Col. A; and, finally, the latter requested to furnish an 
infantry company as battery support. 

CONDUCT OF AN INFANTRY SUPPORT. 

12. The plan of the Blue attack, and the position of the 
leading troops in Whitehall indicate that the battery will 
soon be a mile behind the attacking infantry ; and if a support 
is not provided by Col. A, Capt. D will be justified in asking 
for one. A company would be ample, and would not draw 
too heavily on the attacking force, since part of it could 
be sent forward in case of need. The commanding officer 
of the company would, after consultation with the battery 
commander, be responsible for the posting of the support. 

A possible arrangement would be, one platoon at the 
house 450 yards north of road fork 599, patrolling to north 
and east; half a platoon at Grawmer's, and the other half 
at 633, patrolhng and observing to south and east; the re- 
mainder of the support in reserve at the house south of the 
battery. 

13. Some means of communication with Col. A is neces- 
sary; but Capt. D has reliable noncommissioned officers, 
one of whom can be detailed on this duty. 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 205 

ORDERS OF THE BATTERY COMMANDER. 

14. Capt. D issues the following messages and orders. 

15. At 9.31 a. m., verbally, to Col. A: 

Request a company be detailed as battery support, as the battery will 
soon be a considerable distance in rear of the infantry. 

If Col, A assents to this he will undoubtedly detail a com- 
pany of the main body, which is close by, and the captain 
of this company will soon be up. 

16. At 9.32 a. m., verbally, to Lieut. R. (reconnaissance 
officer), Lieut. E (executive officer), Corp. X (scout), and 
Sergt. S (chief of fifth section) : 

You have heard Col. A's orders and are familiar with the situation. 

Lieut. E, ride back to battery and bring it up quickly under cover, east 
of hill 627, into position in the field north of the 610-633 road, about 150 
yards north of the road, and 400 yards east of the woods just north of 610. 
Limbers and combat train south of the 610-633 road, and east of trees south- 
east of 610. 1 

1 go at once to establish my station on west edge of these woods, north- 
east of Schild's. 

Corpl. X, report as agent to Col. A. 

17. Lieut. E gallops back to the battery, while Capt. D 
waits a minute or two to consult with the commander of the 
infantry support. The latter refers to his map and, after 
having been advised of Capt. D's intentions, suggests an 
arrangement similar to that outlined above in paragraph 12. 
To this Capt. D readily gives his approval. 

OBSERVATION AND COMMUNICATION. 

18. Capt. D, accompanied by Lieut. R, Sergt, S, two mu- 
sicians, and one signaler, keeping under cover of Schild's 
hiU, now gallops off toward 610. Arriving there, Capt. D 
selects, in the edge of the woods north of 610, a tree of good 
height, not too difficult to climb, or needing much trimming, 
and at 9.40 a. m. verbally states: 

The battery observation station will be in this tree. 

Lieut. R, take the signaler and one musician, and establish an auxiliary 
observation station at the house 400 yards northeast of Small's, about 1,500 
yards from here. Use wire fences to establish and maintain telephone 
communication with me if possible. Otherwise arrange for a flag station at 
Schild's. 

19. Capt. D now climbs the tree, and with the help of Sergt. 
S estabhshes his observation telescope,^ breaking off branches 

' Capt. D illustrates his remarks by pointing out orientation features on the ground and on 
his map. 

2 If not equipped with the model 1913 instrument, he would use his field glasses. Sergt. S 
assists in observ-ation. Whenever the captain is conducting fire, Sergt. S maintains the 
general observation of the field. 



206 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

where necessary. The one musician left holds the horses 
and watches Lieut. R, who rides off carefully, his signaler 
wiring up as necessary; the musician with Lieut. R holding 
the signaler's horse as required. 

20. Capt. D need give no further orders until ready to open 
fire. The battery, when it comes into its designated posi- 
tion, will send forward and lay a telephone line to the B. C. 
station; the signal corporal will attend to all the details of 
establishing the station; and the executive officer will report, 
after communication is established, when the battery is ready 
to fire. The executive officer would give an initial laying by 
compass, site and range being estimated or taken from the 
map. The captain corrects by observation of the first fire. 
In the meantime, Capt. D can give his undivided attention 
to observing the enemy's position and the location of the 
Blue infantry. 

21. The executive officer will retain, at the battery's 
position, one of the signal men; the remaining signal man 
and one remaining scout he sends to the B.C. station. They 
lay the telephone line as they go. This line is connected to 
the end of the line laid by Lieut. R. Meantime, the progress 
of the latter is watched by the musician from the east side 
of the Schild house, so that flag communication may be 
established at any moment. 



PART IX.— LIGHT ARTILLERY. 



A Battery in Rencontre — Enemy on the Defensive. 

A Blue brigade, reinforced by a battery and a troop, is 
marching from Emmitsburg on Taneytown. The advance 
guard consists of the First Infantry and Troop A, Second 
Cavalry, under command of Col. B. 

The country is hostile to the Blues. 

The advance guard crossed the Monocacy at Bridgeport 
about 9 a. m., and upon arrival at the heights east of the 
river became engaged with the enemy. 

Gen. A, with the main body west of the river, upon hear- 
ing musketry fire, rode forward to join the advance guard, 
taking Capt. D, battery commander, with him. 

ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES. 

As they rode past Alexander's, artillery fire was heard to 
the northeast, and Gen. A directed Capt. D: 

Send orders for your battery to join the advance guard, and you report 
at once to Col. B. 

(Note. — Capt. D has with him an agent and two musicians; the recon- 
naissance officer and two scouts are with the advance guard.) 

Col. B was found at the house 150 yards east of 500. 
Capt. D reported that his battery was coming up, and Col. B 
gave him orders as f oUows : 

I have a battalion of infantry deployed along the farther edge of the 
woods on that hill (532), and another battalion in the woods west of Eck- 
hardt's; but they can not advance, on account of the fire of a battery of 
artillery at Longville. The battery is right out in the open. You can see 
the upper part of the flashes from this house. About a battalion of hostile 
infantry is on hill 526, and our cavalry from north of Taneytown has just 
reported that more infantry is approaching Longville from the east. 

Get your battery into position quickly and stop that artillery fire. Aa 
soon as you open fire I am going to drive the enemy off hill 526. You must 
stop any infantry reinforcements from advancing to his support. 

Capt. D notes that the Third Battalion, First Infantry, is 
halted about 500 yards northv/est of 500 road junction. He 
estimates that the Blue battery will be now between Monoc- 
acy bridge and the small stream crossing to the east. 

207 



208 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS. 

Lieut. C, reconnaissance officer, reports that he has seen 
the hostile battery, and that it is in the cornfield southeast 
of 541. 

Required: 1. Any orders issued, or messages sent by 
Capt. D upon receiving Gen. A's instructions .at Alexander's. 

2. Capt. D's estimate of the situation in so far as it affects 
the disposition of his artillery. 

3. State disposition and use of reconnaissance officer, 
scouts, and telephone apparatus while battery is in action. 

PRELIMINARY ORDERS OF THE BATTERY COMMANDER. 

Upon receiving Gen. A's orders, at Alexander's, Capt. D 
directs a musician : 

Ride back to Lieut. C; tell him to form for action and bring battery up 
this road at a trot, halting at the road fork (500). 

He indicates to the musician the Alexander-500 road. 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. 

Two tasks are assigned to the battery commander: First, 
to stop the hostile artillery fire ; second, to prevent any Red 
reinforcements from approaching hill 526. 

Capt. D considers the first task to be the more important 
one, for it is the fire from the Red battery that has stopped 
the progress of the Blue advance guard. In selecting a posi- 
tion for his battery he will, therefore, make sure of being 
able to deliver an effective fire on the hostile battery. It 
must be a position that can be occupied quickly, for Col. B's 
orders indicate that the whole movement forward wiU be 
delayed imtil the Blue battery opens fire. 

The hostile battery being already in position and engaged 
in fii'e, the Blue battery should seek an approach along a 
covered route to a position affording defilade and then open 
fire as a surprise to the enemy. 

With the Red battery definitely located in the open and 
the Blue battery concealed, but with good observation sta- 
tions, Capt. D should have no difficulty in neutralizing the 
hostile artillery fire to such an extent that Col. B can re- 
sume the advance of the infantry. 

RECONNAISSANCE AND SELECTION OF A POSITION. 

Capt. D, while riding forward, has been able to estimate 
pretty well the country on both sides of the road for about 
500 yards, with respect to its use by artillery. He notes 
that this area is screened against Longville and vicinity 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 209 

by the \voo(ls to the northeast, where the Blue iofaiitry is 
engaged, but that there are no high places along the road 
suitable for observation stations. 

Arriving at hill 524 and looking over the country from 
the farmhouse he sees that the country to the north and 
nortlieast, between the road and the woods, is all defiladed 
against the enemy's position near Longville, and that there 
are several positions near the house suitable for the firing 
battery. 

From the farmhouse he sees the toj)s of the flashes of 
the hostile battery; he will thus be able to adjust approxi- 
mately the fire of his own battery on the target. With 
the aid of an observing officer at the front of the woods to 
the north, he should be able to deliver a quick and effective 
fire on the Red battery. 

He might go forward himself and establish his B. C. 
station there, but it would be a considerable distance from 
his battery, with the further disadvantage of being right in 
the midst of the Blue infantry firing line, which is now under 
hostile artillery and infantry fire. 

Capt. D can see from the house more distant parts of 
the terrain that may offer suitable places for the battery. 
About 1,000 yards north of 500 road junction, and 200 or 
300 yards west of the bend in the road, there seems to be a 
position behind the crest that will also permit a fire across 
the north front of the woods, on the hostile infantry. There 
is also an open area in the w^oods to the north which may be 
practicable for the battery. 

Capt. D knows, though, that his battery ^vi\\ be up in 
five or six minutes and that the reconnaissance of these 
distant positions will take considerable time. He believes 
that the time element is important, and that he should have 
a position selected for the battery to occupy as soon as it 
comes up. He decides, therefore, to place the battery in 
position near the farmhouse w^here he now is, and to use the 
house as the B. C. station. Looking over the terrain near 
the house, he sees the ravine to the west of hill 524, and also 
the one to the southeast of liiU 524; but neither of these 
offers any advantage over the flat country to the north of 
the road. So he selects a position on the cultivated ground 
north of the farmhouse, with the right piece located near 
the barn. 

The range to the hostile battery will be about 3,000 
yards, and the battery from here will be able to fire also 
on hill 526 and the country to the northeast. 
98755°— 17 14 



210 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS, 

The limbers will be placed behind the woods on south 
slope of hill 524, and the combat train near farmhouse about 
500 yards southwest of the limbers; an auxiliary observing 
station will be at Eckardt's farmhouse. 

USE OF RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER AND SCOUTS. 

The reconnaissance oflicer is in charge of the auxiliary 
station at the Eckhardt house; an agent is with Col. B 
for the purpose of transmitting messages and information 
to Capt. D. One scout is with the reconnaissance officer; 
the other regular scout and one specially detailed are at 
Boyd's providing for security of battery. One telephone 
is at the B. C. station, one at the firing battery, and one at 
the auxiliary observing station. 

COMMENTS ON STUDENTS* SOLtTIONS. 

In several solutions the orders issued were not given in 
proper form; that is, as they would be actually expressed 
by Capt. D. 

The orders for the occupation of the position and a de- 
scription of the manner of occupying position were not 
called for. This was given in several solutions. 

In 17 solutions the firing battery was placed in vicinity of 
hill 524. 

In seven solutions the firing battery was placed on the 
slope west of the bend m road about 1,000 yards north of 
500 road junction. This is a good position for carrymg out 
the tasks assigned to the battery. Flash defilade can be 
obtained against Longville, as weU as an uninterrupted fire 
across the front of Col. B's infantry marching toward hill 526. 
The B. C. station in this case should be at the northern point 
of the woods west of Eckhardt's. 

Under the conditions stated in problem, the objection to 
this position would be the length of time required to recon- 
noiter and occupy it. If the reconnaissance officer recom- 
mends this position to his battery commander and is ready 
to lead battery to it, it satisfactorily solves the problem. 

Four solutions placed the firing battery near head of 
ravine 500 yards north of 500 road junction. In this posi- 
tion, there is no good observing station close to the battery. 
The battery being on lower ground than the woods in front, 
an unnecessarily large dead space is formed m front of woods. 

Four solutions placed the firing battery in north edge 
of woods near Eckhardt's, or on top of the crest near the 



LIGHT AETILLERY. 211 

house. This position is untenable, considering conditions 
stated in problem. In some of these solutions, the battery 
was moved to position through the woods, while the map 
indicates that the woods have thick underbrush. 

Three solutions placed the filling battery in open space 
in woods southeast of Eckhardt's. It is doubtful if more 
than "mounted defilade" can be obtained here, and that 
only by moving back to the edge of the woods. In this case 
the position of the battery and its range would be found 
easily, on account of the flashes appearing against the 
woods in rear. 

One solution had the firing battery in the middle of the 
woods, and another one, in rear edge of woods. 

One solution had the firing battery in ravine near Alex- 
ander's, with B. C. station on hill 503. In this case the 
range is too long, and the battery commander can not see 
his objective. 



PART X.— LIGHT ARTILLERY. 



A Battalion in Observation. 

GENERAL SITUATION. 

A Red army is holding the line Tanoytown-Gcrman- 
town against an equal Blue force attacking from the east. 

SPECIAL SITUATK^N. 

The First Cavalry (Blue) is covering the front Mar^'s- 
ville-Whitehall, with headquarters at Gebhardt's. 

A Blue detachment detrained at Sells Station, is march- 
ing on "Whitehall via Bashor Mill, with orders to cover the 
Blue right flank. 

MARCH SITUATION. 

Advance guard, Col. A commanding; the First Infantry 
and Battery C, First Field Artillery (less combat train). 

The advance guard support consists of the First Bat- 
talion and one platoon of machine guns of the First Infantry, 
under Maj. B. 

Main body, the Second Infantry; First Battalion, First 
Field Artillery (less Battery C) ; the Third Infantry. 

ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES. 

Gen. A, Maj. B, and Maj. C, and Capt. D (battalion 
adjutant) of the artillery, are ridmg together at the head of 
the support, and a rest halt is ordered as they arrive at 633 
crossroad. Messages from the cavalry and from the main 
army cause Gen. A to issue the following order: 

Heavy hostile columns ai'e approaching Whitehall and Square Corners, 
from the west and northwest. 

We will take position in readiness here. Order of march ceases. 

The ai'tillery will go into position at once to cover the front Square Corncrs- 
St. Luke's Church, and will open fire without further orders on any hostile 
body that appears. 

Maj. B, with the support establish a march outpost with your head- 
quai'ters at that group of houses about half a mile west of us. Patrol well 
out and get in touch with our cavalry without delay. Their headquarters 
are at Gebhardt's, that farmhouse yonder (pointing). 

The rest of the First Infantry will close in mass behind that wt^ods (about 
400 yards east of 633). 

The Second and Third Infantry will close up on the First. 

Trains will wait orders at Sells Station. 

213 



214 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION. 

Every problem in tactics contains some main idea, the 
recognition of which is essential to a successful solution. If 
the main idea is recognized, a satisfactory solution has been 
entered upon. Means of carrying the solution to completion 
will differ, for all the factors in a tactical problem are variables 
and no two minds will assign them equal values, but a 
majority of such solutions will differ only in unessential de- 
tails. Rarely will a man who has recognized the main idea go 
wide in his judgment as to how it should be treated. Where 
the main idea is not recognized, solutions are mere gropings 
in the dark, occasionally successful, but by the law of chances, 
more often not. 

The preessential to a good solution is, then, the determina- 
tion of the main idea, the important feature of the situation. 

The problem is a simple one. A general, undecided as to 
his next move, orders his artillery to take a position from 
which it can attack by fire an enemy that is expected to 
appear on a certain line at any time, and meantime has his 
other troops close up on his head of column to be handy when 
he decides how he can best use them. How soon the enemy 
may appear is not known. 

Wliat is the "main idea" for the artilleryman? Simply 
that he should, with no unnecessary delay, prepare to fire 
on the ground where the enemy may appear, from a position 
hidden from hostile observation, and reasonably close to the 
supporting infantry. 

So far as the artillery is concerned. Gen. A's order is one 
that calls for quick action. Heavy hostile columns are ap- 
proaching from the west and northwest. The skyline, be- 
yond which they are, is about 2 J miles distant — not a bad 
artillery range when conditions of observation and the 
character of the probable targets are considered. An enemy 
appearing on that crest would have but a few hundreds of 
yards to traverse to gain shelter in the valleys to the east. 
How near he may be to this skyline is unknown ; but, in any 
case, that is where he must be forced to halt, deploy, or 
change his direction of march. 

The battalion commander has with him, as a rule, his 
musician, orderly, and the agents. The sergeant major, th6 
scouts, the two signal men and the two reel cart drivers are 
at the command of the adjutant. With him are usually the 
sergeant major and the scouts, the signal men being with the 
Ireel cart, of which the signal corporal is in charge. In this 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 215 

case, the statement of the problem indicates that tlie reel 
cart is in its usual place at the head of the battalion. 

The battalion quartermaster, the quartermaster sergeant 
and one orderly are with the field train. 

Maj. C knows that his nearest battery, C, is nearly a mile 
back, and the remainder of the battalion at least 2 miles 
back. The former can be brought up in 10 to 15 minutes, 
the latter in from 30 to 35 minutes. This assumes that an 
agent is sent at a gallop and that the command comes up 
at a trot. 

It will require half a minute to instruct the agent, possibly 
a full minute. To ride to Battery C and deliver the message 
will require about four minutes. The question naturally 
arises, "Why not use the flag?" The procedure in that case 
would be as follows: Since the battery is probably hidden, 
more or less, by the woods at 612, the scout charged with 
sending the message must go to one side and find a place from 
which he can see it. He must avoid signalling from a skyline, 
and must select a background such that he will be readily 
picked up by the battery and his signals read. At the distance 
this is apt to be difficult. The nearest likely place is about 
100 yards to the south. Arriving there, the scout "calls" 
with his flags until answered from the battery, and then 
sends his message at the rate of about ten words a minute. 
At the best, this method would save very little time, and it 
might lose a great deal of time. 

PRELIMINARY ORDERS OF BATTALION COMMANDER. 

Maj. C decides, therefore, to send a 'messenger; one will 
suffice, since the batteries are all on the same road. 

Corpl. C (agent), tell Capt. C to report to me here, as soon as possible, 
■with his reconnaissance party; his battery to follow him at a trot. Then 
go on to the battalion and tell Capt. B to report to me, as soon as possible, 
with Capt. A and the reconnaissance parties of both batteries. The bat- 
talion is to follow him at a trot. The combat trains are to halt together in 
the woods north of the road and about a mile east of here. Stop there on 
your way back until you see them established, then rejoin me at a trot. 
Gallop. 

Maj. A has a very good view of the country in which the 
enemy is expected to appear, but even a 14-foot greater 
elevation is not to be despised. Besides, hostile artillery is 
quite likely to sweep this, the most prominent road crossmg 
the ridge. The enemy territory should be taken under ob- 
servation at once. Until the reel cart arrives, field glasses 
alone will be available; all the scouts have them, and no 
better employment could be found for the adjutant and his 



216 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

party. This form of reconnaissance must begin when a 
sector of observation is assigned to any artillery unit, and 
be maintained as long as the assignment continues. 

Capt. D, leave three scouts with me; take the rest of the headquarters 
party to yonder hill (647), and take the sector Square Comers-St. Luke's 
Church* under observation. WTien the reel cart comes up, run a line to 
the batteries and also establish flag communication. The batteries will 
go in north of here. 

RECONNAISSANCE AND SELECTION OF A POSITION, 

Having made these initial dispositions, Maj. C looks about 
for positions for the batteries. There is plenty of suitable 
ground to the south and north and on the ridge on which 
he stands. Other things being equal, he would prefer to go 
to the north, as the ranges will be shorter. 

The ridge on which he stands is the most prominent one 
for miles in any direction, and is undoubtedly under hostile 
observation throughout its length. It is within reasonable 
range of possible heavy artillery in the main Red positioii. 
A movement across this ridge will certainly be seen and 
valuable information thus given to the enemy — viz, that 
Blue artillery is approaching the Red flank. The batteries 
could go under cover aromid the flanks of the ridge, but this 
would require much time. 

In the distance, west and northwest, are many likely 
looking places where positions for batteries might be found, 
but much time is certain to be lost in getting to them; thoy 
are far from the supporting infantry; Gen. A's final disposi- 
tions may be such that a retrograde movement would be 
necessary; or a serious engagement, with the rescue of the 
guns for its object, might be brought about. The presence 
of the cavalry is no inducement to go forward; it is not a 
part of Gen. A's command, and the instructions under which 
it is operating are unknown. 

Maj. C dismisses all thought of the distant positions and 
looks for that one to the north which can be most quickly 
occupied. He can see over the field to the north, and might 
very well designate a position in it for Battery C; but there 
is time to see personally that no impassable object exists in 
it. If there is, or if the proposed position is othen\'ise un- 
suitable, he will be able to make any other dispositions at 
once, which he would not be if he sent a scout to see. 

With Corpls. A and B (agents), Corpl. X, Pvts. Y and Z 
(scouts), his orderly and musician, Maj. C rides into the field 



LIGHT AKTILLEKY. 217 

to the north, and trots to its northeast corner looking over 
the ground. 

Battery C will go in here. Limbers near that woods to the east (pointing). 
Pvt. Y, post yourself 100 yards from this corner in line with it and the cross- 
roads (633). You will mark the left of the battery. "WTien relieved join me. 

Corpl. X, you and Y open the fence yonder (G12). Conduct Battery C 
to its position, and join me at the crossroads (G33). 

ORDERS TO A BATTERY COMMANDER. 

Returning to the crossroads 633, the major meets Capt. C 
and has him halt his party on the cast slope of the ridge. 
Then to him and to his reconnaissance officer he gives a full 
statement of the situation, of the information and orders 
received from Gen. A, points out the position the battery is 
to occupy and tells him to establish his own station '' in this 
vicinity." He does not attempt to give firing data for 
Capt. C; the latter can get it for himself by the time the 
battery is ready for it, but he might very well designate an 
aiming point, since while on the gromid he could have 
selected one. It may not be possible at 633 to select an 
aiming point that v/ill be visible and unmistakable at all the 
guns. 

It is not necessary to order defilade; the m.ajor has already 
determined that in selecting the position. 

Captain, heavy hostile columns are apiM'oaching the line Square Corners- 
St. Luke's Church [pointing them outj, from the west and northwest. Our 
cavalry covers the front Marysville-Whitehall, with headquarters at that 
farmhouse (Gebhardt's) [pointing out the places or their difections]. A 
position in readiness is ordered here, the infantry closing up on that woods 
(612), the support of the advance guard establishing a march outpost, with 
headquarters at that group of houses [pointing]. The artillery takes a posi- 
tion in observation along this crest. My station is being established on 
that hill [points to 647]. Your station will be in this vicinity, your barttery 
in that field. That scout [pointing] marks the left of your line. 

Take the sector Square Corners-St. Luke's Church under observation at 
once, and, in the absence of further instructions, open fire on any hostile 
parties of any size that you may discover. 

Let the adjutant know your dispositions as soon as they are complete, 
and have another agent report to me . 

Post your limbers about 500 yards east of the battery. 

I am going north to locate the positions for the other Ijatteries 

OCCUPATION OF POSITION BY A BATTERY. 

Capt. C directs his reconnaissance officer to arrange the 
communications, designates an aiming point, and gives firing 
data. The executive (the senior officer at the battery) has 
the guns laid accordingly and reports the battery ready. 



218 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The captain studies the terram from some convenient posi- 
tion — in this case the roof of a building, since the trees 
north of Schild's interfere with his view from the ground. 

The chief of the fifth section comes up, and he and the 
reconnaissance officer assist in observing or computing data, 
or both, or prepare a covered place of observation to be 
occupied in case of need, as the captain may direct. Signal- 
man No. 1 and a substitute operate the telephone line from 
the B. C. station to the battery; signalman No. 2 connects 
with the battalion line at the B. C. station. For fiajr con- 
nection three men are required, who may be scouts, and a 
substitute, or three substitutes. The signal corporal super- 
vises the work of all. 

One scout with flags ready keeps near the battery com- 
mander, in view of the battery and out of view of the enemy, 
ready to conununicate his orders. 

Wlien the battery approaches, the scout stands facing 
down the line it is to occupy, right arm extended in that 
direction, left arm pointing in the direction of fire. By this 
means the executive officer is able to place the battery in 
position without delay, without even riding to the crest 
himself, and the guns will be pointed in the correct general 
direction. 

When the battery is met by the scouts in the road near 
612, the corporal sends the private to rejoin the major, as 
he is only needed to help open the fence. The corporal 
then points out to the executive officer the position the bat- 
tery is to occupy. The latter, without halting, leads the 
battery through the gap in the fence straight toward the 
scoiit, who marks the position, the corporal meantime tell- 
ing him the details of the position, so far as he knows them. 
The ground being suitable, the executive officer signals: 
"Form for action, double section, left oblique, march." 

The leading carriage takes the walk, the others continue 
at the trot, the caissons obliquing out of column to the left 
until clear of the guns by 2 yards, and then continuing 
parallel to them, except the first, which closes up in double 
section column with its piece and takes the walk. The 
others form double section in succession in the same manner. 
The rear caisson of the fifth section passes by the whole bat- 
tery on its right, places itself ahead of the leading section, 
and takes the walk. Having reached the position of the 
scout, the column changes direction half right and marches 
on the fence corner. As the head of the column reaches it, 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 219 

or the rear carriage reaches the position of the scout, the 
executive officer signals, "Action left." The battery halts, 
the connoneers dismount, unlimber the guns and caissons, 
and put them in the order in battery. The limbers move 
out by the right flank and are conducted by the first ser- 
geant to the position designated by the executive officer or 
by the battery commander; in this case, to the small woods 
about 500 yards to the east. The executive officer mean- 
time orders, "Prepare for action," which is executed. 

The battery was at a trot until double section was formed, 
hence no earlier opportunity was presented of preparing for 
action nor, until the gap in the fence was cleared, of forming 
for action. 

The signal men prepare their telephones, one to con- 
nect with the battalion Ime if laid, the others to connect the 
executive officer with the batter}^ commander if necessary, 
and also take their flags from the cases, ready to be used. 

Having assured himself that all is in readiness, the ex- 
ecutive officer reports to the captain, '' Battery in order, sir," 

The captain designates an aiming point, gives the firmg 
data for some point, as Shebley's, adding, "Do not load." 
Instruments are set and gims laid. 

FURTHER RECONNAISSANCE BY BATTALION COMMANDER. 

Maj. C rixles north under cover of the crest, his men cut- 
ting the fences, mitil he reaches the one rmming east from 
the farmyard 600 yards north of 633, then goes up to the 
crest and looks about him. 

He might as well have taken the road, perhaps, for he 
is far in rear of the covering cavalry, and his small party 
would attract little attention. On the other hand, some hos- 
tile observer might spot the artillerymen (rifles and sabers 
missing, semaphore kit cases slung on their backs). Again, 
such an example on the part of the major would be certain 
to be followed by others, and signs of activity on the ridge 
are certain to draw miwelcome hostile attention. 

At the wire fence, the major fuids ample room for a 
battery on each side of it, space for their limbers m the open 
comitry to the east, and for the two battery commanders' 
stations on the crest to the left front . It would be better if 
the latter were more separated, but the chances of confusion 
can be minimized by a little judgment. 

From the crest he can see Square Comers and St. Luke's 
Church, part of the road connecting them, and part of the 



220 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

slopes west and east of that road. Ho decides on this po- 
sition : 

Y, go 200 yards cast along the fence and remain there to mark the ph^ce; 
Battery B yvtII take a position in observation north of you; Battery A south 
of you, lines parallel to Battery C. B. C. stations to the left front on the 
crest. Limbers just beyond that fence about 500 yards east of here. 
Agents, ride across to that corner (pointing to 613), meet the batteries there 
and conduct them here. Tell the executive officers what is wanted. 
Then rejoin me. I am going back to the crossroads to meet the battery 
commanders. Move fast. 

By this time the main body of the artillery should be on 
its way. The batteries might continue to 612 and there 
turn north to position; but if, by any chance, Battery C 
should have drawn fire, this passage in rear of it will be 
highly dangerous. The fence comer at 613 is visible, and if 
the batteries can be diverted at that jooint they can bo 
brought straight across. The distance is less, but this is 
balanced by the ground bemg cultivated; so that time will 
be about the same, but safety will be assured. 

ORDERS TO OTHER BATTERY COMMANDERS. 

The B. C.'s should be up, or soon will be, by the time Maj. 
C arrives at 633. Ho repeats the information as in the case 
of Capt. C, and adds: 

Your positions are about 700 yards from here. That scout (pointing to 
Pvt. Y) is between them. Agents are meeting the batteries at the corner 
half a mile east of here, and have instructions to conduct them to their 
positions. They are also informed as to the position of the limbers. Your 
own positions will be on the crest to the left front of Battery A. 

Wire and flag communication will be established as soon as possible. 
The sector of Battery B is Square Corner, and 200 mils to right and left of it, 
the sector of Battery A is St. Luke's Church, and 200 mils to the right and 
left of it. 

Battery C is at present covering the whole sector with orders to fire on any 
hostile parties. You will report any such that you may see, and will pre- 
pare to fire, but will not do so without orders from me. Go to your stations 
under cover of this crest; look to security of your right flank, and rei)ort 
when you are ready. 

Maj. C now goes to his station and receives the report of 
the adjutant as to its establishment, and w^hat has been 
done. 

' Captain, take four scouts and go to the cavalry headquarters. Arrange 
for signal communication with me and send me any useful information the 
cavalry may have. Remain there in observation and have routes recon- 
noitered for a possible movement over there. 

Corpl. D (additional agent who joined from Battery C), report to the 
brigade adjutant as agent. 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 221 

The sergeant major, under direction of the adjutant, 
nms a line from Battery B.'s B. C. station, keeping the reel 
cart out of sight behind the crest. Men from the batteries 
carry the line forward where necessary to the places desig- 
nated by their battery commanders for telephone men. 

ASSIGNMENT OF SECTOR. OF OBSERVATION. 

Wlien communication with the batteries is established 
and the latter are in position, Maj. C gives the following 
message : 

All batteries: Battery C will now observe tbe sector Whitehall to 500 
mils south. If the wire is busy, be careful not to break in with reports, 
but use the flag. Do not fire without my order. The adjutant is at cavalry 
headquarters in observation. 

Direction point is St. Luke's Church. 

DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION. 

The position as chosen fulfills the following conditions: It 
meets the tactical requirements of the situation, in that it 
can be occupied quickly without attracting hostile attention; 
and from it the hostile columns can be forced to halt, deploy, 
or change direction at the maximum distance of which the 
terrain will admit. 

It is good for a defense organized on this line, or in front 
of it, or for an attack to the front or toward the left flank of 
the main hostile army. 

Ranges are reasonable, observation fair. 

Absolute protection for limbers and combat trains can be 
assured by simply sending them well to the rear. 

Ammunition supply is easy. 

Well-concealed routes to the front, rear, and flanks are 
available. 

The trees east of the line Schild-Grawmer screen it some- 
what from the hostile main position, where heavy artillery 
may be. 

OBSERVATION AND FIRE DIRECTION. 

Maj. C turned over the observation to his adjutant at a 
time when he had no batteries available for action; he gave 
Capt. C orders to fire without reference to him on any hostile 
forces that might appear during the time that Capt. C's was 
the only battery available; by the time all batteries are in 
position Maj. C is at his own station, thorouglily informed 
as to the powers and limitations of his batteries in their re- 
spective positions, and assumes his duties as director of fire, 



222 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS. 

assigning a direction point, taking into his own hands the 
assignment of targets and the opening of fire upon them, and 
assigning such a sector to Battery C as assures the most 
dangerous flank of the possible hostile position being kept 
under observation. 

COMMENTS ON STUDENTS' SOLUTIONS. 

1. The command had detrained at Sells Station; it was 
reasonable to assume it to be in some formation at that 
point — not as marching through that point from the south- 
east. 

2. In a small command artillery is best placed at the rear. 

3. Distances in column may be quite short in an advance 
to a covered front. 

4. On such a short march little or no allowance should be 
made for elongation. 

5. Allowances should be made as follows in an artillery 
command: Battalion headquarters, two carriage lengths; 
battery headquarters, distance between battery and bat- 
talion headquarters, distance between batteries and between 
them and attached fractions (as Battery C's combat train), 
one carriage length. 

6. Several students had four batteries in the battalion. 
Several betrayed a lack of knowledge of the composition of 
a battalion headquarters. 

7. The order of march showed the battalion to be together, 
except for the firing battery of Battery C, yet many put the 
combat trains behind the Third Infantry. 

8. Infantry combat trains were held in rear by some. As 
in the case of the artillery, the statement of the problem 
showed that the regiments were complete. 

9. The time element in the problem was not grasped by 
some; others, while apparently appreciating it, did not ap- 
preciate the distances involved. 

10. Some positions were too far from the infantry. 

11. Some batteries w^ere widely separated, with no com- 
pensation. 

12. Nothing warranted the assignment of counter and in- 
fantry batteries so early in the game. 

13. The terrain should be placed under observation at once. 

14. B. C's. and batteries should be sent for at once. 

15. In some solutions Maj. C scattered his scouts, agents, 
etc., broadcast, without delay, a mistake only too common 
in practice in all arms. Economy in use of messengers should 
be practiced. 



LIGHT AETILLERY. 223 

16. Better prepare for action either just before or just 
after entering the firing position. Some batteries were pre- 
pared miles in rear. 

17. Good positions noted were just south of 612, normal 
order; in the field north of the woods at 612, normal order. 

Positions to the north are best because of shorter ranges 
and better observation, and greater security from heavy 
artillery fire from the hostile main position. 



PART XL— LIGHT ARTILLERY. 



A Battalion in Surprise Attack. 

The First Blue Division, weakened by the detachment of 

a reenforced brigade under Gen. A, on the early morning of 

March 26, 1915, took up a defensive position northeast of 

Gettysburg extending from McElhany to the orchard south 

of 501, to oppose a Red force invading Blue territory from 

the west. 

march situation. 

Gen. A's command consisted of the First Infantry Bri- 
gade; First Squadron, First Cavalry; First BattaUon, First 
Light Artillery; Company A, Engineers; and the First Am- 
bulance Company. At 5.30 a. m., March 26, 1915, the de- 
tachment was breaking Camp 6 miles north of Center Mills 
when a message from the division commander brought in- 
formation that the Red forces, estimated as a division, at 
5 a. m., were deploying for attack. Gen. A was ordered to 
march at once to the aid of the division. 

The detachment marched via Center Mills with the First 
Infantry; First Squadron, First Cavalry; and Company A, 
Engineers, in the advance guard. All attempts to reach 
the division by wire after 6 a. m. had failed. 

At 9,30 a. m., when Gen. A, at the head of the advance 
guard reserve, reached hill 646 north of Table Rock, he re- 
ceived information to the effect that the Blue divisional cavahy 
was engaged with superior Red cavalry near D. Wirt and 
that at 9.20 a. m. the Red division had thrown in all its in- 
fantry but two regiments, one of which was 700 yards north- 
west of the 501 crossroads, the other near 504, and that the 
Blue chvision had absorbed aU its reserves but one battalion. 
The advance cavaby was at Goodintent School. 

Advance party: Company A, First Infantry, 60 yards; 
distance, 400 yards. 

Support: First Platoon, Troop A, First Cavalry; Mounted 
Detachment Company A, Engineers; First Battahon, First 
Infantry (less Company A), 240 yards; distance, 500 yards. 
98755°— 17 15 225 



226 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Reserve: First Infantry (less First Battalion), 710 yards; 
Company A, Engineers (less Mounted Detachment), 60 
yards; distance, 600 yards. 

Main body, in order of march: Second Infantry (less two 
battalions); First Battalion, First Light Artillery (less com- 
missary trains) ; Second and Third Battalions, Second Infan- 
try; Third Infantry; commissary trains. First Battalion, 
First Light Artillery, First Ambulance Corps. 

Total road space, main body, 3,260 yards. 

Trains foUow the main body without distance. 

Gen. A was accompanied by his staff and orderlies, the 
advance guard commander, the artillery commander and the 
commander of Company A, Engineers. After receiving the 
messages, at 9.30 a. m.. Gen. A read their contents to these 
officers. He then briefly consulted his map, and after 
warning the officers to make notes of his instructions, issued 
verbal orders directing the detachment to continue tlie 
march with a view to attacking the enemy's left, advance 
guard to take the road to Herman's; the advance cavalry 
to go to the assistance of the divisional cavalry near D. 
Wirt, leaving patrols to watch the Red left; the firing bat- 
teries to trot up to the tail of the reserve of the advance 
guard; regimental commanders to join him at the head of 
the support. • 

INFORMATION EN ROUTE. 

Gen. A, riding at the head of the advance guard support, 
had reached the ridge crest 700 yards northwest of Her- 
man's at 10.05 a. m., when he received the following message: 

Aeroplane No. 7, Table Rock, 
26 March, 1915—10.02 a. m. 
C. O., Blue Brigade: 

Bed left exteuded by one battalion from regiment northwest of 501 
crossroads. One battalion from regiment near 504 now moving toward 
Varney. Red artillery posted one regiment on Oak Ridge, other with 
right at stock farm, left near 513 road fork. Red attacking line now about 
500 yards from Blue position; has made very slow progi-ess in last half hour, 
but is still advancing. Our cavalry still engaged with Red cavalry; fight 
is slowly drifting toward southeast. 

K, Lieutenant, Signal Corps. 

Gen. A, after reading the above message, with his staff, 
the Cavalry platoon, and officei-s who had reported to him 
for orders, galloped to the fence corner 400 yards southwest 
of the point where the road crosses the ridge crest. By aid 
of the field glasses the artillery regiment in action toward 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. S27 

the stock farm could be plainly seen. A small mounted 
patrol near 513 moving rapidly to the south was also ob- 
served. It was now 10.10 a. m., the Blue column had con- 
tinued the march without halting. 

ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES. 

At 10.10 a. m. Gen. A read the aviator's message to the 
assembled officers, cautioned them to make notes of his 
instructions, and then issued the following verbal orders: 

We vnW attack the Red left. March conditions now cease. 

The artillery battalion will move at once to position, in this vicinity, 
against the Red artillery and their attacking infantry; later supporting our 
attack. The First Battalion, First Infantry, is assigned as support. 

The First Platoon, Troop A, First Cavalry, will take position on that hill 
[pointing to hill 651], to coA-er our right and to report changes in hostile 
dispositions. 

The First Infantry, less First Battalion, will advance through Herman's 
and, when deployed, will attack with its right throiigh J. Weaver. 

The Second Infantry will move, under cover, toward hill 586, northeast 
of Varney , and, when deployed, will attack with its left dhected on hill 58G. 

The Third Infantry, as reserve under my command, will move forward 
to the Goodintent School. 

Emptied combat wagons will assemble at Table Rock after troops have 
cleared the road. 

Station for the slightly wounded at Table Rock. 

Messages to Goodintent School. 

(Completed at about 10.14 a. m.) 

ACTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER. 

On seeing the hostile artillery, Maj. Q at once called out, 
"Agents." They ride up. "Have the battery commanders 
report to me at once. Gallop." 

When Gen. A completes his order, Maj. Q turns to his 
adjutant: 

Captain, Batteries A and B, will take position in that hollow in the north 
end of this field just inside the fence — A on the left, B on the right. Have 
them trot out, passing by the right of the Infantry. Battery C follow 
them, keeping to the road until closed up on the Infantry support. Mark 
the positions of Batteries A and B and have their firing data ready. They 
will fii-e on hostile artillery, A taldng the farther half of the line and B the 
near half. 

Corpl. K, take tliis message to the commanding officer, First Battalion, 
First Infantry, down at that road corner [pointing toward Herman's] : ' ' Youi 
battalion is assigned as artillery support. One battery takes position on 
the hill southeast of you. Please occupy it at once." 

Corp. T (scout), report to the brigade adjutant as agent. 



228 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Upon arrival of Capts. A and B about 10.20 a. m., he 
issues the following order, indicating directions and local- 
ities as mentioned: 

Our division is in position along the Harrisburg Road, about 21 miles 
south of here, facing west. 

The enemy in superior force is attacldng it from the west. Between 3,000 
and 4,000 yards to the southwest you can see a long line of his artillery in 
action. 

Our divisional cavalry is engaged with hostile cavalry about 2 miles east 
of here. Our advance cavalry was on that hill (Goodintent School) and 
has moved to the assistance of the divisional Cavalry, leaving patrols to the 
south. 

The First Battalion, First Infantry, now marching down the road yonder, 
is artillery support and wdll occupy that hill. 

Ou.r infantry marches in a general southerly direction from here in attack 
formation against the hostile left. 

Batteries A and B attack the hostile artillery from position in the north 
end of this field. Battery C goes to that hill (592) to attack the hostile 
infantry. 

Battery A's target is the farther half of the line of guns; Battery B's, the 
near half. The positions are marked. Occupy them at once and prepare 
for immediate action. The adjutant \vill give you firing data. Range by 
volleys. Report when ready and await my order to commence firing. I 
will be on the left of A Battery. 

Capt. C arrives by the time these orders are issued and 
Maj. B repeats the information, adding: 

A battalion of hostile infantry is probably holding those woods (586). 

Hostile reserves are reported from 1 to 2 miles south of the hill up which 
our support is marching [pointing]. 

You should be able to see them or the hostile attacking lines, perhaps 
both, from that Mil. Take a position over there and fire without further 
orders on the enemy's reserves or on his main attacldng line, wliichever in 
your judgment offers the more important target. 

Batteries A and B have reported ready at 10.24 a. m. 
Maj. Q signals, "Commence firing," and rides back to the 
left of Battery A. 

Capt. D, direct the sergeant major to establish wire and flag comm^inica- 
tion with Battery C. Then join the cavalry to our right front and send me 
word of the effect of our fire, and of changes in the hostile dispositions. 

Lieut. W (agent, combat train), ride back to the combat train. Tell 
Lieut. M what you know of the situation, and tell him to retain his present 
place in column; when he comes up to those woods [pointing to the north- 
west] to halt his train and report to me here in person. Ride at 6-mile gait. 

Captain (medical officer), station for the slightly wounded is to be at 
Table Rock. Send two of your men with Battery and establish your aid 
station at that house (400 yards northeast). 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 229 

CONDUCT OF A DETACHED BATTERY. 

Capt. C joins liis hattciy on the road, assembles his 
officers at its head, and explains the situation as they ride 
along, adding, to the executive officer: 

Follow the infantry support, keeping a sharp lookout for si.s^nials from 
me. I am going ahead to reconnoiter. 

He gallops off accompanied by the reconnaissance offi- 
cer and his party. On arrival at the top of hill 592 he sees 
to the south a small part of the 501-McElheny Road (about 
where the 520 contour crosses). Beyond that point the 
road is hidden by the trees on the west slope of hill 552. 
The house and orchard southwest of 501 are visible over 
these trees. The house near 543 is visible, as are parts of 
the battlefield from about 400 yards beyond it. The re- 
ported positions of hostile reserves are not visible, being 
hidden by the trees on the line, hills 586-552, Capt. C has, 
then, no option but to fire on that part of the battlefield. 
This fire should be very effective, enfilading, and at from 
3,500 to 5,000 yards. Besides, it will have the effect of 
drawing the attention of the hostile reserves, perhaps of 
keeping them out of the main fight. The Red Artillery is 
hidden from view by a heavy wood about a mile southwest 
of his position. 

Capt. C decides to go into position just west of Goodintent 
School, with observation station on hill 592, and fire first on 
the hostile main line. He considers that he should waste 
no time in looking for a safer position. By having the bat- 
tery cross the ridge near the orchard, about 400 yards north 
of its firing position, the latter will not be betrayed to pos- 
sible hostile artillery to the southwest, and it is not probable 
that any hostile artillery is east of the ridge 592-586. 

Though in an open position he will use indirect fire, at 
least to begin with, because of its ease of control, distri- 
bution, etc. 

Corpl. L, gallop back to the battery. Tell the executive officer to lead 
the battery over that crest [pointing north] to the orcliard, then south into 
position near the schoolhouse [pointing]. Position will be marked. 
Battery to come in at a trot. Limbers return to orchard. 

Corpl. P, you and K mark the line of the battery, direction of fire toward 
that woods [pointing to south]. 

Lieut. R. O., place the woods in our front under observation and see if 
you car. from the schoolhouse or near by, get a view down the valley 
tlirough that gap in the trees (between the woods on the east slope of hill 
580 and tliose on the stream line). 



230 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

Capt. C selects an aiming point to the front, measures the 
deflection for the right piece, calculates the deflection 
difference, measures the angle of site, and estimates the 
range and corrector. 

The battery being in position, he opens fire by volley on 
the hostile attacking line. 

CONDUCT OF THE INFANTRY SUPPORT. 

The support continues the march, bearing off to the left; 
the leading company being detached toward the Weaver 
house, there to establish a march outpost. The remainder 
closes in mass in the woods north of Goodintent Schoolhouse, 
sending one squad to the road fork due north of 592, another 
to road fork 548, and another to the farmhouse 400 yards 
southeast of the schoolhouse, as outguards. 

The company sent to the Weaver house sends a squad to 
the stream bottom on each flank and a platoon under a 
lieutenant to the edge of the woods about 600 yards south, 
with orders to explore those woods and provide for security 
from that direction. The remainder of the company pre- 
pares a defensive position, extending from the Weaver house 
west over the ridge to the farmhouse on the west slope. 

The support commander joins the battery commander 
and the two make known to each other their plans, and 
arrangements to meet them, as far as is necessary to insure 
mutual understanding. 

COMMENT. 

The problem is one calling for quick action. The regi- 
ment of Red artillery near the stock farm is in a most 
vulnerable position. Two batteries opening a flank fire 
upon it will inflict very great loss on the personnel and 
materiel, and prevent the limbers coming up to take it to 
safety. Only one to two of its guns could probably bo 
turned to fire to the north, and their personnel would be 
exposed to the Blue artillery fire from the east. Although 
not the most threatening element of the Red attack, the 
neutralizing or destruction of this Red artillery will be more 
valuable to the Blues than the participation of Maj. Q's bat- 
talion in the attack of the detachment against the left of 
the Red infantry. 

Moreover, it is not at all certain that the Red infantry 
can be seen or fired upon from hill 592, and advance s^iith 
from there wiU not be advisable until the Blue infantry has 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 231 

advanced well beyond it, at least assuring that the woods 
(liills 586 and 552) arc not held by the enemy. The move- 
ment of the hostile battalion from 504 toward Varney 
indicates that the Reds are becoming alarmed for the safety 
of their left flank and are either sending a support for their 
artillery or occupying the woods on 586. In either case the 
Blues can not expect to approach those woods unobserved 
and unmolested. They are too near the scene of action to 
be left unpatroUed. 

Students, generally, recognize the value of time in a 
problem, but forget it in the solution, and waste much 
valuable time in galloping about the country looking for 
ideal positions. It is a case where the opportunity to damage 
the enemy justifies even an open position. But there were 
a few who went about the selection of the position with 
all the deliberation characteristic of the selection of the 
one for permanent occupancy. Others did not appreciate 
the scale of the map, and had Maj. Q gallop many miles in 
a remarkably short time. 

Many good positions were selected for the artillery, the 
occupation of which would have taken so much time that 
the chance of taking the hostile artillery at a disadvantage 
would undoubtedly have passed. 

Many positions selected were excellent for the guns, but 
had no suitable positions for B. C, stations within a reasonable 
distance. This is a serious error. The two absolute require- 
ments of a battery position are (1) that the battery com- 
mander see his target; and (2) that the fire of his guns be 
able to reach it. 

Several students were led into very serious errors by their 
failure to read, understandingly, the original problem and 
the partial solutions issued to them. Several students 
indulged in the use of a number of technical terms which 
they did not understand, and which were not essential to 
their solutions. Others seemed to feel that they had to 
assign some task to every member of their personnel, whether 
there was any need or not. 

There was a noticeable lack of care in determining the 
position of units on the road at the time Gen. A's order was 
completed. There is no excuse for this. Their location 
should have been the student's first business. 

In the second requirement, several students showed much 
appreliension about continuing the march down the road 
past Herman's, and sought devious ways through the fields 



232 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

to the north, in an effort to avoid being seen. The road is 
2i miles from the nearest hostile artillery, which is extremely 
busy in another direction; and even if seen, a single battery 
could traverse the distance practically in safety. Much time 
is lost by a detour, and just now time is more important than 
safety. 

Positions selected for Battery C were generall}^ good. Yet 
the Reds can not possibly have any artillery east of the line 
592-586; therefore a position in the open east of that line is 
permissible. A few took positions north of the woods by the 
S. H., necessitating a long line of communication to the B. C. 
station, increasing greatly the dead space in front of the guns, 
and, in general, reducing the efficiency of the battery very 
materially. 

The conduct of the support varied from excellent to very 
poor. A support should be handled as an outpost, the 
artillery being the object to be guarded. In this case there 
was danger to be apprehended from the southwest (hill 586), 
probably in possession of the enemy (see problem), and from 
the north and northeast where the Red cavalry is known to 
be. - The artillery battalion commander may need the serv- 
ices of part or all of the support later on. 

Some students spoke of keeping hostile rifle fire at least 
1,200 yards away from the battery, and for this reason sent 
a line of outguards out to that distance. If that is to be the 
line of resistance it is so extensive that it could not be held 
by the whole battalion. Others established observation posts 
as far as a mile distant. The lay of the land permits of 
observation posts, reasonably near the reserve, which can 
perfectly see the country for at least a mile. This indicates 
the line of observation and the line of resistance as the same. 

Some examples of faulty handling of the support were: 
Deploying it all in a semicircle with Battery C as a center; 
having it intrench right and left of the line of guns; having 
it intrench 300 yards in rear of the line of guns; leaving one 
platoon as a local support for Battery C, and taking up a 
position with the rest of the battalion, a mile east of the 
battery. 

The artillery commander docs not issue orders to tlie 
infantry commander. (See par. 583 I. D. R.) 



PART XIL— LIGHT ARTILLERY. 



A Battalion in Defense and Attack. 

GENERAL SITUATION. 

An invading Red carmy, based on Baltimore, has covering 
detachments on the line, Havre de Grace, Parkton, West- 
minster, Mount Airy. 

A Blue army is concentrating in the area, Carlisle, Harris- 
burg, York, Gettysburg. 

SPECIAL SITUATION. 

On the morning of October 28 a Blue force engaged in 
covering the Northern Central Railroad at Littlestown, 
marched to the support of a similar Blue force east of Taney- 
town, now menaced by superior Red forces advancing from 
the direction of Westminster. 

MARCH SITUATION. 

At 9 a. m. the situation was as follows: 

The Cavalry (Second Squadron, Second Cavahy) which 
had gone direct from Silver Run, leaving one-half of Troop 
G to continue reconnaissance toward Westminster, was, 
about a mile south of Big Pipe- Creek Mill, stopped by hostile 
cavalry on the hills to south and east. One-half of Troop G 
was, near road fork 516, stopped by hostile cavalrv on hill 
584. 

The Tenth Infantry, as a flank guard, had inarched by the 
road southeast of the railroad, and its advance party was 
at road fork 626, on the Piney Creek-Mayberry Road. 

The Fourth Infantry Brigade (less Tenth Infantry), the 
Second Battahon, Third Light Artillery, and the Fifth Ambu- 
lance Company marched by Gait. Its advance party was at 
road fork 545. 

A 10-minute rest was ordered. Cannonading had been 
heard for some time toward the south. Information had 
been received that there was no hostile movement north 
from Westminster. 

233 



234 STUDIES IN" MINOR TACTICS. 

A message had just arrived, reading as follows: 

Detachment First Division, Taneytown- 
Westminster Road, 1 Mile East or Taneytown, 

25 Oct. 15, 8.30 a. m. 
C. G. Det., 2d Div.: 

Enemy estimated at strength of a division. Advancing from Tyrone and 
Uniontown. He has begnn deployment in the valley of Bear Creek, the 
woods east of Trevanion, and the heights sonth of that place. His artillery 
has fired from a number of points, mostly in the direction of P^airview School, 
Weishaar's Mill, and Tyrone. A few shots came from the direction of May- 
berry. 
I am preparing to meet an attack on the line Oregon School-Stumptown. 

C, Brigadier General. 

ORDERS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FORCES. 

Gen. A, with his staff, Col. C, Eleventh Infantry, and artil- 
lery commander, Maj. K, was riding in rear of the support. 
After reading this message he galloped on past the support 
and advance party to the house at 571. Here the party dis- 
mounted, maps were oriented, locations determined, Gen. C's 
message read aloud, and Gen. A gave the following instruc- 
tions : 

I intend to attack the hostile right flank in the direction of that hill (584). 

The left flank guard will follow that road on the other side of that valley 
(576-490). 

The main column will go across country to the second road south of here, 
keeping out of sight from the country east of Big Pipe Creek, and then turn 
east. 

The artillery will at once take position, prepared to support the detach- 
ment, first division, and later our attack. 

I ride with the support for the present. 

PRELIMINARY ORDERS OF BATTALION COMMANDER. 

Upon receipt of his orders Maj. K called out, "Agents." 
They rode up. 

Corpl. X report to the brigade adjutant. 

Corpl. Y, take one scout with you and ride to the battalion at a gallop. 
You will follow the road running west from where the advance party rested 
to the main road west of the railroad track, there turn to your right. Leave 
the scout there as marker if the road is passable for the battalion; if it is not 
take him with you. 

The battalion is to come up at a trot by the way you are going if passable; 
otherwise, by the way we marched. Remain with it. 

Battery commanders and their reconnaissance parties come up at the 
gallop by the road we marched over. 

No orders for combat trains. 

Maj. K had the agent repeat the message and mark the 
route on his map. 



LIGHT ARTILLERY. 235 

At 9.10 a. m. the man started, as did the cohimn. At road 
corner 481 he told the scout to fall out and continued on, 
meeting the battalion at Washington, S. H., at 9.23 a. m. 
He delivered his message to Capt. D, who was leading the 
battahon and reported the road good. Capt. D signaled 
trot, and told his executive officer to follow the agent, while 
he turned out on the road to Gait with his reconnaissance 
party and sent a scout back along the road to warn the 
battery commanders to fall out with their reconnaissance 
parties and join him. At 9.26 a. m. all had joined, and the 
party set off at a gallop via Gait. 

Maj. K selected this road for the advance of the battalion 
because it was about the same distance as the one the cohimn 
was marching over, was surely safe, was probably quite as 
good, and led to a point, road fork 509, squarely in rear of 
the covering crest that would determine the position of the 
artillery, and from which two roads led to that crest. Time 
would be saved by not having to pass three or more detach- 
ments of infantry in a narrow road, and the infantry itself 
would not be delayed. 

RECONNAISSANCE BY THE BATTALION COMMANDER. 

P>om where he was Maj. K could see nothing of the country 
east of a line through the summit of hill 584, and he could 
see little of the valley west of that hill. A position further 
south must be sought. Tlie proposed lines of march of the 
columns, on Bashere Mill and the road leading down to 
Zimmerman- Mill, indicated the general location and direc- 
tion of their deployments. The crest, a mile east, was too 
far away to be considered, since time was important. A 
position farther to the south would not only be well located 
with reference to the line Zimmerman Mill, Bashere MiU, 
but also to the line Stumptown, Oregon School, and coopera- 
tion with the artillery of the other Blue force would be easier. 

Corpl. M (scout), you and N ride along this crest to the southwest and 
open each fence you come to, just below the crest on the west side. 

Maj. K rode along the crest to the southwest studying 
the country as he went. His adjutant, Capt. L, rode with 
him. The rest of the party kept abreast, but on the west 
slope and out of sight from enemy territory. At the south 
end of the woods on hill 587 he stopped for a more careful 
observation. From here he had an unobstructed view of 
the crest of the hills, 584 and 567, to the road over the east 
end of the latter, their western slopes down to about the 480 



236 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

contour, the line of the Stumptown-Orcgon School Road, 
of Stumptown, and parts of the valley east of that line. 

A better view might not be had, so far as he could judge 
from map and the terrain, and he decided at least to establish 
observation here. The long slopes to the west would afford 
ample room for the batteries, and any desired degree of 
defilade could be had. Guns at the fence on the west side 
of the field west of 576, for instance, would have flash defilade 
against hill 584 in the hostile territory, would be at least 
400 yards from the covering crest, and yet could clear the 
trees south of them at 2,000 yards range— 2,400 yards, allow- 
ing for the slope of the valley. 

The hostile artillery was apparently, for the most part, far 
to the southeast; but part of it Avould be certain to move 
to the support of that kno^vn to be in the vicinity of May- 
berry. It could readily occupy, unobserved, positions be- 
hind the hne 584-567. 

Capt. L, remain here with three of the scouts, and take the sector from 
Stumptown to that road (east end of hill 567), under observation. The 
rest of the party come with me. I shall reconnoiter fiu-ther. 

9.20 a. m. He then continued along the crest, comparing 
the changing view with what it was from where he left 
his adjutant. He noted that the view opened out to the 
east, but closed from the west. Finally, he went through 
the woods to hill 583. Here he found the view to the east 
limited to the country south of a line through the saddle 
584-567, by the woods east of 563. South of that line he 
had a fine view of the valley to a line through the northeast 
edge of the woods at Stumptown. 

This locality offered no advantage not possessed by the 
other, while it had some disadvantages, such as a lessened 
view of the valley in front of the Blue position. It was a 
bare, flat hill top, difficult for observers to use without 
attracting unwelcome hostile attention. The trees at the 
first place, too, might afford observation points 30 or 40 
feet above the ground, which would greatly extend the area 
otherwise visible. 

9.30 a. m. Maj. K to the two scouts with him: 

Remain here and keep those heights (pointing southeast) under observa- 
tion. Should you notice anything of importance, one of you will come and 
report to me; the other remaining in observation. 

. The woods to the southwest could be seen to extend to the 
neighborhood of the Taneytown-Stumptown Road. A posi- 
tion in those woods was to be avoided, while one to the south 
of them would greatly delay the entry of the artillery into 



LIGHT AETILLERY. 237 

action, would sacrifice the advantage of oblique fire in front 
of the Blue position, and would be rather too far from the 
line of advance of the Fourth Brigade. 

COMMUNICATION WITH THE DEFENSIVE POSITION. 

Information as to the dispositions of the detachment of the 
first division would be necessary, if cooperation with it was 
to be had. 

To Lieut. C, agent combat train: 

Headquarters of the detachment of the first division should be on or near 
this ridge, about a mile or so farther on [pointing]. Go there with your men 
and report to Gen. C as information officer. I want early information as to 
his dispositions, and those of the enemy. 

I will call up another agent to take your place here. 

Our position will be west of the saddle between hills 584 and 587. 

Maj. K rode rapidly back to 576, arriving there about 
9.35 a. m., as the battery commanders, with their recon- 
noissance parties, rode up to report. 

To Corpl. Z (agent) : 

Gallop down the road [pointing toward road fork 509]; meet the battalion 
and conduct it up this road. 

ASSIGNMENT OF BATTERIES TO POSITIONS. 

To the battery commanders: 

Battery D will go into position in the field just this side of that house 
[pointing to house surrounded by trees about 500 yards northwest], face 
about 20° east of south, right at the south fence. 

Battery E, on the left of D, left on the road. 

Battery F, north of the road, 100 yards from it and in line with flie others. 

All B. C. stations will be in the woods [pointing] near mine. 

Reconnaissance officers mark out the battery positions and see that they 
are occupied at once. Battery commanders come with me. 

Maj. K then rode to the rear of the woods, v/liere he and 
the battery commanders dismounted and walked to the 
position of the adjutant. The latter reported that no enemy 
had been seen, but that shrapnel had begun to burst along 
the Oregon S. H.-Stumptown line, which might mean an 
early infantry attack. 

ORDERS TO BATTERY COMMANDERS. 

The major rapidly oriented the B. C.'s on tlie terrain, 
issuing his orders at the same time. 

The enemy is reported as a division in strength. He has been deploying, 
for about an hour, to the south of that hill [pointing to 584], so that this 
infantry attack may be expected to develop at any time. 



238 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS. 

The detachment of the First Division is prepared to meet the attack on the 
line Oregon School-Stum ptown; you see buildings on that line [pointing 
to them]. 

Our flank guard is on that road just east of us. Our advance guard turns 
east on a road just south of those woods [pointing southwest]. 

Our cavalry was last reported on the north slope of those hills (584-567), 
stopped by superior hostile cavalry who hold those hills. 

Sectors of observation: 

Battery E: Stumptown, halfway to the summit of that hill (584). 

Battery F: From there to the house on the east slope of that hill (584). 

Battery D: To include the three roads crossing those hills (584-567). 

Battery D will establish an auxiliary observation station near the south- 
east corner of those woods [pointing to the southwest to hill 584]. 

Batteries will be prepared to fire into each other's sectors. 

Combat trains in the grass field west of the batteries and near the railroad. 

Targets will be reported, but no fire opened without my order. 

Report to me when ready. 

The Tenth and Eleventh Infantry,, now the flank, and 
advance guards would soon be deploying and information 
as to their dispositions and progress would be necessary. 
The view of the terrain in front of the Blue line was not 
all that could be desired if effective fire was to be opened 
upon it; the chances were good that some one of the spurs 
on the west side of Big Pipe Creek would afford a good view of 
it. The battahon reel was not needed, since the battery 
commanders were close to the battalion commander, and 
each had his own lines to his battery. 

Maj. K therefore issued the following additional orders: 

To Corpl. Z (agent) : 

Meet the combat train and conduct it to its position via the road the 
battalion followed. Tell the commander to send me a noncommissioned 
officer as agent, in place of Lieut. C, who is on other duty. 

INFORMATION OFFICERS AND OBSERVATION WITH THE ATTACK. 

To the adjutant: 

Capt. L, you will lay a wire from here, passing in rear of the batteries, 
and following the line of advance of the advance guard, to some point in the 
valley where a station can be established for relaying messages. After 
that, you will establish observation of the terrain in front of Gen. C's line. 
Take four battalion scouts. 

Take the reconnoissance officers of Batteries E and F with you, each with 
two scouts. Explain the situation to them as you go along, and attach 
them to the advance and flank guards as information officers. 

At 9.45 a. m. the occupation of the position was comj^lete, 
except, for the establishment of the auxihary and signal 
stations by Capt. L. The combat train was nearing Wash- 
ington schoolhouse. 

Maj. K so reported to Gen. A. 

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